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NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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MAJID ABU SHARAR DISCUSSES REAGAN, U.S. POLICY

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 13 Nov 80 p 21

[Interview with Majid Abu Sharar, official Fatah spokesman, by AL-QABAS's correspondent in Beirut shortly after the election of Reagan: "Reagan Is No Different From Carter, and There Is No Solution Other Than By Threatening America's Interests"]

[Text] Mr Majid Abu Sharar, an official Palestinian spokesman and a member of the Central Committee of the Palestinian National Liberation Movement (Fatah), assures us that the PLO does not expect any change in American policy during the presidency of Ronald Reagan in the coming 4 years because this policy will be an extension of Carter's policy.

In a special interview with AL-QABAS only hours after Reagan was declared the winner in America's presidential elections, he said that the American of Ronald Reagan will not retreat from its policy with regard to international detente, disarmament, and the signing of the SALT II treaty. This Palestinian official also said that he expected the United States to continue with its Camp David policy. Mr Abu Sharar considers that any change in the Middle East will have to begin with a threatening of America's interests there since threatening these interests may create new circumstances in the Middle East which would force the United States to change its policy.

In answer to a question about what the PLO expects after Reagan's victory, he said that the PLO will be facing more pressure by Arabs, the Americans will try to make contact with certain groups of Palestinians just like they did previously in an attempt to dilute the position [taken by the Palestinians], Israel will continue to deal blows to the Palestinian revolution and to its bases in the south of Lebanon, and the United States, by sticking to its Camp David policy, will continue to weaken the position taken by the Arabs.

The member of the Central Committee of Fatah stated that the Palestinian resistance movement does not expect Israel to deal a crushing blow in Lebanon as a result of the American elections. Instead, the Palestinian resistance organizations expect a continuation of daily Israeli operations conducted against the Palestinians resistance groups.

He expressed his belief that Lebanon will not be partitioned. He said that there is an Israeli-Phalangist plan which has, as an objective, the setting up of a Maronite state which would be allied with Israel and would include most of Lebanon. Here is the full text of the interview:

[Question] How does the PLO assess Carter's loss and Reagan's victory, especially with regard to the Middle East crisis?

[Answer] The United States is ruled by its establishment and not by an individual. When we review America's policy during the last 20 years, we cannot say that this or that president has had a policy of his own. It would be more correct to say that it is the American establishment which has a clear and fixed policy. If there has been any distinction, then this has been a result of the ability of this or that president to present American policy as it has been set by the American establishment—and not as it has been set by this or that president.

It is a well-known fact that in America it is the large industrial concerns, think-tanks, and universities which formulate American policy and then present it to the president for him to implement it. For this reason we should not expect any basic change in American policy during Reagan's administration. Quite the contrary, this period of time will witness a continuation of Carter's policy. And if there will be any changes, they will not be basic changes. If anyone believes that America will retreat or turn its back on matters such as detente, disarmament, or the signing of the SALT II agreement, then he is mistaken, because whatever was begun by the previous administration will be furthered by the new administration. Also, whoever believes that there will be a change in American policy concerning Camp David or toward our area of the world concerning solving the Middle East crisis and the Palestine question, he is also mistaken. Reagan's policy will be a continuation of Carter's policy.

[Question] Do you not believe that Reagan's victory means that one is now less able to count on a European initiative to solve the Middle East crisis?

[Answer] It is well known that the European initiative can never get anywhere without the blessing and consent of America, whether it be the America of Reagan or the America of Carter. This is because one cannot at all separate the policy of Western Europe from the policy of the United States. Western Europe's policy is a natural extension of America's policy.

For this reason, if we want a change in America's policy toward the Palestine question and toward the Middle East issue, then this change will definitely not come from Washington and will not come from Reagan. The change will have to come from our area of the world. Perhaps the Iranian model is a good model to study concerning ways of dealing with America. What I mean is, it is necessary to deal with American interests in the Middle East and it is necessary to threaten these interests in order to force America to change its policy with regard to the Palestine question and the Middle East crisis.

This, in the end, will lead the broad masses of people in America to realize that Israel is no longer the base from which America's interests in the area are protected. As a consequence of this, the ruling establishment in America will decide that Israel no longer deserves the support and backing that it is receiving from America's ruling establishment.

So the problem is not Carter, Reagan, or America. The problem is here in the Arab Middle East. The problem is that our Arab leaders are placing their destinies in the hands of the United States and then expecting America to give them support against Israel, which is the country which is protecting America's interests. This is both unreasonable and illogical.

America has only one policy, and it rests on one, single foundation. It is the protection of American interests in the Middle East and the continued pursuit of these interests.

The only thing that will change the situation is to threaten American interests in the area. When the Arab liberation movement, in particular the Palestinian resistance movement, comes to the point of creating a broad unified front which is able to deal with American interests in the area, threaten them, and strike a blow at them, then this will lead to the creation of new circumstances which will force America to change its policy. But unless the Arab liberation movement and the Palestinian resistance movement seize the initiative and do this, then there is no hope for even the most insignificant change in America's policy concerning the Palestine question.

Reagan and the Palestine Question

[Question] Do you not think that Ronald Reagan, the new American president, will be more of a hard-liner with regard to the Palestine question?

[Answer] The question of whether or not Reagan will be more of a hard-liner than Carter resembles, to a great degree, remarks such as: "Begin is more of a hard-liner than Shimon Peres."

Is there any significant difference, concerning Israel's general policy, between Peres and Begin? Without a doubt there are no significant differences between them. The difference is only one of methods and tactics. This also applies to Reagan and Carter. Carter has been one of the American presidents who has been most opposed to the PLO, the Palestinian people, and their just cause. In this regard, his policy has been an extension of the policy of Gerald Ford and that of Nixon before him. And Reagan will pursue a policy which is an extension of the policy of those presidents. So the change, as I have said, will not come from America.

[Question] What does the PLO expect to see during the administration of the new American president, Ronald Reagan?

[Answer] First of all, the PLO will face more pressure from pro-American Arabs who will be singing their old tune, which is: "We must give the new American president the opportunity to study the facts concerning the Middle East question." Usually this study of the Middle Eastern question takes between 1 and 2 years. During that time, additional pressure will be put on the Palestinian resistance movement, and more effort will be made to weaken and dismember the movement as well as to plant more agents in its ranks and more illusions in the heads of the leaders of the movement. This effort will be made in order to create circumstances in which America, pro-American Arabs in the area, and Israel can impose a pax americana which will continue to serve American interests and will further the survival and continuation of Israel as the strongest power in the area.

Secondly, the Americans will once again make the attempt, as they have done during previous periods, to get in touch with some of the groups of Palestinians which are marginally associated with the Palestinian resistance movement. They will do this in order to use them as a means of making contact with the leaders of the Palestinian resistance movement in order to try once again to dilute the positions taken by the leaders of the Palestinian revolution. They will try to make them believe that a new American policy toward the Middle East can be expected.

While all of this goes on, Israel will continue pursuing its operations to annihilate the Palestinian revolution and its bases in southern Lebanon. It will do this in order to attempt to create circumstances in Lebanon which will allow forces which are hostile to the Palestinian revolution in Lebanon to smash and liquidate it.

Also during this time period there will be an increase in the strength of the trend which is hostile to the fact that the Palestinian revolution maintains relations with the socialist camp. We must admit that, during the past 2 years, this trend has had an influence on the relations of the Palestinians with the socialist camp, and the result has been that our relations with the socialist countries are no longer as strong and stable as they were in previous years.

This has happened because more pressure has been put on the Palestinian resistance movement and because the Palestinian resistance movement has failed to take clear positions concerning some of the issues which have arisen in the Middle East during the last few years. This has led to a cooling off of relations, and forces which are hostile to the Palestinian people--that is, the pro-American Arabs--are now going to try to apply more pressure in an effort to weaken these relations so that they will eventually be shattered.

Furthermore, America will stick to its Camp David policy in an effort to further weaken the position taken by the Arabs. The aim will be to weaken the overall Arab position, especially after the Iran-Iraq war.

The Autonomy Negotiations

[Question] What will be the effect of the result of the American elections on the autonomy negotiations, on the probability that an Egyptian-Israeli-American summit conference will be held, and on the probability that Israel will deal a crushing blow to southern Lebanon?

[Answer] I do not believe that Israel will deal a crushing blow to Lebanon. However, I do believe that there will be a continuation of Israel's daily military operations against the Palestinian resistance movement. The aim of this will be to keep the resistance movement in a position where it has to defend itself so that it will not be capable of taking the initiative and engaging in offensive operations against Israel. The ultimate aim behind these Israeli actions will be to create an accumulation of adverse conditions in the Lebanese arena which will, according to plans made by Israel, result in the creation of a situation in Lebanon where it is no longer possible to accommodate the Palestinians there.

The question of autonomy relates not to Israel, Egypt, or America. It basically relates to the Palestinians themselves. So far no Israeli or Egyptian authorities have been able to muster up any Palestinian organizations which will take up the matter of autonomy. Perhaps the negotiations between Israel and Egypt will be successful, but they will never find any group of Palestinians which is prepared to deal with those who have made the agreement.

It is primarily a political question, and not a question of autonomy. Are there Palestinians who are prepared to negotiate a settlement on the basis of the Camp David agreements or not? If there are such Palestinians—and it would be extremely difficult to find them—then this means that the Camp David policy has been a success. But if there are not such Palestinians, then this means that even if the Egyptians and Israelis reach full agreement concerning the question of autonomy, they will still not be able to successfully implement Palestinian autonomy.

Total Disruption of Security

[Question] In light of recent developments relating to security which have taken place in 'Ayn al-Rummanah, do the leaders of the Palestinian resistance movement anticipate a total disruption of security in Lebanon?

[Answer] First of all, we should not disregard Israeli ambitions which are in collusion with Phalangist ambitions to impose the domination and hegemony of the Phalangist Party over all of Lebanon, the aim being to create a sectarian Maronite entity which will be closely allied with Israel.

If we review all of the steps which have been taken since the events at al-Safra on 7 July until today, we will find that the plans which have been made to accomplish this have been making steady progress and have been achieving the expected success. We must admit that the eastern region now is being ruled by one single group. This group has been able to eliminate all forms of group fragmentation and has been able to create a means by which it alone rules, is able to regulate affairs in its region, and is able to provide citizens living in its area with what they need for their everyday lives. On the other hand, central authority is either lacking or has to collaborate with the Phalangists. In addition to this, for the last 3 years our front has been marking time. The matter of each group providing for its own security was brought up more than 2 years ago, and so far the matter has not even been seriously discussed. At the same time, Lebanese and Palestinian groups are continuing to appeal to the central authorities to impose their hegemony and to undertake their duty of maintaining security in all areas of Lebanon. But in the face of the events at 'Ayn al-Rummanah, they have not been able to act. So how can we expect them to act in the case of an area such as western Beirut? In our area, the actions taken by the Phalangists are proceeding steadily and according to plan. Our area should make its own plan, based on providing for its own security, and based on regulating and determining its relationship to the Palestinians and the Syrians. The result would be the creation of a new situation in which we could steadfastly oppose the plans made by the Phalangists and Zionists to engulf all of Lebanon.

There may be those who will say that it is the Palestinians who are erecting barriers which prevent the accomplishment of this. We will also find people who say that it is the Syrians who are throwing up such obstacles. The truth is that neither the Syrians nor the Palestinians bear the basic responsibility for implementing this plan which is needed. What is needed is for the Lebanese National Movement to initiate the first step and to approach the Palestinian resistance movement and the Syrians and assign them their responsibilities.

Sadat...and the Partition of Lebanon

[Question] The president of Egypt, Anwar al-Sadat, considers that Lebanon, in fact, has been partitioned and that Pierre al-Jumayyil is going to set up a Christian state. Do you consider that Lebanon has become partitioned, and that the trend of events is one which will favor the proclamation of a Phalangist petty state?

[Answer] I do not believe that the Phalangists are working toward the partition of Lebanon. What they are striving toward is to impose their hegemony over all of Lebanon and to create a new Maronite entity which will be totally allied with the Israeli entity in Palestine. Partitioning Lebanon would not at all help in the creation of the Maronite state which the Phalangists want and which would be allied with Israel.

Setting up a Maronite entity in only a part of Lebanese territory would not create the circumstances which would guarantee that this entity would continue and survive, whereas the setting up of a Maronite entity in all of Lebanon, with the Maronites in complete control and totally allied with Israel, would guarantee that this entity would survive and would continue.

For this reason, I am not one of those who believe that the objective of the Phalangists is to partition Lebanon. I believe that their aim is to achieve total control over all of Lebanon's territory so that a sectarian Maronite Lebanon, together with Israel, would constitute a strip of coastal territory which would be tantamount to a cohesive front which would be in opposition to the Arab nation.

This is how we should view the matter. Those who believe in the illusion of partition, who are relaxing because they think that their areas are far away from the territory to be partitioned, or believe that there are no people from the Maronite sect who have infiltrated the ranks of their sects and who live among them--such people are suffering from illusions because it is the objective of the Phalangists to establish total control over all of Lebanese territory.

Their aim is to extend their state from the border with Syria, north of Tripoli, all the way to an open border with Israel.

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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

INCREASED ARAB-FRENCH TRADE REPORTED FOR 1979

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 23 Oct 80 p 14

[Article: "France's 1979 Trade Volume With Arab World Is 102 Billion Francs; Kuwait's Exports to France Amount to 2.7 Billion Francs"]

[Text] France's trade with the Arab world witnessed noticeable increase in 1979. The value of this trade amounted to 102.1 billion francs, with an increase of 33 percent over the preceding year--an increase percentage never realized before, not even in the busiest years.

This increase came as a result of a rise in both imports and exports. The increase in imports amounted to nearly 35 percent and in exports to nearly 29 percent.

The value of France's trade with the Arab world amounted to more than 62 billion francs in 1974 and dropped by eight percent in the following year to nearly 57.2 billion francs. But this trade volume rose again in 1976 and 1977 by 24 percent in each year to reach 80.4 billion francs. In 1978, this volume dropped by four percent to 77.1 billion francs.

If we examine the percentage represented by the Arab world's trade with France to France's total international trade, we will find that 1979 represents a transformation in the contradictory tendency of this percentage which amounted in the period from 1974 to 1978 to 13.1 percent, 12.6 percent, 12.4 percent, 12.2 percent and 10.8 percent successively and then rose to 11.7 percent in 1979.

These tendencies indicate that last year represents a turning point in France's trade with the Arab world, considering that this trade rose [in 1979] by a large degree and that, at the same time, the percentage of this trade in comparison to the total volume of France's foreign trade rose after a long period of decline.

Trade Deficit

The French trade balance has been suffering from a constant deficit since 1974. This deficit rose to 34.4 billion francs, of which 25.9 billions or 75 percent were incurred in trade with the Arab world alone. This deficit then started to fluctuate, reaching 37.8 billion francs last year. Of this deficit, 58 percent was incurred in trade with the Arab world alone. This means that despite the rise in the absolute figure of the deficit in the French balance of trade with the Arab countries, the deficit versus other countries of the world has risen at higher rates, thus leading to a relatively smaller deficit versus the Arab countries.

The French balance of trade faces a big deficit versus the Arab oil exporting countries in the Arab East. Arranged according to the deficit volume, these countries are: Saudi Arabia with 19.7 billion francs, Iraq with 10.9 billion francs, the UAE with 3.7 billion francs, Qatar with 1.5 billion francs and Kuwait with 880 million francs. This means that the French trade balance with these five countries suffers from a deficit of nearly 36.7 billion francs. This figure is close to the figure of French balance of trade deficit against the rest of the world in 1979, a deficit amounting to nearly 37.8 billion francs.

Excluding these five Arab countries, France's balance of trade with the remaining Arab countries realized a surplus ranging from 42 million francs with Syria to nearly 3.5 billion francs with Algeria. However, the noticeable surplus realized by this balance is concentrated fundamentally with four countries of the Arab Maghreb, namely Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia with which the surplus in France's balance of trade amounted altogether in 1979 to nearly 12 billion francs, compared to 10.3 billion francs in 1978.

Exporting and Importing Countries

Saudi Arabia and Iraq share together 62.3 percent of France's imports from the Arab countries. The value of the French imports from these two countries amounted to nearly 21.3 billion and 14.2 billion francs successively in 1979. The value of the Saudi exports to France in 1979 witnessed an increase of nearly 32.8 percent whereas the increase in the value of Iraq's exports amounted to 50.7 percent.

Following these two countries in the value of exports to France are a number of countries, each with 1979 exports to France ranging in value from one billion francs to a little over 5 billion francs. These countries are: The UAE with exports of 5.2 billion francs, Algeria with 4.7 billion francs, Morocco with 2.8 billion francs, Kuwait with 2.7 billion francs, Libya with 2.6 billion francs, Qatar with 2.2 billion francs and Tunisia and Syria with 1.3 and 1.2 billion francs successively.

It is to be noted that all these countries, with the exception of Morocco, Tunisia and Syria, are oil exporting countries.

One of the most significant phenomena connected with France's imports from the Arab countries in 1979 is the increase in its imports from Kuwait, amounting to nearly 2.7 billion francs compared to nearly 1.3 billion francs in 1978, i.e. with an increase of about 127 percent, at a time when France's imports from the Arab countries collectively did not increase by more than 35 percent.

Another phenomenon worth noting is the increased role played by the Arab countries in meeting France's needs of a number of commodities, led by oil. France's imports from the Arab countries compared to its imports from the world rose from nearly 12.4 percent in 1978 to 13.6 percent in 1979. This same fact is confirmed by the increase of 35 percent in France's imports from the Arab world in 1979 compared to an increase of only 23 percent in the value of its total imports during the year.

Exports to Arab Countries

This is insofar as the French imports from the Arab countries are concerned. As for France's exports to the Arab countries, Algeria tops the list of Arab countries

importing from France, considering that its imports from France amounted to 8.2 billion francs in 1979, with an increase of nearly 19 percent over 1979.

The next six places on the list of Arab countries importing from France in 1979 are occupied by the following: Morocco with imports of nearly 6 billion francs, Saudi Arabia with 4.7 billion francs, Egypt with 3.7 billion francs, Iraq with 3.4 billion francs, Tunisia with 3.3 billion francs and Libya with 2.8 billion francs. These six countries thus shared nearly 59 percent of France's exports to the Arab countries in 1979. If we add to these imports Algeria's share which amounts to nearly 20.5 percent, the share of these seven countries thus amounts to nearly 80 percent of France's exports to the Arab countries.

It is to be noted that the Arab market showed bigger demand for French commodities in 1979, considering that France increased its exports to the Arab countries by 28.9 percent during the year whereas its total exports to the world rose by only 20.8 percent.

Among the Arab countries which increased their imports from France by high rates in 1979 are Oman with an increase of 109 percent, Qatar and Kuwait with an increase of 95 percent each, and Jordan with an increase of 80 percent.

Arab Oil in Return for French Machinery and Equipment

Oil tops indisputably the list of French imports from the Arab countries, considering that France imported nearly 57.3 billion francs' worth of Arab oil in 1979. This sum represents about 92.5 percent of France's total imports from the Arab countries compared to 42 billion francs, or 91.6 percent of its total imports from the Arab countries, in 1978.

The major part of the Arab exports to France consists of crude oil and the remaining part is shared by other kinds of exports that are no more than raw materials, such as salt, phosphate, sulfur and some metals, in addition to some fruits and vegetables. This is the distinguishing characteristic of the developing countries' exports to the advanced industrial countries--exports consisting fundamentally of primary and raw materials.

France's exports to the Arab countries are less concentrated [more diversified] than its imports. The most important items of the French exports are machinery and equipment which share no less than 20 percent of the total exports. They are followed by cars which represent about 10.6 percent of the exports, iron and steel which amount to 10.3 percent and then by electrical equipment and appliances with 8.8 percent. Air and naval aviation equipment and instruments share 4.7 percent and four percent of the exports successively. Thus, machinery and equipment, electrical equipment, iron and steel and the means of transportation share nearly 60 percent of France's total exports to the Arab countries.

The rest of France's exports to these countries are embodied in food products, such as milk and its derivatives, grains, flour products, pharmaceutical products and visual equipment.

Maritime Transport Equipment

Even though this equipment amounted to no more than 8.7 percent of the total imports from France, this percentage is still considered relatively large

when compared to the similar percentage of the preceding year which amounted to no more than 2.4 percent. Moreover, the absolute figures for these imports realized big increases in 1979--increases amounting to 463 percent for naval equipment and 296 percent for air equipment. These phenomena confirm that the Arab countries constituted a market with high demand for French naval and air transportation means and equipment in 1979.

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NORTH AFRICA, ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE ON EEC

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 14 Nov 80 p 14

[Article: "North African Countries Threatened by Dangers of Economic Dependence on the European Common Market; The Entry of Spain, Portugal and Greece Into the Market Harmful to Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco"]

[Text] The relationship between the countries of North Africa (Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria) and the European Common Market falls in one way or another within the framework of the general relationship between the rich and poor countries or, more clearly, between the Northern bloc and the Southern bloc. Political and economic experiences have established that the scale tips predominantly towards the industrial countries in view of what the latter enjoys in the way of wealth and industrial and technological capabilities which give them the final word and make them the holders of the profit card in the international economic game.

It would not be rash to say that a complete lack of balance prevails over the relationship between the bloc of the European Common Market and countries of North Africa, especially after the efforts aimed at expanding the membership of this Market to include Greece, Portugal, Spain, and at a subsequent date, Turkey. The possibility of the expansion of the Market's membership has had its clear effects on the ties between the Common Market and North Africa.

The recent visit of Mr. Raymond Barre to Tunis granted the opportunity to Tunisian officials to express their anxiety in the face of the possible European action.

It clearly appears that the appeasement measures that Mr Raymond Barre presented to the Tunisian officials in the name of France as a member of the Common Market will not necessarily be accompanied by practical actions. And this is while France presented assurances this past July to the Spanish authorities that there is nothing of note to prevent the entrance of Spain into the Common Market, and that this matter may include Portugal, Greece, and Turkey.

The fears of the officials in Tunis are not singular in nature, but rather are the same feelings that are harbored by leaders in both Rabat and Algiers.

Therefore, light can be shed here on the relationship of North Africa with the European Common Market in an initial stage, and then after the possibility of the expansion of the membership of the European Common Market in a second stage,

in an attempt to search for the suitable solutions or, subsequently, to conceive of a rationality for the relationships between the two blocs. Is there then another future view towards a departure from the dependence on the Common Market, especially after the appearance of the first indications of a change in the strategy and tactics of the Tunisian authorities?

Economic Dependence

An attempt to shed light on the relationship of the European Common Market with the countries of North Africa may lead to a questioning of the basis of mutual relations and subsequently the paths to be followed on this course. Without a doubt the observer will definitely arrive at a questioning of the complete economic dependence which prevails over the relationships between the two blocs, especially in commercial exchange, since these countries have cast all their interest and directed all their powers toward the Common Market hoping to find a solution to the marketing of their goods. However, the transactions which these countries pursue with the Group of Nine are marked by individualism and there is no coordinated strategy for a course of action among the Three Nations in business relations. The intensity of the crisis and the breach between the two blocs increases with the increase in the intensity of the international crisis and the influence which the latter imposes at this level of relations.

The issue becomes increasingly aggravated as the Three Nations produce almost the same goods which are sent to the Common Market, which demonstrates the lack of coordination and planning among the Three Nations. If we examine their trade relations we would first question the form of the exchange and the dependence and the lack of coordination between Rabat, Algiers, and Tunis. Algeria imports from the European Common Market industrial equipment, half-finished goods, spare parts, mechanical and electrical devices, chemical products, textiles, pharmaceutical goods, light cars, and household appliances. In the agricultural field Algeria imports from the Market wheat, vegetable oils and sugar, and Algeria exports solely to the Common Market crude oil, converted petroleum products, and natural gas. As for Rabat, she follows almost the same commercial policy in importing chemical and pharmaceutical products, photographic equipment, textiles, industrial equipment and wheat, and exports agricultural products such as citrus fruits in addition to some mineral products such as phosphate and manganese.

Tunis follows the same path as her business relations in the agricultural field with the European Common Market total almost 90 percent of her production.

Thus it can be said that the nations of the Arab West live in the vortex of complete dependence and what comes with this dependence is the way of negative effects upon the economy of these nations. Thus the decline in the past few years of commercial relations between Tunis and the European Common Market has caused a general economic mess in Tunisia.

The Effects of Expanding the Market

There is no doubt that the countries of North Africa will be affected in one way or another by the expansion of the membership of the Common Market because the countries whose incorporation is imminent such as Spain, Portugal, Greece and perhaps Turkey, produce nearly the same products which Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco export, especially in the agricultural field.

Accompanying this expansion will be more expansive statistical measures guaranteeing the new countries in the Market that their goods will flow freely within the Market, and perhaps attempt to apply pressure on the Nine Countries to cease business relations with North Africa.

All indications are that Spain, Portugal, and Greece will soon enter the Market. The "Unified European Council" has recently decided in Brussels that European investment banks will provide aid to Spain until she is prepared to enter the Common Market.

Thus it can be said that the countries of North Africa are struggling in a bad situation with the European Common Market, especially since established protocol becomes compounded with the ties of Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco to the Market and subsequently the protectionary policy which increases with a worsening of these ties.

But clearly this policy may not grant a departure from the dependence inasmuch as to give them a complete freedom of choice in the world markets, and especially the European Common Market.

Tunisia, however, has begun to change her policy in the recent past. For Tunisia has gradually become responsive to the Arab markets and may increase that response with new banks which are to be opened such as the Tunisian-Kuwaiti Bank and the Tunisian-Saudi Bank. Is this a transition phase or a change in the manner of business relations, especially with the European Common Market? And will the Arab market become the alternative?

9785
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ALGERIA REPUTEDLY BARGAINING WITH SPAIN FOR MOROCCAN TERRITORIES

Casablanca LIBERATION in French 21-27 Nov 80 p 4

[Article--passages between slantlines originally published in boldface]

[Text] Are the Moroccan territories still under Spanish domination presently the object of negotiations between Algiers and our neighbors to the north? This is a serious question in light of the visit of a PSOE delegation led by Felipe Gonzol to Algeria. During the visit, the two sides reiterated their positions on Moroccan Sahara. Nothing new. The views of the PSOE and Algiers are well known, and there have been no changes. So this was not the aspect of their discussions which drew attention. It was what was said about Sebta and Mellilia that was new...and disturbing. The POSE--must we spell it out?—denies the Moroccan-ness of Sebta and Mellilia. It considers them a part of Spain. Has it succeeded in getting the Algerian leaders to share this view? One sentence from the FLN [National Liberation Front Party of Algeria]-PSOE joint communique is arresting: /"the two delegation,"/ it is said therein—/"reaffirm their support for the territorial integrity of the countries bordering"/ on the Mediterranean and /"consider that any interference constitutes a threat to peace in the Mediterranean basin and in the world."/ Why is this sentence significant? It does not concern the Middle East, which is treated in another paragraph of the joint communique. The question of the liberation of Sebta and Mellilia is a subject which is increasingly being raised in Morocco.

Spanish officials are taking positions on an increasing number of aspects of this problem. It can be said that this question is now on the agenda. The PSOE misses no opportunity to deny Morocco the right to recover the territories still colonized by Madrid. As for Algiers, this would not be the first attack it has made on the territorial integrity of Morocco. In the past it recognized the Moroccan-ness of the so-called Western Sahara. But it did not hesitate to ally itself with Franco to impede the Sahara's return to Morocco. When its plan failed thanks to the decisive struggle of the Moroccan people, it opted for blackmail and pressure. It created a separatist movement in the Canaries and offered it the antennae of its national radio. It practiced piracy and the kidnapping of Spanish fishermen. It used all this to negotiate recognition for the POLISARIO that it created, financed, armed, trained, and hurled against Morocco. It must be admitted that this method has had considerable success: Spain's position has altered to the benefit of the Algerian propositions. However the means utilized have up to now been limited. In Spain, the blackmail is beginning to be resisted. There

seems to be a reluctance to go any further down Algeria's road. The PSOE itself seems to show some nervousness in the wake of the increasing inspections of fishing boats and kidnapping of fishermen. It has gone so far as to condemn these terrorists actions. Algiers, therefore, could only fear any change in the Spanish positions. It is bringing out a new edition of a method already well-known, as it was used in the fishermen affair. It first turns to the PSOE and makes overtures. The negotiations begin. Other political organizations are brought into it. This time the overture could be alluring. Who in Spain—apart from the truly anti-colonialist organizations—would not joyfully welcome an Algerian position hostile to the recovery of Sebta and Mellilia by Morocco?

As for Algiers, what could prevent it from making this gift to Madrid in exchange for a new position supporting its positions on Moroccan Sahara? Certainly not the principles involved, at any rate. These latter are only invoked to achieve hegemonist objectives. Did it not in the past recognize the Moroccan-ness of the Sahara? Still, it did not hesitate to repudiate its positions and instigate plots against the territorial unity of Morocco.

Up to now, it has not denied—at least publicly—Morocco's right to recover Sebta and Mellilia. But for some years it has had nothing to say on the subject. Its silence is calculated. There will be some surprises when the day comes that that silence is broken. This is why it is imperative to follow Algeria's actions closely in light of the latest visit of Felipe Gonzales to Algeria.

9516

CSO: 4400

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

REASONS FOR JORDAN'S SIDING WITH IRAQ EXPLORED

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 15 Oct 80 pp 1, 12-13

[Article by Ibrahim Abu-Nab: "Why Is Jordan Helping Iraq; Artificial Satellites Watched Port of al-'Aqabah After Taking Leave From Gulf War; War Planned to Be Stopped on Seventh Day But International Sides Fueled It With Spare Parts; Saddam Inquired of al-Husayn in Middle of Night About Secret Behind Propaganda Concentration on Jordan; Al-Husayn Befriended Shah to Avert His Dangers From Gulf; Palestinian Representation in Tehran Similar to Jordanian Representation; Foreign Officers Visited Baghdad as Journalists During War"]

[Text] A foreign reporter, while spreading his map on a wall and examining the area around Shatt al-'Arab carefully, said to a colleague: "Hell, I cannot find the port of al-'Aqabah." The colleague laughed loudly and said: "The Jordanian port of al-'Aqabah is not in Shatt al-'Arab area, stupid. It is at the tip of the Gulf of al-'Aqabah in the Red Sea."

When the veteran journalist saw the embarrassment of the inexperienced journalist who had come from a small newspaper in central Australia, he patted the young journalist on the shoulder in consolation, saying: "Never mind, many others who have listened to the radios hurriedly have imagined that the war has been transferred from the port of al-Muhammarah and the port of Abadan to the port of al-'Aqabah which is hundreds of miles away. I do not blame you for looking for the Jordanian port of al-'Aqabah in Shatt al-'Arab."

Both those who know and those who don't know where the port of al-'Aqabah is imagined last week that the battle is about to move to the port of al-'Aqabah. In Washington, reporters were asking U.S. Secretary of State Edmund Muskie at his press conference about the port of al-'Aqabah, the number of ships anchored in it, their nationality, the number of Soviet ships among them and whether those ships were unloading weapons and munitions for Iraq. The reporters were also asking Muskie about the number of other Soviet ships in high seas heading for the port of al-'Aqabah and whether they were carrying weapons for Iraq. They also asked him whether it was true that Jordan has sent 40,000 troops to Iraq and also asked him about the U.S. administration's position vis-a-vis Jordan's support for Iraq.

It seemed last week as if the foreign broadcasting stations and papers had no concern other than to convey what the artificial satellites were saying about the port of al-'Aqabah and the ships anchored in it and heading for it. It even seemed as if the artificial satellites themselves had taken a leave from the task of gazing at the Gulf war and started to gaze in the direction of al-'Aqabah and

Jordan. The matter reached the point where it is said that Iraqi President Saddam Husayn contacted his friend King Husayn by telephone after midnight and found him awake with his military commanders to keep up with the latest developments and so he asked the king about the meaning and significance of the propaganda concentration on Jordan.

Cold Water

Naturally, it is not difficult to guess what sort of discussion took place between the two Arab leaders in light of the official statement issued in Baghdad to deny that any Jordanian or non-Jordanian forces have taken part in the battle which Iraq is waging against Iran. This statement dumped a bucket of cold water on the Israeli and Zionist propaganda machine which has been working overtime and has been overheating in its focus on Iraq and the battle.

The foreign correspondents, like Israel, have been asking: "How can peace be defended by expanding the war? How can the Jordanian monarch say that he wants to achieve peace and to spare the blood of Iran on the one hand and of the Arab nation on the other when he is calling for expanding the war through the participation of all the Arab countries in it? Isn't it better for Jordan to mediate between Iran and Iraq if it really wants to realize peace or to stand neutral, at least, instead of joining Iraq against the Iran of the 'Islamic revolution'?"

This is what the foreign correspondents and Israel's radio, which has suddenly donned the frock of Islam and adopted, it seems, Khomeini's principles, are asking. There is also another question that is raised by Israel's radio, by foreign commentators and by some Arabs who know and who don't know.

This question is: Why was King Husayn a "friend" of the shah's Iran which used to supply Israel with oil and had commercial and economic relations with Israel and why has he become an "enemy" of Khomeini's Iran that has cut off oil supplies to Israel, has severed its diplomatic relations with Israel and has given Israel's embassy in Tehran to the PLO?

Jordanian Theory

King Husayn has answered most of these questions on the local Jordanian television screen and the international television screens. What remains unanswered is what is classified as "state secrets" or as "very confidential." However, what remains unanswered can be guessed or one may venture to read it in a cup of coffee or in King Husayn's palm, as palm readers do.

First, King Husayn is not calling for continuation or expansion of the war between Iraq and Iran but quite the opposite. However, the Jordanian monarch's theory for putting an end to the war is not based on the popular theories that are propagated by the suspect information media and that deceive the semi-educated in strategic affairs. This theory, according to a prominent Jordanian military observer, is the outcome of a strategic assessment of the situation in which the high-ranking Jordanian commanders, forming what may be called the Jordanian national security council, have participated.

This theory says: "Regardless of the reasons and causes of the war, this war has actually erupted. Regardless of whatever is said about this war being a limited war, the characteristics of a limited war do not apply to it because a limited war is war that erupts between two parties, one of whom is so militarily superior to the other that he can hit the joints of the other party quickly, can paralyze him and can render him incapable of any action. The June 1967 war between the Arabs and the Israeli enemy was this kind of war."

Perhaps Iraq had almost managed to make it a limited war in what we have previously called the seven-day war when Saddam Husayn declared on the seventh day of the war realization of the campaign's goals and when he offered Iran, which seemed to have been hit in its joints, peace and detente. But the war did not come to an end because numerous international parties began to supply Iran directly or through intermediaries. It was mentioned at the time that Israel had sent spare parts to Iran through the Netherlands and through Japanese and North Korean assistance.

I personally do not find it unlikely that South Africa's or Taiwan's name will crop up in this regard as long as Israel has strong military cooperation with these two countries, especially in the nuclear sphere.

Officer Journalists

The party that breaks the limited war is the party that wants a war to expand in order to include numerous parties and to turn into a war by proxy nurtured by these parties for their own interests or the interests of whoever is behind them.

It is no secret that a number of the high-ranking military officers of various foreign countries are reporting to the Iraqi information center in al-Mansur Hotel carrying press cards. For example, the British DAILY TELEGRAPH sent a retired former major general in the British army who has taught military principles to numerous Arab and non-Arab military officers [as its correspondent].

One of these officer "journalists" has said that the only way to establish quick peace in the Gulf area is to cut off military supplies to both sides and to let them fight each other until one of them scores a decisive victory over the other. However, this officer adds: But this is impossible because of the intricate political conditions. Therefore, the only practical way to stop the fighting lies in enabling the victor to complete his victory quickly without providing an opportunity for the numerous sides that want to prolong the war and to diversify its means.

These officer journalists say that they can understand why the Jordanian monarch has opted for Iraq to have the upper hand and why he is urging the other Arabs and the friendly international sides to adopt the same position not only for national reasons but also for practical, security and international reasons and for purely Jordanian reasons. Iraq forms a strategic depth for Jordan and can offer Jordan a lot more than Jordan can offer Iraq. By urging the other Arab states to adopt the same position, the Jordanian monarch is working to establish peace in the area and to keep its windows closed in the face of the stormy winds blowing from every direction. Splitting the Arab states into supporters and opponents of Iraq and into vacillating states means prolonging the war and exhausting the area's resources, including Iran's resources, and exposing the area to imminent danger.

Very Confidential

Isn't it better for King Husayn to mediate between Iraq and Iran? This is a question that some people naively ask whereas others, like Israel's radio, ask it without any naivete. There is also the other question that asks: Why was King Husayn a "friend" of the shah's Iran and why has he become an "enemy" of Khomeyni's Iran? Those who know the truth of Jordan's "state secrets" say that the king was not a "friend" of the shah for the sake of the shah's friendship and is not an "enemy" of Khomeyni for the sake of enmity to Khomeyni because the king is one of those who believe that there are no everlasting friendships or everlasting hostilities but that there are permanent supreme interests that are above everything else.

Reviewing the history of the Jordanian-Iranian relations, these people say that King Husayn flew often to Tehran at the peak of the Gulf crisis in the late 1960's and early 1970's when the shah was preparing to seize the entire Arab Gulf and to turn it into a Persian lake.

The shah declared himself king of kings in legendary celebrations on the occasion of the 25th centennial of the Persian empire and launched naval and air fleets and amassed ground troops sufficient to enable him to back up his words with actions.

There is no doubt that King Husayn's repeated visits to Tehran under those circumstances did not endear him to the ordinary Arab citizen in the Gulf or anywhere else, especially in the wake of the shah's seizure of the three Arab islands belonging to the UAE. But this ordinary Arab citizen is perhaps still unaware of what was taking place behind the scenes regarding Bahrain which the shah was determined to seize. The ordinary Arab citizen does not know the elements and factors that made the shah back down suddenly and agree to the formalities of a U.N.-sponsored referendum among Bahrain's population to determine its fate once and for all.

An aide accompanying King Husayn on one of those visits to Tehran tells the following story: A journalist in Tehran approached his majesty and asked him if he is a Shi'ite following the sect of Imam 'Ali, may God honor him, and of the prophet's house or if he is a Sunni. King Husayn looked at the journalist with surprise and then said: "But I am the descendant of the prophet's house and you are our adherents." The Iranian journalist sneaked away and fled.

The Iranian "king of kings," the son of an army sergeant who became an emperor, knew that no matter how much political power he attained, he still needed the approval of the "masters" with the black turbans [clergymen] in Iran, all of whom derive most of their influence from belonging to the prophet's family. Every black turban, even among the bedouin Arabs of Arabestan, indicates that its wearer is a member of that family. If the "king of kings" in Iran could get one of those black turbans, he would have possibly agreed to exchange it for his jewel-bedecked crown and would have agreed not to listen to the advice of the descendant of the Hashimite family [king husayn] on Bahrain and the future of the Arab-Iranian relations.

King Husayn, according to well-informed Jordanians and Arab Gulf officials, feels too embarrassed to say that he saved Bahrain, doesn't actually say so and is content to say that he failed to save the three Arab islands. These people also say that King Husayn risked his popularity among the ordinary Arab citizens and is still doing so for the sake of what he believes to be right and what may not be

included under the heading of passing profit and loss but in the book of permanent accounts--a book which still bears the sign "very confidential."

Jordanian Mediation

But a journalist can, as I have already said, do palm reading or read a coffee cup and find some secrets, especially if he is a man of integrity and of open-mindedness. Something of the sort happened to me once on a flight from Amman to London when the airplane stopped over in Paris to pick up some passengers. Paris was at the time Khomeyni's capital from which he was directing the raging revolution in Iran. I was reading at the time the American HERALD TRIBUNE, published in Paris, which contained reports to the effect that King Husayn was trying to mediate between Khomeyni and the shah. The moment I raised my eyes from the newspaper to look at the passengers picked up in Paris, I saw the Jordanian minister of awqaf [religious trusts] enter the plane with his face on which you can never read happiness or sadness at any time.

I approached the minister in his first-class seat and ventured to greet him and ask him about Paris' life. The minister of awqaf could testify neither favorably nor unfavorably for the city because he simply knew nothing about it. I said to him: "Well then, how is the master, Abu-Isma'il?" He said: "What master do you mean?" I said: "Is there but one master in Paris nowadays--a sole master who raises Paris' name among the capitals of the world, namely Imam Ayatollah Rohollah Khomeyni?" The Jordanian minister answered with no more than: "Do you insist on your question?"

And who am I to insist on my question, and I needed no insistence. However, I concluded from the course of affairs that in his mediation, the descendant of the Hashimite house was able to exert stronger moral influence on the shah, the son of a sergeant, than on one of the members of his sect--a member who is supposed to be a relative of the king's from the Persian branch. It can be said that King Husayn has spared no efforts to mediate and establish detente between the Arabs and Iran in Khomeyni's time, as he had done in the shah's time, and that he has used all the means of persuasion and of religious and secular logic to put the interests of the Islamic nation above the interests of both the Arab and Persian nationalities and to put the future interests above the problems of the sad present. He, meaning King Husayn, did not stop his attempts to win over Khomeyni even after Khomeyni became the sole master of Tehran.

When I met the Jordanian ambassador who had been recalled from his embassy in Kuwait to become the new ambassador to Tehran, I said to him: "And what will you do or be able to do there, Mr ambassador?" The new ambassador answered: "Leave happiness [sa'adat al-safir translated literally becomes: Your happiness the ambassador] alone now. I will focus my efforts to bring Iran and the Arabs closer to each other and to prevent further deterioration." I said: "And what will your means be, besides diplomacy and goodwill?" He answered: "There is no means for me other than to wear my black turban. I am from al-Husayni family and from the venerable Jerusalem, you know." I said to ambassador and friend Muhyi-al-Din al-Husayni: "It is surprising that King Husayn and Abu-'Ammar are thinking in the same way, considering that you will find in Tehran your cousin Ghazi al-Husayni, the son of the grand Palestinian struggler 'Abd-al-Qadir al-Husayni, as the PLO representative there. If your national, religious, family and struggle affiliation cannot win over Khomeyni's Iran and establish detente between it and the

Arabs to serve the cause of the main conflict with the Zionist enemy, then I will begin reconsidering many of the assumptions that we have made in supporting the Iranian revolution."

What is important is that the mediation was required of Jordan or of King Husayn and that he did not hold back when this mediation was needed and was in the right place. But to ask King Husayn to mediate now is, as the blind poet [presumably al-Mi'arri] has put it, "words whose meaning is vague and which our minds cannot grasp." King Husayn is in total agreement with Saddam Husayn out of personal conviction in this regard because the king considers any Arab mediation under the present circumstances not only unacceptable and a shirking of the responsibility but also a disservice to the intrinsic and national interest and a disservice to the goals of peace and of sparing the blood--goals which they say they are seeking.

Agreement of Two Husayns

What draws attention is that Saddam Husayn and King Husayn agree out of personal conviction not only on this matter but that they are almost in agreement and hold the same view on all matters. This agreement has reached the point of telepathy and to the degree that some claim that as soon as one of them lifts the telephone receiver he finds that the other has preceded him to call at the same time and finds that they both want to discuss the same issue!

A foreign correspondent in Amman asked King Husayn if Iraq and Jordan have concluded a joint defense agreement. King Husayn answered that such an agreement has not been signed on paper but that there is no need for such an agreement to make Jordan act in the manner in which it has acted because what Jordan does is not dictated so much by written agreements as it is dictated by Jordan's entire entity. The journalist then asked: "But doesn't this entail danger for Jordan?" The king replied: But the dangers to which Jordan will be exposed by failing to support Iraq will be much greater than the dangers resulting from Jordan's siding with Iraq.

Students of strategy have said: These are completely logical statements. By taking this stance of support for Iraq, Jordan does not so much expose its national safety to danger as it protects it from the consequences of isolation and of losing the strategic and population depth and the "implicit reserve," namely the Iraqi people. If Iraq has gained 2.5 million Jordanians, then Jordan has gained 14 million Iraqis in an "implicit reserve." Strategy experts wonder: Why haven't the other Arabs done the same thing and what are they waiting for?

But the two Husayns think on the same wavelength. It is said that on the night of the telephone call concerning al-'Aqabah and of their review of the Zionist propaganda machine's concentration on Jordan, the two agreed that this concentration has numerous reasons, the most important being the implication that Jordan or any other Arab country must not advance any form of military or non-military aid to Iraq. The Israelis are not so foolish to believe that 40,000 Jordanian troops were actually standing on Iraq's borders but they are intelligent enough to understand the value of the Jordanian port of al-'Aqabah, or of any other Arab port, as a vital artery for the fighting Iraq at a time when the enemies are trying to exploit the opportunity and to cut off Iraq's arteries.

These enemies were chagrined to find some ships which had been heading for al-Basrah with goods, products and food change course and head to an alternate Arab port, such as the port of al-'Aqabah. They were also chagrined to see al-'Aqabah-Baghdad highway turn into an Arab artery which Jordan can secure and protect and to find that this limited Jordanian role is equal in its significance and vitality to the participation of 50,000 troops in the battle of Shatt al-'Arab, Arabestan and Dezful. The Zionist propaganda has tried to incite the United States and the other Arabs, accusing Jordan of expanding the war. It is as if this propaganda wants Jordan to fall into what it claims to be prohibited or wants Jordan to back down and to swallow all it has said about its readiness to support Iraq, thus becoming an example for the other Arabs. But Jordan has not backed down, has not done what Israel wants it to do and has not said what it wants to do exactly, thus preserving its ability to harass the enemy and to leave him in a state of uncertainty. How has this been done? Naturally, this is still in the "very confidential file" which nobody can read by reading a cup of coffee.

The students of strategy in Israel admit that "the state of uncertainty" characterizing the Middle East makes their planning tasks extremely difficult. This is why they try to make all kinds of imaginable and unimaginable assumptions. This is also what makes them try to get out of the quicksand only to find themselves mired in swamps, mud and waves. This is also why they try to be pragmatic and to deal with each case in an improvised manner whereby the plans are drawn up on the spot in the battlefield. What they intended by the battle of al-'Aqabah was to keep the port of Jiddah on the Red Sea, for example, and all the other Arab ports closed to transit traffic to Iraq. But their plan for Jordan, which was definitely offhanded, has failed and this is why it has folded and why another form of improvisation has started.

Psychological War

Last Friday evening, the well-heard and trusted London [BBC] radio reported at the outset of its news bulletins that "Syria and Libya have begun to transport Soviet-made weapons and equipment to Iran." Linking this report to another report, London Radio also said that "in the first direct Arab signal of its kind, Colonel al-Qadhafi has urged the Muslims to support Iran in its war against those who are launching war on behalf of the United States."

But at the end of its report, London Radio said: The reports about the shipment of Soviet-made weapons from Syria and Libya have been monitored from Israel's radio and have not been confirmed by any other source, including the four U.S. reconnaissance aircraft [AWAC's] which are hovering constantly over Saudi Arabia.

Naturally, if many can believe the statement of Colonel al-Qadhafi, then the news makers assume that these people will also believe that the matter has gone beyond the point of statements and to the point of sending Soviet-made weapons and equipment to Iran. This must be inevitably followed by sending Syrian and Libyan troops to Iran to operate these weapons and equipment. Thus, in Israel's opinion, the battle has erupted, O Arabs, and--in Israel's opinion also--see with your own eyes and conclude, O Arabs: Israel supports Iran by Proxy and supplies it with weapons and spare parts through the Netherlands and Japan while Syria and Libya supply Iran with weapons and equipment directly.

While Colonel al-Qadhdhafi says that Iraq is fighting Iran on behalf of the United States, look at him stand side-by-side with Israel at a time when he claims that he is against Israel and against Camp David.

This is the "intellectual chaos" and psychological confusion plan that Israel is trying to spread among the Arab ranks to create despair and kill hope. The Israeli psychological warfare could not have penetrated through these gaps to the minds of the Arab masses if the positions of the other Arabs vis-a-vis the Iraq-Iran war were clear and emanating from a strategy with clearcut features and goals and not from a steam-boiled strategy.

Here arises the final and inevitable question: What are the other Arabs required to do in order to side truly with peace and justice from a national, humanitarian, pan-Arab and religious viewpoint? Are they required to send their military forces to Iraq?

Certainly not because Iraq does not need these forces and will not ask for them. But Iraq, and logic in all its forms, require that the Arab states use all their effective influence to prevent other countries from giving Iran the knife with which to stab and slaughter the others. The Islamic logic requires that all the Muslim states exert utmost pressure on Iran to stop the fighting first and then to prepare for arbitration and for setting matters aright in accordance with the venerable Koran phrase saying: "If two sects of believers fight, then reconcile them. If one sect wrongs the other, then fight the one committing the wrong until it returns to God's commandment."

Fighting the faction committing the wrong, refusing to stop the fighting and rejecting arbitration does not necessarily mean declaring a holy war on it and marching troops against it--troops that should be marched against Israel. It means an Arab and Islamic integration in supporting Iraq with the various means by opening supply arteries to it and by compensating its loss of oil production through raising the Arab oil production and through calculating the entire production increase as if it were Iraqi production and through crediting the revenue of this increase to Iraq's account until the day comes when these other Arab states reduce their production and Iraq raises its production and credits the increase to their account, thus making it seem as if someone has borrowed oil and will repay it in oil without causing anybody to incur a loss and without causing anybody to be indebted to anybody else.

It is shameful for anybody to think of making donations to Iraq which has always been the donor. When we speak of donations, we prefer this to remain, at least for the present, in a "very confidential" file that cannot be read in a cup of coffee or through palmistry but that will be read by the future generations in the aims of the parties concerned. We would like to tell all: Learn from Jordan and from the port of al-'Aqabah in particular.

Let us return to the start, namely the port of al-'Aqabah. When the port workers found that the number of ships anchored in the port rose from an average of 16 ships to 43 ships, they decided to triple their efforts and to force the international shipping and insurance companies not to raise their rates by the 30 percent which these companies had previously declared.

Thus, 4 million dollars have been saved monthly and all of Jordan's trucks have proceeded to operate on al-'Aqabah-Baghdad highway. Moreover, Jordan has permitted all non-Jordanian trucks to operate on this highway. To those who can hear us, there is still an urgent need for 200 more trucks. All of Jordan's factories have responded to the king's stance and have decided to allocate 2 days of their weekly production not as a donation to Iraq but as a repayment of its debt and as an expression of what the Jordanian people harbor for the Iraqi people. Tons of food, medicines and other products have piled up while the drivers union is preparing to ship them, with full hope that Iraq will open its bosom to accept the gift.

In conclusion, we wish to express many thanks to our enemies who have turned their searchlights on the Jordanian port of al-'Aqabah and who have thus come to live in darkness while illuminating the port. As the late Mao used to say, if my memory hasn't failed me, "in agriculture, learn from (Sakahy) province," I wish to say: In days of hardship, learn from the port of al-'Aqabah and from Arab citizen Husayn ibn Talal.

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ABU MAYZAR CALLS FOR HALT TO IRAN-IRAQ WAR

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 7 Nov 80 p 17

[Article based on interview given by 'Abd al-Muhsin Abu Mayzar, the PLO's official spokesman, to AL-QABAS's correspondent in Amman: "Only the Palestinian Revolution Is Being Harmed By the Iran-Iraq War"]

[Text] Mr 'Abd al-Muhsin Abu Mayzar, the official spokesman for the PLO, said that the Palestinian revolution is in favor of stopping the Iran-Iraq war because it alone is being harmed by this war and by the fact that it is continuing.

He added that Arab and Moslem blood should be spared in order that it may wage battle for the liberation of Palestine from Zionism and American imperialism.

Mr Abu Mayzar, who participated in the meetings of the Committee of Seven, composed of foreign ministers of the Arab countries, which recently concluded its work in the capital of Jordan, stressed the fact that Israel is making plans to commit large-scale aggression against the south of Lebanon. He said that the aim of this aggression is to smash the Palestinian revolution and Palestinian and Lebanese mass organizations in order to acquire more Lebanese territory which is would then annex in pursuit of its expansionist policy and its colonial settlement policy which is based on expansionism.

He said that preparations being undertaken by the Israeli enemy in the south of Lebanon, in the border area which is controlled by the militia groups of Sa'd Haddad, and in the northern part of occupied Palestine, indicate that the attack will be a large-scale one--perhaps larger than the March 1978 aggression in which Israel swept over southern Lebanon all the way up to the Litani River.

He added that the enemy would not be able to concentrate so well on these preparations, paving the way for its large-scale offensive, if it were not for the condition of disunity, discord, weakness, and division which predominates in the Arab world.

Mr Abu Mayzar made reference to the Palestinian work paper which had been submitted at the meetings of the Committee of Seven. He said that there was a joint Syrian-Palestinian work paper, that the Syrians and Palestinians were in agreement with each other, and that their points of view were totally identical.

Concerning the meetings of the Committee of Seven, he said that the objective of the meetings was to prepare a long-range joint Arab strategy in order to deal with the Zionist enemy, the Camp David agreements, and all of the plans of liquidation which are linked to them.

Concerning the recent Soviet-Syrian treaty, Mr Abu Mayzar said that so far this has been the only practical and strategic response to the Camp David agreements, to the treacherous plans behind the Camp David agreements, and to the parties participating in the Camp David agreements who, by means of these agreements, have wanted to prevent the Soviet Union from participating in solving the Middle East problem and Palestine Question, and have wanted the Americans to be the only ones to provide a solution.

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CSO: 4802

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

KUWAITI OFFICIAL DISCUSSES GULF LABOR ISSUES

Dubai AL-BAYAN in Arabic 5 Nov 80 p 5

[Interview with 'Abdallah Ghallum Husayn, Kuwaiti assistant deputy minister of Labor, by Ahmad Muhsin; "Interview With Kuwaiti Dep. Minister of Labor; Foreign Labor Poses No Danger in Gulf, If Well Planned"]

[Excerpt] On the peripheries of the meetings of the third session of the labor and social affairs experts of the Arab Gulf states--a session which has concluded its works in Abu Dhabi--AL-BAYAN has interviewed 'Abdallah Ghallum Husayn, the Kuwaiti assistant deputy minister of labor and social affairs and one of the area's experts who have contributed effectively to the session's discussions.

The Kuwaiti deputy minister has said that the failure of any Arab Gulf state to abide by giving priority to Arab labor is considered a clear violation of the state's national labor laws and saddles this state with a pan-Arab responsibility.

The deputy minister has also explained that foreign labor poses no political danger if well planned and regulated and provided that the process is not left to personal whims, individual relations and the exploitation of connections for personal and material gains.

He has also warned of the danger of labor--especially Arab labor--infiltration from one state in the area to another as a result of material incentives and enticements. He has called for some kind of coordination among the area's states in this sphere.

'Abdallah Ghallum Husayn has also defended the Gulf labor legislations, pointing out that they are not very different from the international legislations and that they may be better than the U.S. labor legislations. Following is the text of the interview:

[Question] In your capacity as chairman of the second session of the committee of experts and through your followup of the implementation of the resolutions and recommendations of the area's Council of the Ministers of Labor and Social Affairs, to what degree have the member states adhered to the implementation of these resolutions and recommendations and what is the degree of the readiness of these states to embark on coordination and integration in the sphere of labor and social affairs?

[Answer] Not only in this session but also in the first session which was held in Doha, implementation of the council's resolutions has ranged from 70 to 75 percent because the remaining resolutions depended on communication and coordination with Arab or international organizations. Therefore, we can say that this percentage of unimplemented resolutions is nothing more than a question of time connected with the stance of these organizations. As for the readiness of the participating countries to coordinate in the sphere of labor and social affairs, this coordination is a reality and has existed in all spheres from the time before the creation of this council by virtue of the similarity in the customs, traditions and common history of the area's peoples.

Arab Labor

[Question] Conferences held previously by the area's ministers of labor and social affairs urged the need to employ or give priority to Arab labor. Yet, we find that most of the area's countries are still importing large numbers of foreign workers, particularly Asian workers. How do you view this issue?

[Answer] The resolution to give priority to Arab manpower has not only been issued by the meetings of the ministers of labor but has also emanated from the labor legislations in the area's states. Through their legislations, all the council member states give first priority to the citizen, then to the Arab worker and finally to the foreigner, especially the foreigner from friendly countries.

As for the member states' abidance by such resolutions, it is a foregone conclusion because failure to abide by them constitutes a violation of their national labor laws and I do not think that any state legislates a law in any sphere and then violates its own law. But on the other hand, there are obstacles that have imposed themselves on the labor arena and have obstructed implementation of this provision of the law or have delayed until a later phase any resolution adopted in this regard. All in the Gulf States and in the oil producing countries generally feel that there is a comprehensive and rapid development movement that requires skilled manpower to keep up with its speed. At the time when the development movement, especially the construction movement, in these countries is proceeding according to a geometric progression, we find that the skilled Arab labor increases at a lesser pace than that of arithmetic progression. Under the shadow of this kind of planning for development of skilled Arab labor, I do not think that this labor can keep up with the comprehensive development in the Arab countries that have major development projects.

Foreign Labor

(Husayn adds) This is why these countries have resorted to employing foreign manpower, especially through the major companies implementing such projects. What is worth noting is that the more we can diversify this labor, the more we can control it. Through this labor, we can also form relations with the largest number possible of friendly countries. We hope that this phase will be a transient phase. This responsibility [of providing skilled Arab labor] is not the responsibility of the Arab Gulf states or of the Arab governments. It is the main responsibility entrusted to the Arab Labor Organization, especially since this organization is aware of the extreme significance of this issue. This organization has taken steps on this path by setting up a training center in Tripoli, Libya. It

has also set up an Arab employment agency in Rabat. We hope that the organization will also exert efforts to set up a vocational training center in the Arab east to complete the link. As a result, we will be able to transfer the untrained labor abundantly available in Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti and Mauritania to be trained by these centers and to be supplied to the Arab development projects. Moreover, the Arab Employment Agency has a big role in regard to the Arab manpower that emigrates from the Arab countries in north Africa to western Europe.

Political Stability

[Question] How can harmony be established between the economic, social and political stability needs of the Arab Gulf states importing labor on the one hand and the actual [labor] requirements of these states on the other? Don't you think that the increase in foreign manpower poses a danger to the area?

[Answer] I do not believe that foreign labor constitutes a political danger, if this labor is well planned and regulated. Therefore, the governments must establish the criteria in accordance with which this labor is employed and they should not leave this issue subject to personal whims, individual relations and connections. They should also not allow this issue to be exploited for personal material gains because the security of these states and of the area is a lot more important than any material gain, if the individual realizes the importance and seriousness of importing offhandedly manpower about which he knows nothing.

Husayn points out that the danger lies in the private sector, meaning by this the individuals who import foreign labor for either material gain or for the so-called labor trade and who let this labor into the market without any controls and without any consideration to whether the state needs such labor or not. Therefore, the ministries of labor shoulder a historic responsibility toward the Gulf society and these ministries must be the strong arm that puts an end to such individual actions.

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CSO: 4802

TUNISIAN-KUWAITI COOPERATION DESCRIBED

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 13 Dec 80 p 6

[Text] Mr Abdellatif Al Hamad, general director of the Kuwaiti Fund for Arab Economic Development (FKDEA), has been visiting Tunisia for several days, during which time he has met with the prime minister. He has also attended the opening of the Tunis-Turki expressway, among other events.

Without a doubt, the completion of this new section of the expressway is evidence of the extent of Tunisian-Kuwaiti cooperation and its development. The excellent relations maintained by the two brother countries have enabled this cooperation to become stronger and broader to include many economic sectors in the mutual interest of both parties.

In particular, Tunisian-Kuwaiti cooperation actually involves three important sectors of our economy: basic infrastructures, tourism and industry and energy.

Since 1963, when Tunisian-Kuwaiti cooperation began, the fund has participated in the completion of 13 projects whose total cost has amounted to 65 million dinars. These projects involve various--very important--sectors whose development is responsible, to a certain extent, for the growth of the national economy. Thus this cooperation has contributed to the completion of several projects in the areas of basic infrastructures, tourism and industry and energy.

The development of this cooperation is also the result of strengthening, on one hand, ties between our two countries and, on the other hand, the prestige and credibility enjoyed by Tunisia.

These factors are helping to strengthen inter-Arab cooperation and are making Tunisia a more and more important magnet for Arab investments, as further evidenced by the success of the recent conference on "Arab Investments in Arab Countries," held in Tunisia and in which a large number of Arab development funds participated, as well as representatives of various financial and banking organizations.

The first phase of this cooperation concerns basic infrastructures.

Thus the fund provided financing for the Tunis-Turki expressway (first stage of the project) in the amount of 3.75 million Kuwaiti dinars (DK), for the Tunis-Carthage airport in the amount of 4.0 million DK and for the Bizerte drawbridge (2.25 million DK). In the case of the drinking water system, the fund contributed to the completion of the northern region's network.

In the industrial sector, the FKDEA holds 48 percent of the capital of ICM (Maghreb Chemical Industries) through PIC (Petrochemical and Industrial Company).

The fund has likewise given its approval in principle for participation in financing the ICM 4 of Gafsa.

In the industrial sector as well and following meetings which brought together the various Arab development funds in Tunis, several Tunisian economic projects included in the Sixth Plan have been submitted to participants. These projects involve building, mechanical and agroindustrial sectors in particular.

Kuwait has thus given its approval in principle to participation in these projects, either by participating in the capital of the companies to be established or in the form of credits.

Files on some projects have already been submitted to the fund. The results of current negotiations will be known in coming weeks.

In the energy sector, the Kuwaiti Fund has participated in the construction of the Halq Al-Wadi power station (I and II) and construction of a gas pipeline.

Other projects, such as the modernization of phosphate mines, the creation of a fishing port and development of the Medjerda Valley, have been carried out through Tunisian-Kuwaiti cooperation.

In the area of tourism, the Tunisian-Kuwaiti Consortium (CTKD) has built hotel units which it manages itself. Thus in northern Sousse the CTKD has built the "Maisons de la Mer" [Seaside Houses] complex, whose total cost amounted to 8.5 million dinars. A second tourist complex has been built at Sousse ("Le Nejma"), plus the Abous Navas Hotel (at Gammarth), the Tunisia Palace (undergoing remodeling) and the "Mechtel" in Tunis, as well as other projects in the study stage at Hammamet and Jerba.

The Tunisian-Kuwaiti Consortium, which has contributed to the development of Tunisian tourism, will probably also participate in financing tourist projects included in the Sixth Plan.

Completion of the CTKD's entire investment program (almost finished) will provide approximately 6,000 jobs.

Skeletal Agreement and New Horizons

The agreement between the two countries, signed in Tunis on 29 March, has opened the way to new horizons from the standpoint of Tunisian-Kuwaiti relations in the industrial sector in particular and in the economic sector in general.

This agreement, as well as others, will strengthen bilateral cooperation between the two countries.

In addition to these three areas which have benefited from this exemplary cooperation, last November's conference opened up new horizons for Arab and Kuwaiti investments in particular, for those who could invest in other sectors, particularly agroindustry, which is a vital and decisive sector for the food security of Tunisia and the Arab world in general.

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CSO: 4400

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

KUWAIT, JORDAN AGREE ON CULTURAL EXCHANGE

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 20 Oct 80 p 3

[Article: "Ratification of Executive Program for Cultural Cooperation Between Kuwait and Jordan"]

[Text] Amman--The Jordanian Council of Ministers has ratified the 1980-81 executive program for cultural cooperation between Kuwait and Jordan. The program provides for the exchange of student visits and scholastic and university scholarships. It also provides for laying down the bases for equating academic certificates between the two countries. Following are the most important contents of the program:

Exchange of teachers: Contracts with Jordanian teachers will be concluded with Jordanian teachers with the knowledge and approval of the Jordanian Ministry of Education. The Kuwaiti Ministry of Education will notify the Jordanian Ministry of Education ahead of time of the number, specialization and qualifications of Jordanian teachers it needs to conclude contracts with.

Educational training and development: Joint educational training courses will be conducted according to the need and to what is agreed upon between the authorities concerned.

Each country will inform the other of the training courses it intends to conduct in each academic year, the nature of the courses, the number of those from the other country that can take part in them and the qualifications that the participants must have.

The two sides will also exchange the programs and curricula prepared for the courses so that both sides may benefit from them, in addition to the exchange of lecturers in educational courses in accordance with the programs to be agreed upon.

Visits by educators: At the invitation of Kuwait, Jordan will send a number of educators to familiarize themselves with the educational renaissance in Kuwait. Jordan will also invite a similar number of Kuwaiti educators to familiarize themselves with what Jordan is doing in the various educational spheres.

Equation of Certificates

The two sides will exert efforts to exchange complete information on the various educational institutions in both countries with the aim of laying down the bases for equating academic certificates issued in both countries.

The two sides will also exchange academic books, curricula, documents and educational publications issued in each of them.

Kuwait will also welcome the participation of a scout group comprised of 8 members and a leader in the scout camp which the Ministry of Education will conduct during the mid-year holiday. The Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan will also welcome the participation of a [Kuwaiti] scout group comprised of a similar number of members.

Each side welcomes the visit of a student delegation comprised of about 30 students from the other side during the mid-year vacation. Each side also welcomes the participation of an athletic team from the other side to take part in group sports.

Academic Scholarships

The University of Kuwait will allocate annually only 10 academic grants for the Jordanian side in each of the 5 academic years of this program. Kuwait will also allocate five academic scholarships for Jordanian citizens in the Telecommunications Center in the spheres to be agreed upon, in addition to five scholarships--of which two will be allocated for the Arab Orphan Committee--in the art and vocational training institutions.

The State of Kuwait will also allocate four academic scholarships for Jordanian citizens in the private educational institutions.

The Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan will allocate for the Kuwaiti side five academic scholarships in the Polytechnic and three scholarships in each of its two universities.

The ministry concerned in each of the two countries will nominate the students for the scholarships and grants provided for in this program. This program will be renewable annually at the request of one of the two sides.

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CSO: 4802

FATAH OFFICIAL DISCUSSES ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF FOURTH CONGRESS

Kuwait AL-SIYASAH in Arabic 17 Aug 80 p 13

[Interview with Majid Abu-Sharar, Fatah Central Committee member: "In Comprehensive Interview on Area's Conditions, Fatah Central Committee Member Majid Abu-Sharar: We Abide by National Movement's Position vis-a-vis Designation of Taqi-al-Din al-Suh; We Expect Israeli Attack on Camps Because Camp David is in Real Crisis; Resolutions and Results of Fourth Congress are Forward Step in Palestinian Struggle March"]

[Text] Beirut--(MANAR PRESS)--Majid Abu-Sharar, a Fatah Central Committee member, considers the plan to resettle the Palestinians in Lebanon a renewed old plan which U.S. Secretary of State Dulles projected in 1954 "but was foiled by our people's will."

In an interview conducted with him by AL-SIYASAH, has has underlined the measures undertaken by the Palestinian resistance in Lebanon to close its military offices in the cities. Following is the text of the interview with Abu-Sharar, official Palestinian spokesman and Fatah Central Committee member, which started with the following question:

[Question] Some people consider the outcome of the fourth congress an advanced step in the march of the revolution. The congress's resolutions have won broad support. However, there have been critical observations. How do you personally appraise this congress?

[Answer] It is definite that Fatah's congress constitutes a step forward in continuing the march of the Palestinian revolution and in escalating its various struggles, especially since this congress has been convened nine years after the third congress, a period during which Fatah movement has undergone big development at the various military, political and organizational levels. The fourth congress has also come under a very critical and sensitive Arab situation. Internationally, the congress has come under the shadow of strong strain in the international relations, especially since the conclusion of the Camp David accords, the Iranian revolution's triumph and the events in Afghanistan. Therefore, it is not surprising that the congress has drawn strong attention at the various Palestinian, Arab and international levels, considering the sweeping effect of Fatah's resolutions on the Palestinian issue and on its ramifications. The congress lasted, as it is well known, ten days during which real democracy prevailed. No

resolution was made outside the congress hall and the congress has been subjected to no external influence. This is why it has been a pure Palestinian congress for the sake of Palestine and of the Palestinian revolution. It is a congress in which the characteristic of the movement as a national liberation movement has been underlined. The movement has emerged from this congress united and committed to the laws of the national liberation phase, the phase through which we can realize our goal of national independence. The congress has also defined the nature of the movement and of its alliances and has separated clearly the camp of friends from the camp of enemies. Perhaps one of the most important issues which the congress has dealt with courageously and objectively is the issue of the settlement. The congress has decided to underline the continuance of the armed struggle in this phase within the prevalent balances of power. The Camp David [accords] mean relinquishment of the Palestinian people's firm rights. They mean entrenching the feet of the U.S. imperialism in the area, maintaining Israel as an advanced base of U.S. imperialism to protect the U.S. imperialist interests in the area and to strike the area's liberation movements. The accords also mean entrenching al-Sadat's capitulationist approach. The congress has also drawn up for the movement a more advanced constitution than the previous one. This constitution regulates the relations within the movement and organizes its internal democratic life.

Democratic Congress

(Abu-Sharar added:) In view of all of this, I consider the movement's fourth congress a democratic congress rarely seen in our area. With its resolutions and its outcome, this congress constitutes a step forward. Since the conclusion of the congress, we have been struggling to implement its resolutions and recommendations, especially on the Lebanese arena and in the occupied territories. We are proud of our congress, of our movement's unity and of this movement's constant ability to develop and to face its historic responsibilities.

[Question] But some people believe that this democracy was for the purpose of pressure release?

[Answer] Those who have an opinion different from ours on Fatah movement's fourth congress are certainly unable to understand Fatah movement's unique ability to develop despite the complex conditions engulfing the Palestinian struggle. Those who speak about the movement's inability to develop are also alien to the movement. Development is the law of life. Struggle from a committed revolutionary position leads to the observed development. Continued struggle and reinforced experience among the strugglers turns them from idealistic strugglers into realistic strugglers who are not afraid of confronting problems and who deal with problems and exert efforts to solve them in line with the goal of developing and enhancing the revolution.

Resettlement Is Renewed Old Note

[Question] The issue of resettlement has given rise to questions and to clamor and has been exploited by numerous sides. Do you believe that this plan is presented seriously in the international lobbies as a solution to settle the Palestinian issue?

[Answer] The settlement presented within the framework of Camp David and of the U.S. sphere of action is based on the need to resettle the Palestinians in the Arab countries because, in view of the Israeli rejection of the repatriation of the refugees, the U.S. scheme believes that the soundest solution, from the American viewpoint, is to resettle the Palestinians. This is an old plan that is constantly renewed. U.S. Secretary of State Dulles presented this plan in 1954 and proposed resettling the Palestinians in the Sinai. The uprising of the Gaza Strip population against the resettlement plan is well known. Four Palestinians were martyred and tens of others were wounded in Gaza as a result of the Strip's uprising against the resettlement plan. We thus find that even when unarmed and powerless, our people rejected resettlement. There is no need to discuss their position at present, now that they are armed and that they are seeking to liberate their homeland with the support of the Arab masses and of international forces with great weight and influence, such as the socialist countries, led by the Soviet Union, and the nonaligned countries. Therefore, our ability to reject and to foil the resettlement is stronger than ever before. Resettlement means the relinquishment of Palestine and the abandonment of our history as a struggling people. Resettlement means our relinquishment of the simplest rights enjoyed by man. Resettlement means our acceptance of slavery, humiliation and third or fourth class citizenship. Therefore, the resettlement plot is a falsehood and a failure. The guarantee for foiling it is our continued armed struggle to return to our homeland.

Closure of Offices in Lebanese Cities

[Question] What is the background and what are the dimensions of the closure of the Palestinian offices in Beirut, Tripoli and Sidon? Is this a serious decision?

[Answer] One of the main issues discussed by our fourth congress has been the issue of the situation on the Lebanese arena. We have adopted in this regard resolutions stressing the importance of putting an end to all violations and of establishing a sound relationship with the masses on the Lebanese arena--a relationship established on the rule that only the masses can protect the revolution and that a revolution that loses its masses loses the reasons for its existence and survival. This is why after our fourth congress, we proceeded to adopt a number of resolutions and measures, including the resolution to close our offices outside the boundaries of our areas and camps and the resolution to rely on organization as the instrument of communicating and of establishing our relations with the masses. We are totally serious in eliminating every violation and in punishing contraveners without any hesitation. An offense against the masses is an offense against the revolution and the sacred cause. The Lebanese arena will witness further measures on the way to establishing a sound relationship with the masses. The masses that have shown patience, have fought and have sacrificed deserve full care and attention from the revolution. All the Palestinian resistance factions are in agreement on implementing these resolutions out of their common conviction on the need for a sound relationship with the masses. We are carrying out all these measures in coordination and understanding with the Lebanese National Movement.

Al-Sadat's Capitulationist Course

[Question] Al-Sadat has recently made a statement spreading the news that another Israel will rise in Lebanon. What, in your opinion, lies behind such a statement?

[Answer] Al-Sadat is pushing in the direction of further collapse in the Arab area in the wake of the collapse of the Egyptian national position as a result of the capitulationist course followed by al-Sadat. Lebanon is one of the positions on whose collapse al-Sadat is wagering through what he has called Pierre al-Jumayyil's Christian mini-state. We say that Lebanon is not Pierre al-Jumayyil and Pierre al-Jumayyil is not Lebanon's Christians. Lebanon's national body, with its Muslims and Christians, is stronger than the U.S.-Zionist scheme and is capable of foiling this scheme. The heroic Lebanese people who have waged throughout years the battle of defending their survival, of the unity of their soil and of their Arabism cannot submit to the Phalangist blackmail which is supported by Israel, the United States and some Arab circles.

Exchange of Views With Franjiyah

[Question] After the 7 July massacre in which the Phalanges Party liquidated its ally, the Liberal Party, you met personally with ex-President Sulayman Franjiyah. What was the nature of this meeting and was there any discussion of future alliances?

[Answer] We met with ex-President Sulayman Franjiyah for consultation and for the exchange of views on the recent developments following the 7 July massacre which took place within the same isolationist line. We felt that ex-President Franjiyah has a true understanding of the nature of the area's struggle and of the Israeli scheme that is being implemented in Lebanon by the isolationist forces. Ex-President Franjiyah is fighting this plan with all his capabilities and with his efforts to establish a noble national position in the face of this scheme.

Resistance is Committed

[Question] What is the Palestinian resistance's position toward the recent events in Lebanon, beginning with Prime Minister Salim al-Huss's resignation and the clashes between the Phalange and the Liberals and ending with the designation of Taqi-al-Din al-Suh to form the cabinet?

[Answer] Formation of the cabinet is a Lebanese affair. As is well known, we are committed to the Lebanese National Movement's view on any Lebanese affair because the movement is our natural and true ally on the Lebanese arena.

In any case, we believe that Lebanese national detente is a national must that has to be realized through the conditions projected by the Lebanese National Movement in its document concerning national detente. Foremost among these conditions is the severance of all relations with Israel, guaranteeing Lebanon's unity and Arabism and guaranteeing continuation of Lebanon's democratic life and the freedom and survival of the Palestinian resistance in accordance with the agreements concluded with the Lebanese government. We cannot create any obstacle in the face of any real Lebanese detente because Lebanon's unity and

safety realize a definite interest for the Palestinian people and for their just cause. At the same time, we do not disregard the importance of bolstering and strengthening the Palestinian-national Lebanese-Syrian relationship because this front is the front that continues to confront the Camp David accords practically and that is paying a daily price for its confrontation against these accords.

(Concluding his statements, Majid Abu-Sharar said:) There is no doubt that Lebanon is one of the constant targets of the United States and Israel and that partitioning Lebanon or imposing fascist isolationist control over it is a goal that our nation's enemies are seeking to realize. Therefore, the possibilities of a large-scale Israeli operation against the Palestinians in Lebanon and against Syria are open, especially since Camp David is facing a real crisis as a result of the firm Palestinian and Syrian position. This makes the war option a likely option to begin in the hope that he will succeed with his forthcoming military operation in imposing the peace of force and in implanting his scheme firmly. We are aware of this and are ready to confront all circumstances, including the inevitably coming war which will be a war that will leave its impact not only on the area but will also affect the entire international relations, including the relationship between the Soviet Union which supports us and the United States which will support the forthcoming Israeli operation as it has supported Israel's previous operations.

The features of the new political map in the area will be determined in light of the outcome of this war. We are exerting efforts to turn this map in the interest of the Arab steadfastness and confrontation forces and Arab liberation movement.

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CSO: 4802

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

BRIEF

SYRIAN-LIBYAN RELATIONS -- The Public Relations Office of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in Damascus announces that, as of the end of October 1980, Arab Syrian citizens will not need visas to enter Libya. Syrian citizens who want to visit the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya will only need to show their passports or identity cards. [Text] [Damascus AL-BA'TH in Arabic 7 Nov 80 p 3] 9455

CSD: 4802

ARMED FORCES COMMANDER: TERRORISTS ARE ISOLATED

Oslo PRIHETEN in Norwegian 20 Nov 80 pp 1, 6, 7, 10

[Article by Kari Andre Nilsen]

[Text] "You can write home to your paper that everything is all right." So said the top man responsible for the defense of Afghanistan, General Abdul Quader, in an interview with PRIHETEN.

Abdul Quader said that the months that have passed since the second phase of the April revolution began last year on 27 December have been one big success for the revolutionary forces.

Party unity has been re-established, the Afghan army has regained its strength and another element has been added: volunteers who join up for armed service in Committees to Defend the Revolution.

"We have won the masses, the reactionary groups that were creating instability in 70 percent of the country when Karmal took over last year are almost destroyed and can only carry out isolated terrorist attacks. Today they are isolated from the masses," said General Quader.

"Today you can write home to your newspaper and say everything is all right. We are sure we will be able to do what we promised the people. We are sure the Afghan revolution will succeed in the future."

The man who said that to PRIHETEN is one of the most central figures in Afghanistan today. He is in the military, a general by rank and in reality he is the top leader of the country's defense and security.

One of Heroes from April Revolution

Abdul Quader, originally a commandant in the air force and later a colonel under Daoud's regime which lasted from 1973 to 1978, is now chairman of the Defense and

Justice Commission of the Central Committee of Afghanistan's Democratic People's Party. This really means that he is probably a notch higher than Defense Minister Mohammad Rafiq.

Abdul Quader is one of the heroes from the ranks of the military in connection with the 1978 April revolution. At that time he had been in the air force for 18 years. He had been a member of the revolutionary party (PDPA) for many years--as an underground member. Not many people knew that. His party task was to organize party members in the armed forces. He was defense minister in Taraki's government after the revolution but when Hafizullah Amin had Taraki killed and seized power Quader was sent to prison and underwent severe torture. He got out on 27 December 1979 when the second phase of the revolution was introduced.

Amin CIA's Top Agent

"Hafizullah Amin was the top CIA agent in Afghanistan. His assignment was to infiltrate our party," said Abdul Quader who characterized the results of his work like this:

"In the first place he split the party, he set friends up against each other. He attacked things that are sacred to the people: religion, culture and other traditions. The result was that the masses who had enthusiastically supported the revolution in 1978 broke away from the party and the revolutionary regime. The revolution was detoured. Amin used his special tactics to weaken the party. He sent comrades into exile or to jail. Many were tortured and many were killed. A virus, a cancer, spread through the party.

Personal Confrontations with Amin

"These plans were rejected when we introduced the second phase of the revolution," said Quader, who said the reason he had to spend a year and a half in jail was that when he was defense minister he had come out openly against Amin. "When I understood that he was trying to destroy unity in the party I realized at once that things were going wrong," said Quader who was also one of those who said at an early date in personal talks with Amin that he would have to quit using the people's money to buy two or three cars for his close friends. "I referred to party rules and the ideological basis for party bans on that kind of corruption," he said.

But Amin did not just weaken the party from within. He also attacked those closest to the party, large numbers of the intelligentsia, progressive people who wanted to work for national interests as political 'independents'. They were removed, sent to jail, executed or else they fled to other countries.

Only 30 Percent Under Control in December

But what is the situation in Afghanistan today, almost a year since Karmal's regime took over the leadership and three-quarters of a year since FRINETEN was last in Afghanistan? Abdul Quader outlined developments in this way:

"When the second phase was introduced last December," he said, "the situation was difficult. It could be said that 70 percent of the country was not under full control, things were not stable there."

What lines were established to win back and stabilize these parts of the country?

Our Secret Weapon

"We stressed three things. First we had to overcome the tendencies toward party dissolution. We put full emphasis on reestablishing unity in the party. Second we mapped out a plan that would lead to regaining the support of the masses for the party. And third when we had taken care of these two tasks we started to combat the reactionary forces that had intervened from abroad and from inside Afghanistan. After 58 days of the second phase, at the end of February 1980, the imperialists changed their tactics. They succeeded in creating a kind of revolt and demonstrations in Kabul. They set fire to government buildings and cars. Their tactic was to force the government and the party to shoot at them in the middle of the capital, Kabul. It was at this time in Kabul that we set in our secret weapon. It was based on not using arms. We were careful not to create a bloodbath or any bloody demonstrations.

New Situation Created

"This led the people to realize who we were, who really made up this leadership. The mass media in the West wrote at the time that hundreds of people were killed but the truth is that some of our people and some of theirs were wounded and taken to hospitals. We caught many of these people but we released most of them. This too was a major factor in getting the people to think about the kind of leadership we now have in this country. The other thing we did was to start re-organizing our somewhat disorganized army. We created unity, pride and prestige among people in the armed forces. The military became much stronger."

And what is the result after these months?

"The result is that we have a new situation. An increasing number of places have been liberated from the reactionary forces. The party organization and government organs have been established in more and more new locations. After we liberated these areas we gave weapons to local patriots, those who wanted to defend the people."

The general has organized committees to defend the revolution. What role have they played?

"They consist mainly of party members and youth group members. Our line is: the army first. It liberates. The committees take over. But the job of these committees is not just to fight reactionary forces, it is also to help the people. They do political work in agriculture, in economics. They fight politically and militarily."

Are they similar to the revolutionary defense committees in Cuba?

"The principle is the same but there are differences. I was in Cuba myself a short time ago. But there they are divided into divisions and each one is responsible for itself. The organization is different but the work is the same. We send out our groups. They keep order, return. New ones take over."

Military Tradition

Did this work start after the third plenary session of the party's Central Committee this summer or had it already started?

"We began before the plenary session but the guidelines were drawn up there. The plenary session legalized the organization. The organizational work was done before. After the session we started putting our plans into practice in earnest."

Have there been great losses in these groups; have some ended up as martyrs?

"The members of these groups first go through training in the armed forces, both military and physical training. Not until then are they ready to set out. There are martyrs among them to some extent. But I am sure our traditions here in Afghanistan are known. Our tradition is military. We are soldiers in this country. We are used to fighting enemies and defending ourselves."

All Areas Now Liberated

The general said that 70 percent of the country was not living under stable conditions last December. What is the situation now? Are there still places that are not under the control of the revolutionary rule? And what are the relations between Afghan military forces and the Soviet contingent?

"It is true that we have a limited Soviet contingent in Afghanistan but its task is to strike down foreign aggression. When it comes to intervention by reactionary forces our own army has been able to handle it. There have been very few instances when we needed help from the Soviet contingent. I must say that I am proud that our own army has been able to fight so well for the masses and for the party. In reality all locations in Afghanistan are liberated today.

National Composition Created

"But there are still bands that do some damage. That is what leads the western mass media to speculate but I can assure you that the party and the government are installed everywhere in Afghanistan today. All locations are liberated. We have managed to create a national composition. Today we Afghans are proud of our courage. We are proud that our own forces haven't asked the Russians to go in ahead of them. They haven't done this. It is in line with our own national culture to go in first. We say, 'I'll go first. The bullets will come at me, not at the friend who came to my assistance.'

Gangsters Now Isolated

"But another secret reason why we have succeeded so well in these months is that we have gained the confidence of the masses in Afghanistan. The gangsters have been isolated. We are the ones who inspire confidence, not them. This is closely connected with the fact that we are the ones who stem from the masses. Anyone from the masses would not destroy them the way they do. The reactionaries have no respect for the masses. They destroy schools and housing. Village people are very poor. Often they have only one cow or a sheep. But these groups come and take away the cow or the sheep, kill the only livestock they have and eat it. It isn't hard to understand how people feel. They come to the village and ask for the prettiest woman there. Then they kidnap her. The people understand now who are their friends and who are their enemies."

Situation in Kabul Calm

But what about the cities? How about the capital, Kabul? I experienced the events in February. There were several tense days. What now?

"At that time they tried to paralyze life in the capital. When they met resistance outside Kabul they tried a new tactic by sending these groups into the city. We caught many of them. We put some in jail. We talked to a lot of them and let them go. The situation was entirely under our control. We adopted a calm attitude which proved to be fruitful. In recent months things have been calm in Kabul. The situation is stable.

"I can assure you," said Abdul Quader, "that today we are sure of our cause. Our party is a big party. We have many members. Everything is under control in the party today. In the past it could happen that some of the young people were a little pessimistic, coming up with negative views, but it is not like that today. We are sure we will succeed.

Support of Masses Important

"Another factor that strengthens us is our conviction that we have the support of all the progressive elements in the population. We are sure that they will stick with us until our revolutionary process ends in total victory and success. Revolution is revolution--and counterrevolution is counterrevolution. When the revolutionary process starts from one point counterrevolutionary elements will arise in another, groups of counterrevolutionaries. But the important thing is that we have the support of the masses. It is against this background that I can say they will not succeed. They are not capable of carrying out any military actions, like terrorist actions. They call themselves guerrillas but guerrillas are progressive. These people are not guerrilla fighters. They also say they are fighting for Islam but that is just a mask they assume. They burn the Koran. They are simply reactionary elements and that is one of their tactics.

Afghanistan Belongs to Masses

"In Afghanistan today we have a united PDPA, a party without wings. We tell everyone who has confidence in our ideology to come to the party. There are also

many people who don't want to be in the party but support it anyway. They are the ones we fight alongside in the national patriotic front. We say: fight there. We don't discriminate against people who don't belong to the party. In the government alone there are three unaffiliated members. And among department heads, half don't belong to any party. We involve everyone willing to work for Afghanistan's interests and the interests of the revolution. Our stand is that the country is not the property of the government or the party, it belongs to the masses," said Abdul Quader who concluded by characterizing the situation in these words:

"My job is to supervise national defense. If this interview had taken place in February it would have been constantly interrupted by phone calls. In these 2 hours there has been only one telephone call. That also tells you something about the situation."

6578
CSO: 8139/0410

ALGERIAN-USSR COOPERATION TALKS

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 23 Nov 80 p 3

[Text] The meeting at the Vice President level of the sixth session of the Permanent Intergovernmental Algerian Soviet Commission ended yesterday in Algiers.

During its stay in Algeria, the Soviet delegation assessed with the Algerian delegation the results of the Algerian-Soviet cooperation and discussed the prospects of development of this cooperation, especially in the sectors of agriculture, hydraulics, industry and professional and cadre training.

Talks with Party Representatives

At the end of the visit of the delegation of the USSR-Algeria Friendship Association, a meeting was held in the Zirout Youcet palace, to discuss the modalities of the forthcoming signature of the agreement protocol which should take place in Moscow early in 1981.

The meeting was held in the presence, on the Algerian side, of Kamal Bouchama, member of the Central Committee and of the Permanent Commission of the Central Committee, and Chabane Al Abderrahim, governor of Constantine and Vice Chairman of the Algerian-Soviet Friendship Association.

The Soviet delegation included Suvunov Nazar, Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Turkmenian Republic, Mr Tashliy Kurbanov, Chairman of the Union of Turkmenian Writers, Secretary of the USSR Writers' Union and Mr Anatoliy Richagov, member of the Association.

Both parties observed that by the end of the visit of the invited delegation, from November 15 to 22, new possibilities are offered to extend the area of cooperation.

The protocol draft prepared would therefore be enlarged before the signature. The Soviet delegation, which left Algiers the same day was greeted at the international airport of Houari Boumediene by Messrs Mustapha Kourdali, member of the Party's Foreign Relations Commission, in charge of friendship associations, Hadj Belayat, Secretary General of the Algerian-Soviet Friendship Associations, Oulmane and Fouanis, members of the Party's Foreign Relations Commission, also the USSR Ambassador to Algeria and the director of the Algiers Soviet Cultural Center.

Shortly before he left, Suyunov Nazar declared: "Our visit to Algeria left us with excellent impressions.

We observed the efforts of the Party and the Government to improve the standard of living of the Algerian people."

"Algeria is a large construction yard," he specified, before citing a few of the achievements of independent Algeria.

Mr Suyunov indicated that one of the objects of his visit was to become better acquainted with the Algerian people so as to talk about them to the Soviet people through the mass media.

Referring to the question of cooperation, he declared: "I believe that the development of our multisided cooperation will achieve new successes for both our nations." He also mentioned his talks with some of the Algerian authorities, during which they discussed the socio-economic development of the Turkmenian Republic.

Finally, Mr Suyunov mentioned that they had agreed to exchange delegations of Algerian and Soviet writers, taking into consideration the importance of culture for the full development of both nations.

9018
CSO: 4400

LETTER POINTS OUT FAULTY WORDING OF 'WORKERS, STAFF'

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 20 Nov 80 p 12

[Text] In your Monday 17 November edition on p 2, you publish an article whose title refers to the "unity of staff and workers." The reason I am writing to you today is that I have observed that this terminology (staff and workers) is often used in your columns.

Well, this is a faulty, even a deviationist wording, which does not in any way correspond to the definitions of the national Charter. The expression you use assumes in fact, or at least tends to have one believe, that the staff constitutes a category, if not a "class", different from the workers. The national Charter is opposed to this assumption. It defines unequivocally the fundamental social forces of the Republic, and mentions, among these forces "manual and intellectual workers" without establishing any distinction between the staff and other personnel members. For their part, the State and Party leaders have often stressed that from an ideological point of view, the staff represent an element of the category of workers, in the same way as office personnel or specialized workers. For the rest, the definition of the "worker" concept given by the national Charter and the Constitution is perfectly clear and encompasses explicitly all salaried personnel. It states: "A worker is any person who lives by the product of his work, whether it be intellectual or manual, and does not employ to his profit other workers in his professional activity." (National Charter, p 36, Constitution, Article 8).

It is true that there are other ideologies in the world, reflecting other historical conditions and manifesting other sociological situations, and which classify separately intellectuals or management and the manual workers. But the analysis of the revolutionary movement in Algeria, established by the FLN, recorded in the National Charter and approved by the whole Algerian nation, does not subscribe to such a distinction. It considers the intellectuals and salaried management staff as workers. This analysis is the only one valid for the Algerian Revolution and its militants. If for purposes of demonstration in an article, the journalist wishes to specify further, it would then be proper to use the terminology: "executive staff and personnel" which does not permit any equivocal meaning.

I am not indulging here in a "dispute over words" with "EL MOUDJAHID." I am much more concerned with a basic clarification. It would indeed be highly regrettable if the repeated use of inadequate terms or irresponsible expressions should end up by causing a certain confusion in the minds, the deviationist idea of a "class division" between manual workers and management staff.

It seemed to me the more appropriate to raise this question because in his recent message on the State of the Union, President Chadli Bendjedid has just emphasized that the "best trump of the Revolution on the way to progress is the management staff, an upright staff working in the shadow of humility."

Central Administration Staff

9018
CSO: 4400

BRIEFS

TAHER AUTOMATIC COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK--The telephone exchange of the Taher daira (Jijel governorate) has just been connected with the national automatic network by the Post and Telecommunications Services of the Jijel governorate. This telephone exchange, designed for 500 lines, may be extended to 1000 lines in a second phase. Built within the framework of the Second Four Year Plan, it was commissioned locally in August 1978. For a few days now, the telephone subscribers of this daira have been able to reach directly and easily their counterparts in different areas of the national territory. It is also indicated that the telephone exchange of the Al Milla daira (1000 to 2000 lines) will soon be operational. On the other hand, a similar installation is expected for Ferdijioua by early next year. These plants will contribute greatly to the social and economic development of the areas of the governate. The chief town of the governate has a 5000 line exchange in service since 1 November 1977. [Text] [Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 25 Nov 80 p 4] 9018

CSO: 4400

REVOLUTION MAY SUFFER FOR LACK OF STRONG PARTY

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 14 Dec 80 p 2

(Text)

X—X—X—X—X—X—X

The morning daily *Sabk-e Azadiyan* in an editorial recently said that one point that worries people in any Revolution is that after the victory of the Revolution the lack of any strong party may cause the Revolution to be deviated from its true course.

Such a phenomenon has happened in many countries for instance one of the main reasons that people deviated from the true course of the Revolution in the Cuban Revolution was that the country lacked a strong party or organization to organize people.

Prior to the peak of our revolution people were concerned that absence of any political party might hinder the Revolution and affect its outcome. But the clergy filled this gap; in other words the clergy under the leadership of Imam Khomeini made up for the absence of any political party and themselves mobilized the masses of people.

It should be said that in this process the mosques played a great role. They worked as political bases and it was in the mosques that the Revolution found its proper line and direction. The revolutionary clergymen played an effective role both in the urban centers and in the villages—they mobilized and united the masses and thus created demonstrations in which millions of people participated.

It is ironic, that these same people who led the masses are now being asked to wash their hands of the politics of the country just because they have refused to hand down before the criminal United States. Nothing would make the leaders of the U.S. government more happy than to see that in Iran the clergy are being put aside and instead that a group of liberals are taking their place. *Sabk-e Azadiyan* pointed out.

It would be a disaster for the Revolution if the true followers of the line of the Imam are pushed out of the political arena. We should not let the revolutionary clergy, those who are in the line of the Imam be isolated and attacked by agents of foreigners and suspicious elements.

The respect towards the clergy has deep roots in the country, but the liberals, because of their interests have opposed the committed clergy. However, these elements ~~will~~ ^{are} uninterested that the masses are aware of all these movements and plots.

The article concluded by saying, those who are trying to damage the Constitutional Law approved by the masses and the nation should know that the masses will deal with them and thwart their plots.

CSO: 4920

'POLITICAL PRAYER' ON 'MAKTAB' PUBLISHED

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 14 Dec 80 p 2

[Text of "Nonajat-E-Siyasi -- Political Prayer"]

[Text]

OH GOD! I see that you have fulfilled the desire of the officials for "maktabizing" the organs and institutions. And have also made all the conspirators and "liberals" meet their punishment which means to get suffocated!

You have rescued the government from the machete of those who valued "expertise". And have liberated the nation from the claws of those independence seekers who do not accept the supervision of responsibilities!

You have singly conducted the government in order that a just more are the people from dispersions.

And have abolished the roots of dispersion in such a way that even the Marists, affiliated with Eastern Super-power, have come into the Line of Imam and are openly and heedlessly fulfilling their political "duties."

You have turned the newspapers by the hands of maktab with "mazka".

And have "maktabized" the radio and television in such a way that left no forbearance for the President, elected by the people, to have an interview therewith!

You have made the hearts come so close together that the wolf and the cow drink water from one stream and the Tudeh Party becomes the supporter of the clergy!

You have so promoted the freedom that the people get optimistic.

And have brushed aside the extra formalities of elections by staging of demonstrations to drive a deputy out of Parliament and assist the shinginess of Parliament.

You have so convinced the officials that, contented only when all Power fronts are conquered, they do not get anxious for the shortcomings of the nation.

To invite the people and, by shouting dogma, stop them from production which is the aesthetic style of Eastern and Western craftsmen.

You have detached us from export of oil, and procurement of currency that is an others' desire, and have attached us with a dogma-oriented export of revolution!

You have rescued us from the cursed importation that caused filled stomachs at home and an emasculation of men and women at the factory.

OH GOD! The radio and television unit sings day and night these blessings in my ears and invites me to be grateful.

But in spite of the universities being closed down - and there remained no other place to have an excess for temptation - yet again this conceitiveness, this moulding intellect and this bridled thought hurls me into temptation.

Last our maktabia, God forbid it, learnt nothing in the maktab except power-seeking and all they have done and are doing is a means to fool me.

OH GOD! Now that I have no strength to flee from this mad intellect, at least blind my eyes and deafen my ears so that I breathe with comfort under the shadow of blindness and deafness!

Amen! Oh God of the All-Oppressed!

HEAVY BANK WITHDRAWALS HURTING ECONOMY

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 15 Dec 80 p 2

[Text]

TEHRAN -- During the past two months many thousands of Iranians have withdrawn their savings from the banks reducing the cash on hand in the banks to the lowest level since the culmination of the Islamic Revolution, and thereby preventing the banking system from fulfilling its potential role in the development of industries in Iran.

The government authorities have urged the people several times recently to deposit their cash in the banks and to be reassured that whenever and wherever they might need their money they would be given their entire cash without the slightest delay.

But the government's efforts have yet fallen short of giving many of the people the reassurance they need. Below is a review of background and an analysis of the problem in the country's economic system, and the observations of prominent figures and banking experts.

Many thousands of Iranians had withdrawn billions of rials in cash from the private banks and the Bank Mell (National Bank) of Iran during the Islamic Revolution. They were prompted in their doing so by several considerations: firstly because as the Revolution gained impetus many banks (beginning with the Bank Saderat of Iran in which the business magnate of the shah's regime Hushair Yassani was said to have been the principal share holder) were set on fire by angry revolutionaries though such acts were never endorsed by Imam Khomeini.

The regular attacks against the banks throughout the country made especially the more dauntless, as well as the less discerning people, withdraw their cash from the banks.

Many people, too, did so in for the purpose of bringing economic blows upon the ex-shah's regime with the hope that they would thereby speed up his downfall from the throne. The ex-shah's regime, however, did not last long enough to be faced with the potential economic problems that might have been caused by the outflow of the people's cash from the banks.

As it could be expected, the Iranian people deposited their cash their cash on hand in the banks immediately after the culmination of the Islamic Revolution. Sometime later the government said that the Western system of banking did not conform to Islamic principles.

The promoter of the idea was President Baniadr who was then the Minister of Economy and Financial Affairs. Baniadr who had done extensive studies during his college years in Iran and Europe for making the modern banking system conformable with Islamic interest-free banking finally came up with his plans for interest-free banking in Iran.

The plan was almost immediately put into practice. From then all loans (excluding industrial loans) to persons, real or corporate were interest-free except for a small sum under 'service and handling' charges. Holders of savings and other types of deposits received a sum under the heading of "net profit." This sum is proportional with their balance each month of the year.

The elimination of interest from the banking system in Iran has contributed to the promotion of a sound economy consistent with Islamic principles. The Iranian people have welcomed this reform and have been pleased with it.

But recently and for the first time since the culmination of the Revolution many of the Iranian people have been pulling their money out of the banks. The reason? The war with Iraq, and the prospects of an unstable economy looming ahead.

As more and more people continued closing their savings accounts and other deposits, the issue caused increased concern among the government authorities and the industrialists. Some weeks ago the Governor of Bank Markazi (the Central Bank) of Iran, Alireza Nobari, suggested to the Imam the idea of giving 'cash prizes' to holders of savings and other types of deposit accounts in the banks for the purpose of attracting more of the people's cash money to the banks, and the Imam approved of the move as being consistent with Islamic principles.

The idea helped to bring some more cash to the banks, but all in all it fell short of increasing the cash reserves to the level required by an ailing economy. Which in the face of the war and the economic blockade still seeks to rid itself from the bonds of foreign dependence.

But experts and government authorities have almost invariably acknowledged that depleting of the banks from cash money is a clear sign of the people's lack of confidence in the government's economic policies, while many of them have attributed the phenomena to plots being carried out against the state by counter-revolutionaries. Below are excerpts from those interviewed.

President Bani-Sadr

I think the government should encourage the people to put their savings in the bank. The Imam said some days ago that this can be done by creating an 'atmosphere of security' about the banking system, so that the people might do so with optimum assurance. I hope our people will regain their faith in the firmness of this regime and will thereby place their trust in our banking system and shall provide for prosperous days ahead.

Prime Minister Rajai

...There is absolutely no reason to believe that our banks might refuse to pay out cash to their clients at any time in the future. Why? Because all the banks here are nationalized. They belong to the people and the people's money in the banks will always be protected against all future contingencies.

Governor of Bank Markazi, Alireza Nobari

Our people should place their trust in our banking system, and should return their cash to the bank for safekeeping. The banks now belong to the people and prizes have also been considered for the people's deposits. We'll announce the rate of the cash prizes payable to the deposit accounts later on.

Ayatollah Montazeri

On the one hand we are involved with the war imposed on us by Iraq, while on the other we are tackling the problems of an economic blockade against us by the United States. We should give whatever help to the government we can. Put your cash money in the banks and feel sure that nothing will happen to it. I guarantee your deposits in the banks.

Majlis Speaker Hojjatoleslam Rafsanjani

I think only two groups of our people might have withdrawn their money from the banks. First some perfectly well-informed people, who ever been dissatisfied with the Revolution, have done so for a wicked purpose, and secondly another group of material people who have been led into believing that in the process of the current war the people's deposits in the banks might be in danger, which belief is totally unfounded. We will never cripple our own economy.

We will never do anything for abolishing banking regulations or for nullifying our bank's commitments with respect to the people's deposits. Our people should feel assured that our government, due to its adherence to 'Islamic' principles will never be prompted to take such indirect and un-conceived measures as to seize people's assets in the banks.

Deputy Minister of Economy and Financial Affairs Dr. Nurbaksh

... Fortunately in the wake of the recent statement of Mr. Prime Minister many of our fellow countrymen have brought in their cash on hand to the banks. I would like to assure our people that we have rich foreign exchange reserves, and that the government guarantees the people's deposits.

Deputy Director of Bank Mellî (National Bank) of Iran, Taleqani

...I think certain misunderstandings prevailed in the minds of the public due to the interference of unauthorized people in this concern until recently but luckily the frank assurances to the people by many of our government authorities helped to put an end to all the public mistrust and misunderstandings. The reason for the diminishing volume of cash money in our banks in the recent weeks should be sought in problems prevailing in transportation and communication systems. I can assure you that our people will bring back their cash money to the banks if only sufficient cash money were provided to the banks.

Dean of the School of Economy of the University of Tehran, Dr. Qadiri Aslli

The people should be able to receive their deposits upon demand. The views of the clergy and the requests from the people of government authorities such as the person of the President and the Prime Minister can generate fresh confidence in the minds of the people that their deposits will remain safe.

Majlis Deputy Dr. Reza Esfahani

The people who have withdrawn their deposits from the banks because of their lack of trust in the country's political status, are in fact harming the country's ailing economy, since the diminishing of the volume of cash in our banks will adversely affect the country's economic balance. I would like to reassure our people that owing to the Almighty our banks can be trusted, and I hope soon the war crisis will end in the victory of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Therefore at a juncture like this not only should our people refrain from withdrawing their deposits from the banks but they should even try to increase their bank deposits thereby enabling our banks to fulfill their tasks in the economic life of the country.

MARRIAGE LOANS ATTRACT MANY APPLICANTS

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 15 Dec 80 p 1

[Article by Mehdi Sharafi]

[Text]

TEHRAN - A long queue of enthusiastic Iranian youths was witnessed yesterday opposite the center of the Financial Services Foundation on the first day of filling up forms to apply for an interest-free Islamic loan or "Qars-ul-Hassaneh" being provided by the government to help the unmarried people meet the marriage expenses.

The Islamic loan also means that once the unmarried are married, they can either pay back the loan when their financial resources can withstand it, or they can withhold the payments until such a time as when their financial position genuinely restricts them to do so.

The "marriage" loan or "elect life partner" loan is between 100,000 to 500,000 rials and payable in long-term installments is only approved for

- (a) Those who did not marry before.
- (b) The minimum age should not exceed 30 years.
- (c) Those who have a valid guarantor.
- (d) After a month of their marriage, stamped identification cards should be presented certifying that the marriage indeed took place.
- (e) Any age hinting at "maturity and readiness" for marriage just like "eating food" for which the "hunger and need" of the human being should be paid attention to.
- (f) Ask the concerned office for other details.

The Persian Kayhan daily reported that applicants complained the authorities were asking for a "membership fees" of Rials 5,000 which is an essential requirement to get the loan.

The newspaper quoted an applicant as saying that authorities said the membership fees would not be returned "regardless of whether the loan is granted or not."

The "future-builders" program was severely critical of the "Western culture" that had "prostitution" in it.

The radio also asked the youths to make a right selection of the opposite sex "with the help of their parents."

The program said the prospective to-be-marrieds should take steps with "commitment" and "not like the Westerners whose relations are devoid of any commitments."

It invited the nation to "increase the population" and contended that in view of the "substantial reservoirs" and "vast Iranian territory" had a place for "increment of population without any limitations."

CSO: 4920

FRIDAY SERMONS STRESS POLITICAL MESSAGES

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 14 Dec 80 p 2

[Text]

TEHRAN -- The religious-political Friday prayer ceremonies were held mostly in the Jamiyah mosques of the provincial cities and the participants reaffirmed their alliance with the clergy and the Velayat-e-Rahbar and condemned the "conspiracies of internal agents" of the superpowers, reported the Fars news agency.

'REVEAL THE CONSPIRATORS'

SANDAR ABBAS -- The demonstrators carried the posters of Ayatullah Mohammad Beheshti, Housseini Montazari, Rafsanjani and Premier Mohammad Ali Rajai and marched to the city mosque shouting "Liberate the clergy is the enemy of Islam" and "the plot of every conspiracy should be condemned, the agents of every conspiracy should be made known".

WARNING TO THE SO-CALLED REVOLUTIONARIES

FABRUZ -- Friday prayers leader, Ayatullah Madani, warned in the religious gathering at Imam Khomeini Square that a group of so-called revolutionaries have infiltrated into the state organs to frustrate the nation.

"I warn these type of people that if they do not take their hands off the deviating acts, I will introduce them to the revolutionary courts", said Madani.

A tribal mobilization official also detailed and appreciated the epic of tribal clash in the Iran-Iraq war.

ANTI-REVOLUTIONARIES ASSASSINATING PERSONALITIES

SHANREKORD -- Friday prayers leader, Hojjatoleslam Nasravi, told the gathering that anti-revolutionaries are assassinating the personalities "to continue its rule for a few days more".

Nasravi did not elaborate on who these ruling anti-revolutionaries might be.

OFFICE WORKERS SHOULD NOT BAD-TALK ISLAMIC REPUBLIC

YAZD -- Friday prayers leader, Ayatullah Saikooq, told prayers that those who are in the office should not bad-talk on the leadership and Islamic Republic "under any reason and under any title".

'YOU HAVE NOT REVOLUTIONIZED FOR OIL AND RICE'

ZAHEDAN -- The Friday prayers leader, in an apparent reference to the rationing on essential commodities, told the crowd that "you have not revolutionized for oil and rice. You have revolutionized to rescue your Maktab. The sign of clenched fists and shouting slogans is not the indication of being a revolutionary".

The leader charged that the Ba'athist Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein, is playing "the Moslems against each other".

But the Imam's representative claimed that "you Moslem people will reduce traitor Saddam to his own place."

'SADDAM'S MOUSTACHE TO BE RUBBED ON THE DUST LIKE HIS MASTERS'

ISFAHAN -- Friday prayers leader, Ayatullah Taheri, referred to "deviating propaganda infiltrated in the people's ranks" during the time of first Shi'ite Imam, Hazrat Ali (AS).

Taheri said similar influences were being rooted in the people's mind now and should be thrown out "in order for Saddam's moustache to be rubbed on the dust just like his masters".

THE KREMLIN-WHITE HOUSE HOTLINE

KERMANSHAH -- Tehran's Hojatolislam Mohajeri went to the Friday prayers gathering in Kermanshah.

Mohajeri referred to the "incidents after the revolution" and told the crowd that the Soviet Union still faced numerous shortcomings after the success of its now 60-year old revolution.

If the United States did not reveal the Soviet shortcomings it was the result of the "Red Telephone" line between the Kremlin and the White House the joint interests of whom links the two superpowers together.

'CLERGY IS NOT SOMEONE WHO SELLS HIS COUNTRY', HEJAZI

KERMAN -- Tehran's Parliament deputy, Sayyed Fakhreddin Hejazi, participated in the Friday prayers and told the crowd that "we will protect this government at any cost and will propagate it in the world... the history has shown us that clergy is not someone who sells his own country to the foreigners".

Kerman's Friday prayers leader, Hojatolislam Sayyed Yahya Jasafari, cautioned the audience that cold water should not be thrown on the marriages of the youth.

He "asked the families to refrain from throwing stones in the way of the marriages of the youths".

Jasafari was not reported having elaborated on that score.

GIVE UP DEFENSE AND ATTACK

JIRAN -- "Armed Forces should give up defensive and develop offensive attitude".

The Friday prayers leader in the southern Khuzestan Province asked the people and all groups to feel their responsibilities to move forward to help the war-ridden.

Hojatolislam Sheikh Mohammed Sadiq Taheri then went on to address the military commanders, officers, and the Revolutionary Guards saying, "Today the nation wants of you to give up the defensive attitude and to blacken the life of Saddam with an aggressive attitude.

"If all the forces get united, we can destroy the Army of Saddam within the period of a week", claimed Taheri.

The President, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Abolhassan Banisadr had advised sometime ago that the "first phase" to stop the enemy from advancing more into the Iranian territory was a "success".

The Commander-in-Chief had also declared that the "second phase" of military operations had already been commenced "to push back the enemy from the Iranian soil."

GODLY DUTY TO HELP WAR-STRICKEN PEOPLE

TEHRAN — To help the unfortunate, unsheltered war-ridden refugees is a human, Godly duty "and ignorance of this God's order will entail a "responsibility" and a punishment in the next world", warned Ayatollah Ashrafi Isfahani.

The Kermanshah Friday prayers leader Friday appealed in a communique to provide assistance to the refugees in whatever form the committed people can to overcome a fresh series of hardships.

The Imam's representative told in the communique that a group of the refugees and innocent children were suffering in absence of accommodation and essential requirements of life and are bearing the snowfall and the cold season by living under tents and poor clothes.

Hundreds of thousands of people who left their homes and belongings behind near the troubled Iran-Iraq borders have migrated to other cities and have taken refuge as a direct result of the war.

ARAB PUBLICATION VIEWS INTERNAL POLITICS

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 5 Sep 80 pp 32-33

[Article by Mirwan al'Asli: "Israel Plunges Ahead With Policy of Settlements and Land Confiscation"]

[Text] The number of Israelis who think that the tenth Knesset elections will be held as scheduled in November 1981 is growing smaller by the day.

The number of those who are convinced that the elections will be held before that date is growing continuously, especially in view of the fact that the Likud ship of state which took over the reins of power in Israel more than 3 years ago under the leadership of Begin is still being immersed in internal whirlwinds, one after the other, and is still being hit by storms raging against it from abroad, whether from international assemblies or the international community.

For several months there have been high expectations in Israel that Begin's government was about to fall and that the Knesset elections would be held this summer. It was said that the summer would be a hot one for the Israeli political parties.

When the "Shay" movement submitted a proposal to the Knesset several weeks ago to move up the date of the elections, the Labor Party, in opposition to the Likud government, launched the battle it has been waiting for impatiently since its defeat in the last elections in 1977, in order to win power and restore the glory of its party. However, the vote on the Shay Party's proposal brought the defeat of that segment of Israelis who were awaiting the hour of salvation from the Begin government.

The Likud government has been facing extremely difficult conditions due to its political practices, its economic plans, the flaring up of social problems, and confrontations in the occupied territories. Problems have been continuously arising within both the seat of government and Israeli society. All this has been causing more economic difficulties, more political isolation and more social divisions. Therefore, some Israeli observers have reached the point of pushing the alarm button and saying that the Begin government will not remain in power long, no matter how stubbornly Begin tries to continue on the courses he has set for his government and no matter how much the Likud coalition tries to find

temporary solutions in face of the cries of distress among the exasperated Israeli public.

The degree of alarm surrounding the Begin government was made clear several weeks ago when Interior Minister Dr Yosef Burg, head of the "Mafdal Party," said, "This government will not be able to hold out until the end of its legal mandate."

Also that same day, as certain Israeli newspapers mentioned, Burg did not moderate his opinion that the tenth Knesset elections will be held earlier than scheduled, possibly next spring.

Today, many Israelis share the opinion of their interior minister. They think that inevitably something will happen to cause the elections to be held sooner than scheduled.

Certain observers of Israel feel that the election battle has actually begun, that the contest for Knesset seats will begin to heat up at the end of this summer, and that next fall and winter we will witness an outbreak of party disputes. This is especially true since there was a new hike in oil prices 2 weeks ago, and that will cause other price hikes in basic necessities. It is true also because next winter will be difficult, just as last winter was after oil prices rose and caused insomnia within the Israeli society where the highest rate of inflation in the world has been eating away at the economy for the last 3 years. The rate of inflation there recently reached 133 percent and is continuously rising.

The bitter truth many are facing has to do with a question which arises insistently: "What will save the Israeli society from the dangers surrounding it socially, economically and politically--the Likud remaining in power or the return of the Ma'arakh?"

The confusion of the Israelis, or of some of them at least--and they seem to be a large portion in any case--resembles more than anything else the confusion which tore the Israeli society apart on the eve of the last Knesset elections in 1977. At that time the question repeatedly asked was, "What will save the Israeli society from a deterioration of its political conditions, once party disputes have flared up and the economy has been begun to decline--the Ma'arakh remaining in power or the Likud coming to power?"

The battle of the next Knesset elections, whether they are held in the spring or fall of 1981, will not be a simple battle according to observers.

Some say that the battle has actually begun sooner than expected, and that the Labor Party is the one which joined it when its top party officials began making contact with the public in Israel, including the Arab public, more than 3 months ago.

Others say that the election battle was joined by members of the Likud when the director of the prime minister's cabinet published a memorandum of 13 pages including what it called the achievements of Begin's government for the people of Israel.

Observers felt that this memorandum was the "first shot" in the war of the next elections and that the battle had begun once the two big parties in Israel, the Likud and the Ma'arakh, hurled accusations at each other regarding certain problems. These included Begin's calling on the people of Israel to contribute one day's pay to the state treasury, Ma'arakh's response urging the public not to pay, Finance Minister Yigael Hurwitz' warning about the establishment of the Palestinian state if the Labor Party were to return to power and the party's reply that his words were "hollow, cheap demagogic."

In Israel they are now saying that Begin fired the first shot of the elections when he refused late last June to move up the date of the next Knesset elections. He said by way of justification that summoning Israelis to elections ahead of time would mean surrendering the reins of power to the Ma'arakh and, consequently, surrendering "Judea and Samaria"--in other words, the occupied West Bank--to the PLO.

In Israel they are also saying that one of the party games played by Begin in confronting his Ma'arakh enemies was to stand behind passage of the Jerusalem bill, or the "Ge'ula Cohen bill" as Israelis call it, for the purpose of heating up party competition before the Israeli electorate.

Commentators on the issue say that the next electoral race will lead Israel toward greater intransigence and extremism and that the begging for the Israeli electorate's votes will make the battle fierce among the parties and will also make it a field for the right-wing race in the domain of appeals, statements and pronouncements as well as in the domain of applications, decisions and achievements in real terms, especially with regard to the occupied territories.

The real fears of observers in essence are that the coming months will see practical steps, especially in the occupied territories, such as more settlement, more heavy-handed measures, more confiscation of land and more economic pressure. All this will lead to more difficulties for Israel in facing the world, the Arabs and dissatisfied Israelis.

These observers expect that Israeli extremists will grow in number and that their backing of members of the Likud will give the latter the necessary support in the coming elections. Also, this competition, according to these observers, will push members of the Ma'arakh toward more rightist extremism in their attempt to keep up with members of the Likud in the arena of the party race. This may consequently push them toward more intransigent positions, especially in the occupied territories.

In this connection, it is worth our mentioning that there is confusion over what was said late last June by Jad'un Jaddut, chief of information for the Herut Party, when he commented on a recent meeting between Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky and Yitzhak Rabin. After he pointed out the deep-seated conflict between Rabin and his competitor Peres for the leadership of the Labor Party, he said, "It is clear that Peres and Rabin are ready to agree with those calling for recognition of the PLO."

On the other hand, some observers of Israeli party affairs say that the coming electoral battle will have different features than those which Israel has been accustomed to in the past.

They assert that the Israeli parties are currently going through a period of unprecedented, harsh, internal dissension. This dissension will grow with the coming electoral battle. It may ultimately bring in a new parliament of "various colors." Consequently, it may bring in an Israeli government which does not have an absolute majority or which is incapable of passing resolutions easily in the future.

These suppositions cannot be easily verified at this time. The battle is still in its infancy. Perhaps it will be convenient to examine the expected results once the electoral battle in Israel has been underway for a time. Today one can study the current picture of Israeli party life and throw some light on certain expected phenomena in the Israeli political arena.

The Israeli political map may seem complicated these days. At first an Arab may find prominent differences and think that the distances separating the various parties or wings in a party represent radical or profound conflicts and that the splits among them are great.

Perhaps this is true with regard to internal Israeli political activity. Perhaps there are important conflicts. However, a fact which cannot be overlooked is that Israeli political activity rallies around Zionism as a movement with an ideology, a plan, a program of action and a program for application, and that the one exception is the Communist Rakah Party.

According to certain observers, the conflicts concern only tactics and touch on Zionist strategy only very minimally.

Any conversation with Israelis these days about their party problems immediately provokes a seemingly "defensive" response. They say that internal divisions among the parties and within a party is something which has been associated with party life in Israel since its creation and is proof of how widespread democracy is in Israeli life!

The fact is that all the parties, with the exception of RAKAH and the Democratic Front which heads it, are Zionist parties, as we have already said, and are experiencing what may be called the ordeal of fumbling about, due to the consequences of conditions in Israel from the occupation of 1967 until the present.

Although the phenomenon attracting attention in the Israeli political map is the fact that divisions have taken a new form during the last few years, there is now competition for party leadership. In the Herut Party headed by Begin, for instance, there is the so-called "legacy war." The reason for this is the likelihood that Begin will step down from leadership of the party if his doctors advise him to retire to preserve his health or if he dies suddenly from the weak heart he has complained about.

As is well known in party circles, there are two fronts within the party. One supports Israeli Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir and is known as the "Shamir

front," and the other supports former defense minister Ezer Weizman and is called the "Weizman men." This division has caused concern within the Likud coalition because observers feel that it won't be "qualified" or capable of entering the elections and ensuring success. Defeat would make matters more complicated, since observers would expect the party of the Liberals to withdraw from the coalition. Some even expect the Liberals would join the Ma'arakh grouping in case of an election defeat, and this would be the definite end of the Likud coalition.

Other circles say that Begin's withdrawal at an appropriate time because of his illness would provide the Likud an opportunity for winning the elections if internal conflicts flare up at the last moment or a short time before the elections.

Therefore, some observers within the Herut Party feel that the only way out of the present party crisis is for Weizman to form a new middle-of-the-road front--in other words, to establish a new party--including men from other party movements. The independence of action in the two fronts, the Shamir front and the Weizman men, would ensure the success of the Likud in the coming elections.

Nevertheless, some vehemently resist the idea, because the establishment of a new party would tend to weaken Herut first of all and consequently weaken the entire Likud. It would reduce the coalition's chances of winning votes which would help it win a majority and make it possible to govern.

The picture inside the Labor Party isn't any better. The conflicts are deep-rooted between the two wings--one headed by Shimon Peres and known as "Alif" and the other headed by Yitzhak Rabin and known as "Aurim."

Observers say that the latter wing has not yet officially announced its competition with Peres for the post of party leadership, and this tends to add to the dilution of conditions within the party itself at the present time. The announcement of its candidacy would mean a flare-up in the fight for leadership within the party, and the party's fate in the next elections would be uncertain.

The Herut's twin party in the Likud is the Liberal Party. The picture inside it is also divided, especially after the recent elections if the head of the central bureau and the head of the party leadership. There have been two rival factions, with a difference of only one or two votes between them in every election held. Observers have seen clear proof in these results that the party is truly divided and incapable of possessing strong political effectiveness.

The situation is no different in the other small parties. MAFDAL (the party of religious nationalists) is currently suffering from new division, especially after Minister of Religious Affairs Aharon Abu-Hatzeira fired Director of the Ministry of Religious Affairs Yisrael Lebel.

It is common knowledge that the party formerly had two wings--one comprising the group of Interior Minister Yosef Burg and called "the Maifni," that is "the former ones" and the other comprising the group of Minister of Culture Zevulun Hammer and called "the Young Guards." The party's position has become very grave during the last 6 months. It has come to include a third wing rallying around Minister

of Religious Affairs Aharon Abu-Hatzeira and called "Likud and Tamura." These divisions have greatly complicated the party's position. Their effect is still felt on the street in Israel as well as in the Israeli press these days.

As for conditions in the Democratic Party, the shaky picture seems funny, because the party, as an Israeli journalist says, exists only in the person of three ministers in the government and four members of the current parliament.

Members of the movement are divided among the other parties like the Liberals, the Rafi group and the Ma'arakh, etc.

An Israeli journalist said of them, "What has ensured the continued existence of the Democratic Party so far is the fact that they retain a good portion of party funds allocated to them by the Israeli government. The remaining members await the disappearance of one after another of them until the last one gets the party treasury full of money. Then the heart of the party will stop beating once and for all."

In any case, the picture of the actual state of Israeli parties, as seen by observers, confirms that the deterioration of economic conditions, the alarming increase in political problems and the widening of the gap in social differences ever since Begin came to power have caused a deterioration of the position of parties themselves. Division has been growing by the day as a result of the continuous stream of problems arising in Israel, both for the government and the people. The surest proof of the degree and the ugliness of divisions on the Israeli political map is the fact that a party grouping is now in the process of being formed in Israel, because its supporters have not been able to obtain telephones from the Postal Authority!

During the last 3 years Begin's government has caused the various segments of Israelis as much suffering as it has complicated problems and confused stands. All these have reflected on political and party life as well as on economic and social life and have placed Israel on the threshold of a difficult test. The electorate and the parties all stand at a fateful fork in the road. Either they enter a rational historical period or they drown in a sea of extremism without end.

7811
CSO: 4802

ISRAELI WATER POLICY SEEN INJURIOUS TO ARABS

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 14 Sep 80 pp 15-16

[Article by Raymond al-Tawil: "The Arab Gardens Are Parched, and Water Goes To the Settlements First"]

[Text] The first condition laid down by Israel in the autonomy talks with Egypt and the United States was that this autonomy, when established, would apply only to the population, not to the land and the natural resources, especially water.

Israeli officials have constantly stressed this condition, insisting on the need for Israel to control the lands of the West Bank for two purposes: first, to establish settlements, and second, to ensure the free flow of rain water stored by the West Bank mountain aquifer, since the West Bank immediately consumes 200 million cubic meters out of an original 700 million cubic meters, the rest being stored by the aquifer. In case Israeli control of the West Bank ends, the Arabs will be able to drill as many wells as they wish in the West Bank and the Jordan Valley, thereby reducing the stored water in Israel, since the aquifer-stored water in the West Bank constitutes one-third of Israel's yearly consumption. Israel is trying to cover its increased water consumption by developing its own water resources.

In its 5 June 1978 issue, HA'ARETZ mentioned that Israel will face a 400-450 million cubic meter shortage by the beginning of the 1970's, and that there would be a shortage of drinking water for local consumption, which would force Israel to make up this shortage at the expense of water allocated for agriculture. It said that inasmuch as geographic Palestine relies basically on rainfall in the northern part of the country and on the waters of the Jordan River, these limited sources would be insufficient to meet the increasing needs of Israeli consumption, especially when it comes to establishing agricultural settlements in the Jordan Valley, which consume half of the West Bank's yearly consumption.

The first one to call attention to the need to exploit Jordan River water was the English Zionist engineer Walter Sladerook (transliterated), who in 1944 referred to the possibility of building electricity and agricultural projects by intelligently exploiting the Jordan River, thereby enabling the Zionist movement to accommodate 4 million Jews in Palestine and employ the Arabs there as workers on these projects. He also said that the Arabs who refused or resisted these projects could be transported to the Jazirah area of Iraq, inasmuch as it was an agricultural region capable of accommodating them. He suggested that the Zionists build a canal from the Mediterranean to the Dead Sea to produce electricity.

In the early 1950's, Israel invited an official from the state of Tennessee to supervise its Jordan River projects in cooperation with the Mikorot Water Company established in 1936 by the Jewish Agency and the Histadrut. At present there is a crisis between Israel and Jordan because Israel is protesting the construction of the al-Maqarin Dam on the Yarmuk River, claiming that Jordan's share of the river has dropped since 1967 because the West Bank now belongs to Israel, not Jordan, and therefore Israel's share has increased, according to its claims, from 23 million to 40 million cubic meters. All of this is aimed at covering increased water consumption, which in 1978 was distributed as follows: 1.2 billion cubic meters for agriculture, 320 million cubic meters for local consumption, and 70 million cubic meters for industrial consumption, totalling 1.59 billion cubic meters. At the same time, Israel's water capacity was distributed as follows: 950 million cubic meters in ground water, 600 million cubic meters in Jordan River and Lake Tiberias waters, and 30 million cubic meters in waterfalls and springs, totalling 1.63 billion cubic meters.

No Wells For the Arabs

In the 26 November 1978 issue of DAVAR, Imru Naghan said that the sources of Israel's and the West Bank's water were the same, and that luckily for Israel West Bank agriculture is undeveloped, the West Bank per capita consumption of water being only 40 cubic meters a year, while the Israeli consumes 120 cubic meters a year and the Israeli settler on the West Bank consumes 100 cubic meters a year. Total West Bank water consumption amounts to 30 million cubic meters coming from 331 wells scattered throughout the West Bank, the maximum depth of which is 60 meters. After 1967, no Arab citizen has been allowed to drill an artesian well for irrigation; only 7 wells have been permitted, specifically for citizens' consumption, public services such as municipalities, and so forth. Meanwhile, Israel has drilled 22 artesian wells, 17 of which in the Jordan Valley have a capacity of 14 million cubic meters a year as of 1978, i.e. about one-half the capacity of the original 331 wells in the West Bank. The reason for this greater capacity is that the Israeli wells are deeper and are drilled close to Arab water sources, some of them reaching depths of 400 meters.

As a result of this policy, 12 Arab wells have dried up and 6 other wells are gradually drying up, all in the Jordan Valley close to wells recently drilled by the Israelis. In addition, the Israeli authorities have taken over the wells belonging to Arab refugees who fled the West Bank after the 1967 war, and whom the authorities have not allowed to return to their land.

Water For the Settlements

The wells drilled by the Israeli Mikorot Company, in addition to the confiscated wells, are intended to ensure the water needs of the Israeli settlements on the West Bank, of which there are 150, not to mention the Gaza and Golan settlements.

Most of the water goes to the al-Ghur settlements in the Jordan Valley, which in 1979 numbered 23 settlements on 77,200 dunums of land taken away from Arab farmers. The Israeli authorities also confiscated 140 water pumps along the Jordan River which the Arab citizens had been using to irrigate the confiscated land. Six wells were drilled in the Jordanian al-Ghur area close to Arab wells which had

existed prior to 1967. At the al-'Awjah watersource, 2 wells were drilled, and another well is being drilled. These 3 wells are for irrigating the Itaf settlement. Also, 2 wells were drilled in Wadi Fasayil, only 200 meters away from the 'Ayn Fasayil watersource, which irrigates Arab lands. By drilling these 2 wells, the authorities intend to irrigate land on which the Israeli Fafsayil settlement has been built.

These 5 wells are connected to a general grid irrigating 20,000 donums of land in the Jordan Valley on which the Itaf, Naran, Haghdu, Ghalghal, Tawmar, Fafsayil and Miswah settlements were built. The Israeli wells will have a serious effect on the West Bank aquifer, especially in the Jordan Valley, since Israel is plundering an incalculable amount of water, its first concern being ensuring its settlements' needs at the expense of the Arab citizens, who are forced to abandon their lands because water is unavailable.

Damage To the Arabs

The damages suffered by the Arab citizens as a result of Israel's water policy can be summarized as follows.

1. Twelve Arab wells have dried up as a result of the drilling of settlement wells close to these wells; some of the dried-up wells are those for the villages of Bardalah and 'Ayn al-Bayda.
2. Other wells have been shut down because vast areas of land have been closed off for military purposes.
3. Water consumption has dropped because the Arab farmers have been forced to install meters on the water sources to limit the amount of water extracted, according to licenses which do not allow them to exceed a certain level.
4. Six Arab wells were confiscated in al-Zaydat and Marj Najih, and signed over to Israeli settlements.
5. The capacity of Arab wells has dropped, which led to the destruction of banana and citrus crops in the al-'Awjah area in 1970. The farmers' losses amounted to about 3 million Israeli pounds.
6. Some 140 pumps which had ensured water for Arab lands were taken away.
7. The farmers have been prohibited from using the channels in the plantations of the al-Jaftalak area, which has led to the dessication of many such plantations.
8. Arab agricultural growth has declined because of the prohibition from drilling new wells for agricultural use since 1967.
9. Agricultural cooperative societies have been prevented from getting loans, Arab towns have been prohibited from improving their circumstances, and those societies have not been allowed to import modern tools and equipment.

BRIEFS

NEW JORDANIAN-ZIONIST NEGOTIATIONS -- King Husayn is conducting negotiations, on a regular basis, with the leaders of the Zionist enemy in each of Eilat and 'Aqabah at the rate of 3 to 4 meetings per month. Informed sources state that these meetings were resumed since the beginning of 'Id al-Adha and are still continuing. Shimon Peres, the opposition leader of the Zionist entity, declared that he made contacts with King Husayn during his last visit to London. Peres said: "There were definitely several meetings with King Husayn and I tried to talk him into staying out of a PLO-related solution." Peres thinks that he succeeded in that. He also thinks that his Labor Party's stands are considered an "opportunity that must be seized by King Husayn." Peres also promised that, if he was re-elected, his party will not oppose the Jordanian regime's supremacy in some West Bank areas if the Jordanians sign a peace treaty with Israel. Shimon Peres had previously announced on 14 February 1980, on the Israeli radio station, that he had made contacts with King Husayn when he was in London, where Peres was attending the meetings of the Socialist International Parties. He said that King Husayn specified the meeting date in some place in London. We do not know if the Amman Summit Conference will commission King Husayn or someone else to continue the negotiations with the Zionist enemy. The competition now is between Siad Barre and Gaafar Nimeire. Nimeiri will win because Siad Barre is neither fluent in Arabic nor in Hebrew. [Text] [Damascus AL-BA'TH in Arabic 27 Nov 80 p 3] 9455

CSO: 4802

VARIOUS OFFICIAL REACTIONS TO REAGAN'S VICTORY AS RELATED TO ARABS

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 6 Nov 80 p 3

[Article: "Sabah al-Ahmad Says: 'We Must Change Before Demanding That America Change Its Policy'"]

[Text] It is important to us as Arabs that President Reagan try to comprehend the status of the Palestine question.

It is expected that Reagan will take a hard-line position concerning the hostage issue.

'Awni (Battash) says: "Both Reagan's America and Carter's America are our number one enemy."

Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad, the deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, said that the results of the American presidential election are an internal American matter which concerns only the American people, regardless of who becomes president.

In this first official Kuwaiti comment concerning the results of the American presidential election, which was won by Ronald Reagan, the nominee of the Republican Party, Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad added: "Above all, it is important to us as Arabs that the new president try to comprehend our crucial issue, which is the Palestine question." Concerning the probability of a change occurring in American policy toward issues concerning the Arabs and with regard to Arab-American relations, Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad said: "I do not want to cherish any great hopes that American policy with regard to issues concerning us will change. What is needed is for us to change before demanding that America change its policy toward us."

On the other hand, the results of the American election were the focus of attention on the part of political circles in Kuwait. Many politicians and diplomats expressed their expectation that radical changes will occur in America's position in its foreign policy, especially its policy toward the Middle East and Iran. They feel that this will be true especially after the new president's landslide victory which will give him a great impetus to implement his campaign platform.

Concerning the Middle East question, some diplomatic sources have stated that Reagan may discard the Camp David agreements and try to create an alternative to them which is more favorable and partial to Israel, especially since American Jews voted for him.

Concerning Iran, political observers think that Reagan may demand that Iran free the hostages unconditionally, on the basis that negotiations between the two countries take place after this occurs. They said that Reagan is prepared to fight a war with Iran to free the hostages, and that the votes which he received from the majority of the American people will give him an impetus to carry out his policy.

The opinion which disagrees with this says that Reagan will be forced to continue within the same framework of current American policy, with no essential changes occurring, because America's strategy is one which is established and fixed, and does not change with changes in the presidency.

On another political level, Mr 'Awni (Battash), the head of the PLO office, said that the United States is the number one enemy of the hopes and aspirations of the Palestinian people. He said that in spite of what the Arab nation has given to humanity, America always insists on taking a hostile attitude toward it and on working toward fragmenting the Arab world in order to exploit its resources. He added that the Palestinian people, who have shouldered rifles to wage battle for the liberation of Palestinian soil, already knew in advance that, whether the election was won by Reagan or Carter, the winner would strive to annihilate and obliterate Palestine's national identity.

He said furthermore: "To all of those who are counting on America's policy, we say that this is not the thing that will benefit them. The thing that will benefit them is their cohesiveness and reliance, primarily, on their Arab nation and its masses and, secondarily, on their own capabilities."

9468
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KUWAIT

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN FIRST HALF OF YEAR OUTLINED

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 12 Oct 80 p 15

[Article: "Fifteen Percent Rise in Liquidity in First Half of Current Year; Increase in Foreign Financial Transactions Expected"]

[Text] A prominent economist said yesterday that the financial developments in Kuwait in the first half of 1980 continued to be influenced by two major factors: The level of the local economic activity, including the government spending, and the changes in the discount and exchange rates in the international monetary markets. Added to these two factors, to a lesser degree, are the political developments in the area.

In an article published by AL-IQTISADI AL-KUWAYTI [Kuwait Economist], a magazine published by the Kuwait Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Dr Ziyad Taqi says that the total liquidity available in the market in the first half of 1980 rose by nearly 15 percent (343 million dinars) compared to a rise of five percent (89 million dinars) in the corresponding period of 1979.

Interest [discount] rates in the local market dropped during the first half of 1980 below the rates prevailing in the international money markets.

Dr Taqi, who is the executive director of the Economic Research and Marketing Department of the Kuwait National Bank, has noted that there are three main factors that influence local liquidity, namely: The net government spending pumped into the local economy, the banking credits and the private sector's net transactions with the outside world.

Injection of 1.2 Billion Dinars

Taqi has said that the sum injected by the government during the first half of 1980 is estimated at 1.2 billion dinars, i.e. with an increase of 20 percent over the first half of 1979. Moreover, the government injected additional sums of liquid monies through the purchase of private sector stocks in the Kuwaiti Transportation Company and the stock of the United Arab Maritime Company offered to it.

Dr Taqi added that he expects the total government spending in 1980 to range from 2.7-3 billion dinars, taking into consideration an increase of 30 percent in the government spending estimated in accordance with the general budget for fiscal year 1980-81.

As for banking credit, it rose by 8.6 percent (181 million dinars) in the first half of 1980, compared to 16.6 percent (259 million dinars) in the first half of 1979. It is expected that 1980 will witness a change in the direction of increased foreign transactions.

Dr Taqi has also pointed out that the (balance of the existing assets of the commercial banks) amounted to 4,864,000,000 dinars by the end of June 1980, thus realizing an increase of 572 million dinars (13.3 percent) in the first half of 1980 compared to 450 million dinars (13.7 percent) in the first half of 1979.

Central Bank Policy

As for the monetary policy and the Central Bank's measures, Dr Taqi has said that the Central Bank has continued its efforts to regulate and control the money and credit level in the local economy.

Insofar as regulation is concerned, the Central Bank has introduced a new measure concerning liquidity that requires banks to maintain a certain percentage of their liquid assets in the form of interest-earning bonds issued by the Central Bank.

On the other hand, the Central Bank has continued, through jawboning, to urge the commercial banks to be more careful and cautious in giving credit for speculation purposes and to work gradually to reduce the rate of open drawing versus the rate of loans in the total credit facilities.

Moderate Liquidity

Dr Taqi has also said that the developments in the Kuwaiti monetary system in the second half of 1980 are proceeding in the direction of realizing a relatively moderate rate of liquidity in the market generally.

As for the particular conditions changing from day to day, they are influenced by two factors: The first is embodied in the volume and stability of the government spending pumped into the banking system, keeping in mind that the figures allocated in the budget show an increase of 30 percent over last year.

The second factor is embodied in the gap between the existing interest rates for the dinar on the one hand and the foreign currencies on the other. This gap will have its impact on the movement of capital from and into the banking system. The recent hike in interest rates paid for the dollar has caused the local interest rates for the dinar to rise. Unless the gap exceeds four to five percentage points, it is unlikely that there will be a massive outflow of capital to the outside world, as happened in the first quarter of 1980.

While the fiscal year is approaching its end, it is normal for the commercial banks to be more cautious in possessing assets in an attempt to reflect their budgets in their best form, paying special attention to the quality of these assets and the degree of their liquidity.

KUWAIT

NATIONAL OIL COMPANY ANNUAL REPORT PUBLISHED

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 27 Oct 80 p 17

[Article: "Annual Report of National Oil Company; Al-Mutayr: Record Profits and Sales in International Markets; 20 Million Tons Marketed Profits 122 Million Dinars"]

[Text] The Kuwaiti National Oil Company has issued its annual report for 1979. The report includes a word by Ahmad 'Abd-al-Husayn al-Mutayr, the chairman and appointed [al-muntadab] member of the Board of Directors, and a review of the company's prominent characteristics, activities in planning, projects, refining, marketing and maritime transportation, its manpower, subsidiary companies and finances, a review of the profit and loss account and explanations on the financial data concerning 1979.

Following is the text of the word of Ahmad al-Mutayr, the chairman of the Board of Directors, in which he discusses the company's total works and accomplishments last year:

The year 1979 was characterized by rapid changes in the world markets of refined oil derivatives. The demand for these products rose, thus causing their prices to rise considerably. In its capacity as a refining company, the Kuwaiti National Oil Company benefited from the constant supply of crude oil and from the operational flexibility characterizing al-Shu'aybah refinery. These factors put the company in a position which enabled it to respond to and benefit from these rapid changes. This is reflected in the excellent financial results realized during the year.

The international marketing sales reached a record figure of 19.7 million tons of various oil derivatives. The company was also able to enter new markets, in addition to maintaining its strong position in the traditional markets. As a result of the increase in the volume of international sales and of the considerable increase in the profit margin for refining operations, the company realized record figures in its profits resulting from its commercial transactions in the international markets--profits amounting to nearly 122 million dinars.

In the sphere of the refining industry, the efforts were focused throughout the year on improving the operational efficiency in order to increase the refined volume and to enhance the quality of the products. Nearly 186,000 barrels were refined in al-Shu'aybah refinery daily, with an increase of 11 percent over the preceding year. The company continued in its efforts to complete the process of

integration among the refineries operating in the country in order to realize the highest degree possible of operational flexibility by connecting the refineries with pipelines that enable them to exchange products and to perform the mixing and processing operations according to what the circumstances require. The company also continued to pay attention to curtailing pollution and to studying the means capable of reducing energy consumption in the processing operations.

Regarding the local marketing operations, the company continued to set up new filling stations in the various parts of the country to meet the increasing demand for oil derivatives. Benzene sales realized an increase of 12.4 percent over the preceding year. The sale of lubricant oils produced by the company in the oil mixing plant also realized a big increase amounting to 41 percent over the preceding year. One of the most important projects whose implementation was started in order to improve the services of the local marketing operations was the construction of the new central warehouse for oil derivatives which is expected to start operating by the end of 1980.

In the sphere of maritime transportation, the new tanker Bahrah has been added to the company's fleet, thus bringing the number of tankers owned by the company to three tankers. By the end of the year, a bid made by a shipbuilding company to build four more tankers for oil derivatives was approved, with an option for building two more tankers. It is expected that these tankers will be delivered in 1981 and the beginning of 1982.

The success achieved by the company in its various operations during the year was the result of the sincere efforts exerted by all the company's workers at all levels. Our many thanks and deep appreciation to all of them and to every official of the state ministries and official departments who has supported the company.

Prominent Features

Following are the company's prominent features: Net profits in 1979 rose from 29.5 to 156.5 million dinars. Sale revenues rose from 499 million to 1,057,000,000 dinars. The volume of international sales rose from 16.4 to 19.7 million tons. The volume of aircraft fuel sales rose from 385 to 454 million liters. The volume of local sales rose from 1,606,000,000 liters to 1,739,000,000 liters.

As for al-Shu'aybah refinery, the volume of the incoming crude rose from 167,000 barrels daily in 1978 to 186,000 barrels daily in 1979. The rate of incoming crude in 'Abdallah Port refinery rose from 81,000 barrels daily to 82,000 barrels daily. Finally, the number of the company's employees rose from 3,661 employees in 1978 to 3,987 employees in 1979.

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KUWAIT

BRIEFS

JAPANESE INVESTMENT -- Yesterday an agreement was signed to make a commercial paper loan to the paper manufacturing company "Daishowa," (Ltd.) which is one of Japan's well-known paper manufacturing companies. The issuance of these bonds is being administered by the Kuwaiti Trade, Contracting, and Foreign Investment Co., which signed the agreement in its corporate headquarters. The issuance of the bonds is being co-administered by the Sumitomo International Financing Co. The loan totals \$15 million and will be converted into Japanese yen, in the interests of the borrower, on the basis of a fixed rate set by the agreement. The loan matures 15 November 1987, and is guaranteed by Sumitomo Bank Ltd. The bonds bear a semi-annual interest rate of 8.7 percent, with an issue rate of 100 percent. At any time during or after 15 November 1984 the company may demand the return of either a portion or all of these bonds, but this will be on the basis of a fine which begins at a rate of 1.5 percent and is reduced 0.5 percent every year until maturity. The bonds are registered in the Luxembourg Stock Exchange. Joint administrators of the issuance of the loan are the Kuwaiti Investment Co., the Saudi National Commercial Bank, the Arab National Investment Bank, and the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas. The Japanese company will utilize this loan in order to finance part of its program for expenditures in Japan. [Text] [Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 12 Nov 80 p 15] 9468

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LEBANESE LEADER DISCUSSES U.S. VISIT, LEBANON SITUATION

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 24 Oct 80 pp 19-21

[Interview by AL-HAWADITH Washington Correspondent Muhammad 'Abd al-Mawla with Lebanese Leader Raymond Iddih: "Raymond Iddih to AL-HAWADITH: In Washington I Found That the Gulf's Oil is More Important Than Lebanon's Apples"]

[Excerpts] Raymond Iddih had postponed his visit to the U.S. twice before. The first time was when the Afghan crisis erupted following the Soviet military intervention there. Iddih concluded that officials in Washington would not be very interested in Lebanon at such a time. The second time was when American secretary of state Cyrus Vance resigned. He made it on the third attempt, but the American administration is busy with the election campaign. What Iddih might say to the Carter people could become irrelevant if Ronald Reagan were to win the elections. Nevertheless, talking to Raymond Iddih is important wherever he may be--especially, when he is visiting Washington.

When Raymond Iddih, the leader of the National Bloc Party in Lebanon, opened the door of his suite in a Washington hotel for me, he was carrying a book by Gibran Khalil Gibran and some typewritten papers. Before I could exchange greetings with him and ask him about his health and life in his temporary self-imposed exile in France, he said: "You came at the right time. Listen to what I was reading by the Lebanese philosopher-poet Gibran: [passage omitted]

Iddih: "These words apply to the Arab nation." "That's not my concern," he answered. "As far as I am concerned, they unfortunately apply to Lebanon." Before we got into an argument about whether the Arabs or the Lebanese were intended by Gibran's words, it suddenly occurred to me that Iddih was avoiding the issue which brought him to the U.S. in the first place. So I said: "Let's leave Gibran aside. There are more important issues which I would like to discuss with you. Tell me, please, about your talks with the Americans on the question of Lebanon."

Iddih did not want to talk about his visit to Washington and New York, but I interjected: "What else can we talk about?" So he said: "Americans on all levels are so preoccupied with the oil war in the Gulf that no one wants to bother about the apples in Lebanon. Oil is far more important than apples."

Iddih wishes that he had not come to the U.S. "Had I delayed my trip for two days," he said, "I would have postponed the trip as I had done three times before. I planned to come last October, but I put off the visit because of the problem of the hostages. Then I thought of coming last January, but the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan made me postpone the visit again. And last May, I had to postpone the visit yet a third time because of Vance's resignation and the appointment of Edmund Muskie later as the new secretary of state."

[Question] But would it not have been better if you had come earlier and become the first [Lebanese] to talk to the new secretary and offer your views on the Lebanese problem before he listened to someone else?

[Answer] Americans like to read about a problem first then listen to the views of others about it. Muskie needed to study the problem.

[Question] As long as we are talking about America, let me ask you this. You are known to have strong opinions and to hold on to them to the point of intransigence. This is why you have never been able to become president. Is it true that one word from you to the Americans could have gotten you the presidency?

[Answer] Let me answer your question by breaking it down into its historical elements. What you have said involves more than one question. First, you characterize my belief in my country as an act of intransigence. Let me ask you this: Have not events corroborated by fears and warnings which I've repeated until I've grown weary. I want you to know that my policy is based on certain principles whose ultimate aim is the protection of Lebanon's unity, territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty. This is a policy which I have maintained ever since I entered the chamber of deputies in 1953. I have often drawn attention to Israel's expansionist aims in southern Lebanon, namely, its intention to seize the Al-Litani river. I have badgered the various Lebanese governments to ask Syria to appoint an ambassador in Beirut and to have a Lebanese ambassador stationed in Damascus, as is common among all the Arab states. Syria and Jordan as well as Syria and Iraq exchange ambassadors. Iraq and Jordan are as close to Syria as is Lebanon. I have it on historical evidence that Syria wants to retrieve Tripoli, the 'Akkar region and Al-Biqa' from Lebanon."

Raymond Iddih adjusts his seat, then goes on: "In 1958, the aim of 'Abd al-Hamid al-Sarrat, who stirred up the events in Lebanon that year, was to make Lebanon the third star in the flag of the United Arab Republic. Lebanon is thus like Poland. Both of its neighbors want to carve it up. My aim, therefore, was to call attention to the dangers surrounding Lebanon. In 1964, when President 'Abd al-Nasir wanted to change the course of the tributaries of the River Jordan--that is Al-Hasbani, Al-Wazzani, Banias and Al-Yarmuk--I told President Charles Hili, who had just assumed the post of president, that the courses of Al-Hashani and Al-Wazzani cannot be changed unless Lebanon called for international forces to protect the utilization of the waters of Al-Hasbani. I insisted on using the term "water utilization" because Lebanon was entitled to utilize its waters, which it badly needed, and because the term water utilization had a greater impact on world opinion than the term "changing the course of a river." I also told President Hili that the waters of the Al-Wazzani river--which is an offshoot of the Al-Hasbani--should be left alone to flow into Lake Hulah, because Palestine had legitimate rights to Al-Wazzani. Israel today claims those rights. The Al-Hasbani river, on the other hand, is 100 percent Lebanese. Its source lies at a distance of 20 kilometers from the borders. Lebanon needs the waters of Al-Hasbani for drinking and irrigation.

"President Hilu did not pay attention to my remarks. In September 1965, operations to change the course of Al-Wazzani began. On the same day, a single Israeli warplane shelled the equipment and machinery despite the presence of Syrian tanks sent to protect the operation of changing the course of the river. That put an end to the myth of changing the course of the river Jordan."

Without pausing long enough for us to ask a question, he goes on in his usual nervous manner: "Israel wants to take Lebanon's waters. This is why it prevents any operation designed to utilize the waters of Al-Litani and Al-Hasbani. I was told that Israel has a special department concerned with Al-Litani river. I have not been able to verify this claim thus far. Therefore, how can I soften my positions and concede the rights of the Lebanese people to their land and waters? I am not asking for anything from anyone. All that I want is to satisfy my conscience as a deputy, that is as a representative of the people in the chamber of deputies. When I hold talks with foreign governments, I do so only in my capacity as a deputy."

[Question] What about the claim that you could have the presidency if you were to say the word?

[Answer] I am not an opportunist and I have never asked a foreign state to appoint me as president. This is not to say that I shirk responsibility or that I turn away from my duties. I am at the disposal of the Lebanese people. It is the Lebanese people alone who can determine whether I can serve them in any particular capacity. The Lebanese people can influence their representatives who choose the president, unless, of course, the president is appointed by the bayonets of others.

[Question] I heard it said that you are playing the same role De Gaulle had played after the fall of France in World War II. Is it really your ambition to be Lebanon's De Gaulle?

[Answer] If I could become another De Gaulle I wouldn't hesitate one minute. But for someone to play the role of De Gaulle, he should first be a "De Gaulle." I am one of 99 members in the Lebanese chamber of deputies. De Gaulle was able to play the historical role which he had played because he belonged to a people with a history of deep national loyalty--a people which had fought and paid dearly in lives in order to protect the borders of their country. In Lebanon, we have a different situation. For 37 years, the Lebanese state was incapable of making the Lebanese people cling to all the territories of the Lebanese republic. National loyalty means that every Lebanese should cling to his village or area. But if a resident of Kisrwan is asked whether Lebanon should give up the south to put an end to Israel's war against that area, he would probably say: Let's give up the south and be relieved. And if a southerner is told that he may have to go to war with a foreign country because it has designs on Akkar and Tripoli, his answer will be: Why don't we abandon those areas and put an end to our trouble. What I am driving at is that national loyalty has not permeated all the Lebanese whereby a southerner would fight in defense of the north and a son of Kisrwan would go to war in defense of the south. The French people fought twice for the sake of Alsace and Lorraine. The French people, especially the French settlers outside France, supported De Gaulle. When the Gaullists came to Lebanon and Syria in 1941 they did not hesitate to fight the Vichy authorities, and they defeated them. In this connection, I would like to say that not a single French soldier, either from the Vichy or the Gaullist forces, was allowed to loot or destroy civilian houses or factories in Lebanon. Not a single French soldier was allowed to plunder banks or cars or to attack the Lebanese police.

[Question] Raymond Iddih is harsh in his criticism of things and there are some Lebanese who suggest that you should form a third party which offers positive slogans. They accuse you of being a negative critic.

[Answer] As a deputy, it is my duty and right to criticize the rulers when they do not act in accord with the interests of the Lebanese people. They have the right to answer me and prove me wrong. It is my right and duty to criticize any minister who does not carry out his duties. But I have never allowed myself to be abusive against anyone, because it is not in my nature to be so. Political criticism of and attack on the conduct of rulers is one thing and personal abuse is something else. Yes, I have attacked the government. I have also criticized the president for approving the Cairo agreement without advising the cabinet or the chamber of deputies about its terms. It was my right and duty as a deputy to criticize the president there and to call on the chamber to reject that agreement which no other Arab state would accept for itself. When I and my party's deputies stood against the Cairo agreement, our stand was positive not negative. I had been calling for international forces since 1964. The positions which I had taken when it was decided to change the course of the Al-Hasbani river, when Israel attacked Beirut airport in late December 1968 (I was then a cabinet minister) and especially after the Israeli army's attack on southern Lebanon on 15 March 1978--all those positions are positive not negative. Time has proved how positive those positions were. Those who criticize me, be they deputies or ministers, should have the courage to tell the Lebanese people what positions they had taken on the question of the Cairo accord and the request for international forces. Those who have dragged Lebanon into the present disaster do not have the right to open their mouths and criticize those who have exposed themselves to danger in defense of the homeland's sovereignty. As for those who want me to form a third party, well, let me tell them that there is such a party, namely, the National Bloc. It is not a sectarian party, a fascist-Nazi party or a party which cooperates with Israel one day then cooperates with someone else another day. The National Bloc is a democratic party which believes in democratic freedoms, upholds the unity of Lebanon and its people and seeks peaceful coexistence among the sons of the same homeland.

[Question] Let's be realistic. A wise man has once said that it's not enough to tell the truth, one has also to live by it. You have spoken the truth about the problems of Lebanon. When do you become the man who would live by and for that truth?

For the first time in four hours of nonstop conversation, Mr Iddah looks quite sad and forlorn and heaves a long sigh.

[Answer] I do not believe that I can. Countries which have suffered the same kinds of tragedies [as Lebanon] were able to get rid of their usurpers only through a government in exile. Lebanese politicians are not likely to form any such government. (Karamanlis) stayed in exile for 11 years, but he was able to face the colonels who ruled Greece and to rally the people from his exile. At any rate, does a resident of Kisrawan today have freedom of political action when he is under the control of a single party? So what do you expect me to do with truth in such a situation? Ever since I left my country following the attempt on my life, I have dedicated myself to the goal of liberating my country. But I am still alone. My role is fraught with dangers and risks. Lebanese politicians do not like to court danger and take risks and would rather steer clear

of trouble and protect their own hide. It may be that I am not worried about protecting my own hide because I am single. If someone says, "Why then don't you go back home?", I will answer him that the reason is that I want to preserve my pride and dignity, that I do not want to satisfy, unnecessarily, those who had ordered the murder of Kamal Junblatt. It's not death that worries me, but torture. God rest the soul of the [late] owner of this magazine.

[Question] You say that Lebanon has been partitioned. Can this problem be solved through the advent of a historical man or through joint action?

[Answer] A historical man cannot emerge among a people who pay no attention to history or to their country in general, as I had mentioned earlier. A historical man cannot change things on his own and without help and support. Even De Gaulle, without help from the allies--that is America and Britain--and later from the Soviet Union, he would not have been able to liberate his country. Which power wants to help anyone liberate Lebanon today? Which Arab or foreign state--regardless of who the historical man may be--wants to liberate Lebanon at the present time?

[Question] You have said more than once that America has had a major role in the conspiracy against Lebanon. If so, are you now in America to ask the officials here to put an end to the conspiracy?

[Answer] I said that Kissinger's America--and not America per se--has carried out Moshe Dayan's policy, when it decided to partition Lebanon so that the Palestinians residing in Lebanon may settle in the Islamic part of the country, that is north of the Al-Litani river. Some of the American figures with whom I met admit Kissinger's mistakes. At any rate, President Sulayman Franjiyah has himself admitted that, although belatedly. In an interview with the weekly AL-JUMHUR AL-JADID of 4 May 1978, he stated that when he and Henry Kissinger met (in Riyad) before 1974, Kissinger "had just completed drawing up a plan designed to stir troubles in Lebanon and give the south to the Palestinians in implementation of Israel's masterplan." After his talks with Jimmy Carter in Geneva, Syrian president Hafiz al-Assad himself stated in an interview with AL-MUSTAQBAL on 25 June 1977, that America was determined at the time to undermine the Egyptian-Syrian solidarity which developed after the 1973 war. He added that "America then turned its attention to Lebanon to trigger the slaughter there. When the troubles erupted in Lebanon, a convergence occurred between the American and Soviet policies..." My charges against Kissinger do not prevent me from meeting with officials in the American administration today, especially since Kissinger is no longer in the State Department. Even if Reagan wins the elections, he will not ask Kissinger to take over the State Department. It may be that Kissinger felt that he would be serving his country's interests if he destroyed Lebanon and the Christian-Islamic coexistence in Lebanon and if he imposed [Palestinian] resettlement in the Islamic section of Lebanon. He may have believed that this is the best way to solve the Palestinian problem and consequently the problem of Israel's existence in the region, whereby America would then be spared trouble. But surely Kissinger must have realized that what he did in Cambodia was not in America's interest, that the partition of Cyprus did not solve the troubles and problems between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. He must have also realized that Lebanon cannot be legitimately partitioned because no state would recognize such a partition. A state that is not recognized by other nations will have the same status as that of Sa'd Haddad's state.

[Question] Do you think that America has a set policy in Lebanon whether Kissinger is in office or not. We know that the two mainstays of American policy in the region are: The encouragement of sectarian states, to justify Israel's existence as a theocracy, and the belief that the existence of Israel is in the strategic interests of the U.S. because it can be a barrier in the face of Soviet expansionism in the Middle East.

[Answer] I still hope that the American people, regardless of who the president is, will remain a democratic and freedom-loving people. The majority of the American people believe in God and will never allow Israel to destroy Lebanon because also believes in God. This little country, Lebanon, has given the world a model of coexistence. Israel is trying to destroy it today because Lebanon was a model of peaceful coexistence between two major religions--Christianity and Islam. I came to New York and Washington, and I will come again after the elections, because Lebanon needs to persuade the officials in America that it is in the interest of the American people to restore Lebanon as a country of coexistence and freedom. As for the premise that Israel is a barrier in the face of Soviet expansion in the region, I hope that America will come to realize soon that Israel has not prevented the Soviet Union from getting into the region and will not be able to play the role assigned to it, that is to prevent Communist intrusion into the Middle East. The events which have taken place in Lebanon because of Israel's ambitions and policies have opened the doors to Communism. As I have said 2 years ago, we may see another Cuba in the region.

[Question] You know quite well that the Soviet Union is a party to the problem of Lebanon--at least through many other parties. The Soviets can stand in the face of any possible solution by acting through those other parties. Given that, don't you think that you should also talk to them as you talk to the Americans?

[Answer] The Soviet Union is helping non-Lebanese parties against Lebanon. The arms that have poured into Lebanon are Soviet arms. This does not mean, however, that the Soviet Union cannot agree to the preservation of Lebanon as an independent and sovereign state within its given borders. But I am apprehensive about the recent agreement between Syria and the Soviet Union, for Syria may use its new ties with Moscow to reinforce its presence in Lebanon.

[Question] Many Arab parties are deeply involved in Lebanon. Why don't you go and talk to them?

[Answer] The Arab states were quite happy that Lebanon is the only war arena in the region. Therefore, I saw no need to persuade those states to come to Lebanon's aid. The fire, however, has begun to spread to the Arab countries. Of course, I do not wish for them to have the same fate of Lebanon, but I do hope that some Arab states lay aside their individualism and help Lebanon overcome the conspiracy against it. I also hope that those states are as real sisters to Lebanon instead of just paying lip service to the word "sister" in the press and in some communiques.

[Question] Finally, is there a message you would like to address to the Lebanese from Washington?

[Answer] I would like to reiterate to some of the Lebanese people the words of Gibran Khalil Gibran: "You have your Lebanon, I have mine. You have your Lebanon and its problems, I have my Lebanon and its beauty. You have your Lebanon and all its disputes and conflicts, and I have my Lebanon and all its dreams and aspirations."

MINISTER M'HAMED DOUIRI: ARABIZATION, 1981 EQUIPMENT PLAN

Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE in French 28 Nov 80 pp 1, 6

[Article: "M'Hamed Douiri Presents 1981 Equipment Plan"]

[Text] M'Hamed Douiri, minister of equipment and national development, in the course of a speech given at the beginning of the 15th century after the Hegira, announced a series of measures which he intends to apply in his ministry and reviewed actions undertaken, especially in the framework of the program of Arabization. The main points of his speech follow:

The Training of Technicians

No one is unaware of the importance which training of technicians should have in the development of a country which has played an important cultural role throughout history. Thus it is that we should work in order to provide our country with a national form of technology.

As I told you last year on a similar occasion, our ministry, which gives a role of primordial importance to the training of technicians, has established a "Directorate of Training." This directorate will be charged in particular with preparing training programs in terms of the need for each type and with developing scientific research.

Scientific and Technical Research

In the same way, in the course of the coming year, the ministry will establish an organism for scientific research as well as research laboratories in the areas of basic and applied works. These laboratories will be provided with the most modern equipment and will be administered by Moroccan engineers.

The ministry is presently undertaking, in collaboration with planning offices directed by Moroccan nationals, studies which should permit the initiation of new methods of public administration. These new methods should make it possible to define the policy to be followed in the matter of equipment and to identify the different persons responsible at the time of decisionmaking. In the same way they should contribute to optimize the return on investments.

Overall Port Plan

Considering the encouraging results obtained from the application of the overall road plan, a study has been undertaken regarding preparation of an overall port plan. In the same way a similar study concerning water problems will be undertaken in the next 5 years.

In the course of the coming year the ministry will publish a "flow board" which will make possible better control and follow-up of public works projects under way as well as an improved system for identification of needs.

Reform of Laws and Regulations Concerning the Civil Service

In the social affairs sector the Ministry of Equipment and National Development has proposed a revision of the laws and regulations applying to the civil service. While waiting for approval of these revisions studies will also be undertaken in the ministry to encourage promotion from within the civil service.

Further, a proposal has been made to reduce from 7 to 5 years the period necessary to obtain the civil service status for workers paid on a daily basis. In this way about 1,000 daily-paid workers will be accorded civil service status this year.

Regarding distribution of housing for civil servants, measures already undertaken have begun to produce results. In agreement with the Ministry of Housing and Territorial Management parcels of land and houses will be reserved for junior civil servants in the future programs of that ministry. The proposal made by our ministry, that is, to reserve 2 percent of the equipment budget for the construction of housing for civil servants, has been well received by the government.

The experiment undertaken by the Directorate of Hydraulics Affairs concerning vacation facilities will be extended to all directorates.

Priority for Transportation Pools

In order to ensure the availability of transportation to all civil servants, the ministry will develop a program for the purchase of vehicles for transportation and to lower the purchase price of privately-owned vehicles.

Restoration of Religious Practices

The social role of our ministry is not limited solely to the employees of the Ministry of Equipment but is applied to all state employees, particularly in the religious sphere. Our country must not continue to perpetuate habits inherited from colonialism but must regain its appearance as a country authentically Muslim in outlook. Whereas during the colonial period our children did not attend school on Fridays, they do so now. They should use this day to go to the mosques and develop their religious education.

Friday As a Weekly Holiday

Therefore, in accordance with the wishes of His Majesty King Hassan II, the prime minister has prepared a draft decree to make Friday into a weekly holiday.

Against Extension of Alcoholic Drinks

Further, regarding the extension of alcoholic drinks, which is becoming more and more general in our country and which is contrary to our religion, the prime minister, in accordance with the instructions of His Majesty King Hassan II, may God glorify him, has given instructions to put an end to this traffic.

No More Foreign Planning Offices

In the framework of its task of supervision of the construction and public works sector, the ministry is undertaking several actions at the government level to reactivate this sector. The ministry has ended its program of cooperation with foreign planning offices and will only enter into contracts with Moroccan planning offices and enterprises, with the exception of cases where a foreign enterprise is paying for the project, on condition that the work will be undertaken by Moroccan companies.

Officials for Moroccan Enterprises

Further, in order to permit Moroccan enterprises to have enough Moroccan staff, the ministry has decided to provide such enterprises with engineers and supervisory staff and to permit officials of the ministry with long experience to join the private sector.

No More Foreign Officials

Action will be taken to require private enterprises to recruit Moroccan employees, instead of relying on foreign employees.

Arabization of Correspondence

Since everyone knows the important role played by the program of arabization in the development of our country, within the ministry we have arabized all correspondence and converted stenographers who previously worked in French to working in Arabic. In the same way we are going to arabize procedures for letting of bids and entering into contracts.

To facilitate this work, the ministry has prepared a technical dictionary which will soon be distributed to the different government services.

New Equipment Policy

In accordance with the instructions of His Majesty King Hassan II, may God glorify him, equipment procured by our ministry will be carried out in a new way and with the aid of modern methods. Thus, we will distinguish between two kinds of equipment:

--equipment of an economic character

--equipment of a social character

The first type of equipment should permit our country to achieve its economic independence and to develop its international trade. I would like to give the following examples:

--regular communications between Europe and Africa across the Straits of Gibraltar, which will transform the region, both from the economic as well as the social point of view

--in accordance with the instructions of His Majesty the King the ministry will undertake studies for the construction of a new port near the Straits of Gibraltar to develop North-South trade.

--equipment for the Gharb plain involving construction of several dams, including the Mjara Dam, the M'dez Dam, the Ait Ayoub Dam, and the diversionary canal of Matmata. These should permit us to take care of the sugar needs of Morocco and to strengthen our independence in energy.

--equipment of fishing ports in order to contribute to the development of this sector. Thus, as from next year work will be undertaken in this direction for the ports of Nador, Jorf Lasfar, and Agadir.

Regarding social equipment, the ministry will reserve for itself an important role in these activities in the coming years. This will be done in order to improve the living condition of our citizens, to reduce regional disparities, and to open up isolated areas.

Roads

In terms of the road network the Ministry will take action in all regions of the Kingdom for the maintenance of the national road system. In order to develop regional commerce, the ministry, in collaboration with local authorities, will construct new roads to serve regional needs. To that end the ministry will provide the necessary technical assistance, will do the planning work, and will provide the construction equipment. The local government entities will provide the labor and the materials.

Ports

In terms of the ports, the effort to develop ports of a regional character will be continued. One might mention the construction of the port of Ras Kabdana; the renovation of the ports of M'diq, Jebha, Al Hoceima; and the provision of equipment to the ports of Nador, Safi, Agadir, Tantan, and Tarfay. A contract has been entered into for the construction of the port of Laayoune, and contracts for work at the ports of Sidi Ifni, Boujdour, and Dakhla are being prepared. As we may note, these ports will contribute to the economic growth of several regions of the Kingdom.

Drinking Water

Regarding research on water matters, an important program will be undertaken and substantial human and material resources will be provided for its implementation.

Furthermore, the ministry will undertake the construction of two important dams which will provide drinking water for the cities of Nador and Safi. A large dam to provide drinking water and to produce electrical energy will be constructed in the region of Al Hoceima. For the dam at Ait Chouarit on the Oued Lakhdar, the plans have been completed, and the construction work should begin shortly.

The ministry will compensate the owners of the land which will be flooded, will reestablish communications on all roads cut as a result of the construction of dams.

Major work will be undertaken for the provision of drinking water to the largest cities of the Kingdom.

For cities of lesser importance a substantial amount of money will be earmarked in the next 2 years to assure their supply of drinking water.

In the rural sector the ministry will undertake the drilling of wells at the request of local authorities, in the framework of the program of the "World Decade for Drinking Water" (1401-1410) [dates given in terms of the Muslim calendar]. These different actions should make it possible to assure every citizen of his supply of drinking water by the end of this decade.

National Development

Special attention will be given to the national development services to allow them to continue the important work done in the course of the last few years. Strengthening these services will give them all the resources necessary for national development, so that they can play an important role in economic development, particularly in terms of reduction of unemployment and assistance to other services within the ministry.

This work at the regional and local level takes the form of construction of roads, drilling of wells, reforestation for the protection of watersheds, and construction of a social character, including building mosques and homes. Further, His Majesty King Hassan II has given instructions for the program of national development to contribute to the opportunities for youth and its inclusion in national life.

All the projects which I have just mentioned are those which our ministry plans to carry out in the course of this first year in the 15th century after the Hegira.

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MOROCCO

BOUABID ON SAHARAN QUESTION

Rabat L'OPINION in French 7 Dec 80 p 3

[Interview with Maati Bouabid, prime minister and minister of justice, in early December in Paris, name of interviewer not given]

[Text] (Maghreb-Arab Press Agency)--During his visit to Paris where he presided on 1 and 2 December, on behalf of his Majesty King Hassan II over the "International Seminar on Al-Qods" organized by the Organization of the Islamic Conference, Maati Bouabid, prime minister and minister of justice, gave an interview to the new African daily appearing in Paris, LE CONTINENT.

In this interview, published Friday, Maati Bouabid reaffirms Morocco's position on the current tension in northwest Africa.

Returning to the subject of the just cause of the Moroccan people, the prime minister and minister of justice stresses that "Morocco will do everything possible to establish peace and avoid a fratricidal war" and that "Africa realizes this is not a limited conflict."

Herewith is the full next of this interview:

[Question] Mr Prime Minister, there are many rumors and speculations circulating now about the possibility of peace for the Sahara. Even the idea of a referendum has been advanced. What is Morocco's official position?

[Answer] Morocco has never hidden the fact that the northwest African conflict is a conflict between Morocco and Algeria. We have maintained and continue to maintain that POLISARIO is nothing but an armed group trained by Algeria, assisted by rear bases in Algerian territory. Without the help of this country, which has always wanted, by any means, to create a national awareness, POLISARIO would not exist. Secondly, in order to resolve the conflict, Morocco has always held the hand [of friendship] out to the main interested parties, that is to say, to Algeria. Up until recently, nothing pointed to any kind of rapprochement between Algeria and Morocco. Recently, there have been events which we consider important: the latest statement of President Chadli Bendjedid before the General Union

of Algerian Workers [UGTA], and the position taken on the radio program, "The People's Maghreb," which took up the ideas explained by his Majesty the King, in opening Parliament, on the Rabat-Algiers axis. This latter should be strengthened and assume its rightful place in international relations. Coming from a radio station that has been unceasingly critical of Morocco, this is a sign.

[Question] Is the idea of a referendum still alive? I am speaking theoretically, as, in its implementation, it would seem very difficult.

[Answer] I do not have any ideas to express on that subject, but I do have the impression that our Algerian brothers are favorably disposed. From all that I can deduce that there is an interesting heightening of awareness which will make it possible for us to break the impasse.

[Question] A certain attitude of increasing toughness by the political parties in Morocco has been noted in the face of what they are calling the "pacifist" stance of the government. How do you interpret this?

[Answer] Of which parties are you speaking?

[Question] I am thinking of the Istiqlal Party and the USFP [Socialist Union of Popular Forces].

[Answer] I do not have this impression. The army is carrying out its responsibility by defending our territorial integrity. Perhaps, at the diplomatic level, one could find some fault. The army, since the creation of the "Ouhoud" groups, is in complete control of the terrain. As for our "pacifism," I do not try to hide Morocco's preference for a peaceful solution. If we can avoid war, with its toll of blood and tears, then of course...

[Question] The Moroccan press makes much of certain economic problems. Morocco, it seems, would put the blame on the effects of the Sahara war, but are there other reasons?

[Answer] Economic crisis is presently wreaking its damages throughout the entire world. Unemployment and inflation are sparing neither the western countries nor those in the east. The most significant example--and your journal reflects this--is the case of Poland. The interdependence of economic problems is such that no one is spared. We are going through a difficult period, naturally, but our government is devising a series of measures which should strangle inflation.

[Question] The National Union of Moroccan Students has recently withdrawn from the Colloquium of Ifrane and criticized the laxity and delays of the government.

[Answer] Certainly the students have their point of view, they are leaders in the national unity. His Majesty the King has just presided over a national commission for education, commission responsible in fact for defining the profile of the Moroccan student of the year 2000. We are aware of the problems which education poses. We are studying them in depth, we attach extreme importance to youth, both the youth of today and that of tomorrow too.

[Question] There is also talk that the opposition parties may eventually participate in the government, following a ministerial shake-up.

[Answer] I read the press, the news, like everyone else, but there is always plenty of speculation. The changing of a ministerial team is not in itself a problem. His Majesty the King decides on a policy and on people who are able to implement that policy.

[Question] I return to the question which preoccupies all Moroccans: Are you confident about the Western Sahara problem?

[Answer] I think that what is important is not to be overwhelmed by events. We are cognizant of the justice of our cause, we are trying to explain it, to make it understood by our friends, but also by our enemies. Certain African countries are beginning to understand that we are not dealing with a limited problem, but rather with the consequences of a destabilization which is influencing the entire region. The implications of the conflict are striking Morocco today, but tomorrow will assuredly hit Mali, Niger, Gambia, and even Algeria. We remain calm, but we will defend our cause to the limit.

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PRIVILEGED RELATIONS BETWEEN MOROCCO-USSR

Rabat L'OPINION in French 7 Dec 80 p 2

[Article by Mustafa Nassiri]

[Text] Morocco and the USSR have recently signed an important contract relating to prospecting for the phosphate deposits in Meskala.

This contract, one of a series of accords reached between the two countries, illustrates the spirit which has always reigned in Moroccan-Soviet relations which, over the years, have clearly developed on the basis of mutually advantageous cooperation.

This contract for exploitation of the Meskala phosphate deposits is in fact a part of the framework of accords including such important ones as the fishing agreement or those providing for the delivery of citrus fruits and other Moroccan products to the Soviet Union.

Relations between Morocco and the Soviet Union, which incidentally go back a long way, are continually improving in the interests of both countries. The USSR holds a special place with Morocco, which has diversified and increased these exchanges.

Our country provides the Soviet internal market principally with agricultural products and phosphates. The USSR contributes to the development of Moroccan agriculture and agro-industry. This friendly country, with which Morocco cooperates on a solid and well-founded basis, remains a privileged partner able to participate in a goodly number of development projects.

The mobilization and exploitation of Morocco's national wealth, to which the USSR contributes, is illustrated by the series of important accords which our country has signed with the Soviet Union and which stretch out over long periods.

Morocco concluded its most important commercial accords with the USSR in 1975. The present contract, covering the prospecting of the Meskala phosphate deposits, which implements the above-mentioned accords, is testimony to the consistency of our policy with respect to our partners. It is proof of the determination on the Moroccan side, at the same time, to diversify its trade, and to maintain within a stable framework the relations which, over the years, it has established with the outside world.

BREZHNEV'S PERSIAN GULF PROPOSAL

Rabat L'OPINION in French 13 Dec 80 p 10

[Article by Ahmed El Fadili]

[Text] The proposal made Wednesday in New Delhi by the head of the soviet state and party before the Indian Parliament, calling for the reaching of an international accord on the security, or, more precisely, the "neutralization" of the Gulf region, has hit like a bombshell.

More perhaps than Brezhnev's promise the day before to recall his troops operating in Afghanistan "if the U.S. and Pakistan abstained from intervening in Afghan internal affairs, his "peace plan" for the Gulf has aroused the most excited and contradictory reactions both in Washington and also Brussels (NATO), Kuwait, Tehran, Cairo, etc...

The Soviet plan, which according to Mr Brezhnev would involve the United States, the other Western powers, China, Japan, and "all states concerned," recommends among other things:

--Not operating foreign military bases in the Gulf and in the islands of the region, and not installing nuclear arms or other weapons of mass extermination.

--Not using force or threats against the countries of the region and not interfering in their internal affairs.

--Respecting the nonaligned status of the states of the region and not enlisting them in military groupings in which the nuclear powers participate.

--Respecting the sovereign right of states in this region over their natural resources.

--Not creating obstacles or threats to commercial trade and the utilization of maritime communication routes which link this region to other countries in the world.

If, at first glance, they seem reasonable and in accordance with the fundamental interests and deep aspirations of the peoples of the region for peace, stability, and progress, these proposals should all the same be examined in depth and calmly, and fitted into the international context in which they originated.

Let us note, in fact, and right away, that this plan corresponds, in its broad lines to that proposed several months ago by Iraqi President Saddam Hussein in the context of his proposed inter-Arab charter. The difference is that the Iraqi proposal concerned the whole of the Arab nation whereas Mr Brezhnev's is restrictive and applies only to the Gulf region. But this difference becomes blurred when we bring to mind this fundamental truth: that in this day and age this kind of geographic delimitation no longer makes sense and what is happening in the most isolated spot on the planet can have serious repercussions on far distant countries with apparently no connection to the spot in question.

Another difference: whereas the Iraqi plan only concerns Arab countries and thus can be ratified and guaranteed only by the governments of these countries, the Soviet proposal by contrast would include not only the countries of the region but also all powers of any influence in the world. Which is, let us acknowledge it, an additional guarantee of both the effectiveness and the viability of such an accord if it were concluded.

Thus, just as we have forcefully and vigorously supported the proposed inter-Arab charter of Saddam Hussein, basically because it called for the "neutralization" of the Arab world by distancing it from the rivalry of the super-powers, we can only applaud the proposals of the Soviet leader to the extent that, as a high Kuwaiti official has underlined, they tend "to protect the Gulf and the Indian Ocean from international rivalry and from the presence of any foreign military base." But, if one looks a little more closely, one concludes--as emphasized above--that the circumstances in which these proposals have been made are by themselves sufficient to preclude any complacent optimism.

First of all, the fact that these remarks were made in New Delhi--seven years after Mr Brezhnev's first visit to India--could be interpreted as an attempt on the part of Moscow to calm the apprehensions of the Indian Government regarding the future evolution of the Afghan question and its possible fall-out on India; next, it could appear as a maneuver aimed at leading Mrs Gandhi's India--formerly allied with Moscow--back to the Soviet bosom to make a dent in the growing hostility of the countries of the region and especially of Pakistan and China to Moscow's Asia policy.

In the second place, these proposals are made at a time when the Afghan crisis is still unresolved, when anxiety--whether well-founded or not--is becoming more and more persistent with regard to a possible Soviet invasion of Poland, when the Iran-Iraq war continues to rage, when a conflict between Syria and Jordan was averted in the nick of time, and when, above all, a new governing team has just been elected in the United States, a team known to be scarcely disposed to conciliation with the USSR on a number of problems and, in particular, on those directly affecting the Gulf region...

All of these factors which should not be swept aside, or leave us indifferent, and which, in the final analysis, even if looking at the spirit of the proposals can arouse only optimism, must not for all that make us forget the deep antagonism which has existed for 63 years between the USSR and the United States and which could well be at the origin of such honeyed and comforting words, especially when they concern as sensitive and explosive a region as the Gulf.

SPANISH PRESIDENT VISITS MOROCCAN COLONIES OF SEBTA, MELLILIA

Rabat L'OPINION in French 7 Dec pp 1-2

[Editorial by Mohamed Idrissi Kaitouni]

[Text] The president of the Spanish Government has just made a two-day visit to two occupied Moroccan cities: Sebta and Mellilia.

It is not our intention to discourse on the juridical and historical arguments which demonstrate in an irrefutable fashion the Moroccan character of these two cities which remain under colonial occupation, for their Moroccanness is recognized by the international community as a whole, and no one--except for those who insist on trying to turn back history--denies that these two cities are Moroccan and should be freed from the colonial yoke in order to be re-integrated with the motherland.

The question posed is thus what were the reasons for this visit, which observers judged inopportune and a gratuitous provocation.

It is evident that political calculations and electoral designs motivated the decision of the Spanish prime minister to go to Sebta and Mellilia. But for all that, did he calculate the gravity of such an action and its repercussions on the friendly relations which the two neighboring countries are trying to establish in the interests of peace in the region and of bilateral cooperation? Mr Suarez is hardly unaware of the fact that the Moroccan people, who made the most epochal Green March in contemporary history, have never renounced [their claim to] the Moroccanness of Sebta and Mellilia and their recovery. Morocco, which has always supported the peaceful solution of international differences, has on numerous occasions reiterated the Moroccan character of these two cities and invited Spain to engage in direct talks leading to their decolonization and re-attachment to Morocco.

The occupation of Sebta and Mellilia was considered by Morocco as an after-effect of the colonial era which should disappear with the advent of democracy in Spain. The return of these two Moroccan cities was inscribed in the program for the process of liberation undertaken to consolidate our territorial unity, and on this point the Moroccan people are unanimous and categorical, for in matters of territorial integrity and national sovereignty there can be no question of making any concessions.

The fact that Morocco has opted for dialogue does not mean that it has abjured its rights or accepts seeing a part of its national soil remain under foreign occupation.

Just as the Spanish people are attached to the Spanishness of Gibraltar and demand its liberation, so the Moroccan people are determined to recover their two plundered cities in order to put the past behind them and open up new perspectives in Moroccan-Spanish cooperation.

Our two countries which control the access route to the Mediterranean and which will be called in the near future to serve as a linkage point between Africa and Europe, by virtue of the fixed link that will be established across the Strait of Gibraltar, are inevitably forced to reach understanding and to live in a climate of neighborliness, amity, and mutual respect.

For this, they must settle all the differences still pending, and especially those inherited from the colonial epoch and in the first place the occupation of Sebta and Mellilia.

It is thus the duty of the Spanish Government to take no action of a nature to upset the good relations between the two countries and to avoid any step which could create a climate of tension in the region and compromise the future of Moroccan-Spanish amity.

Also, the visit of the chief of the Spanish Government to Sebta and Mellilia is nothing but a provocation and an act prejudicial to the amity which links our two countries. But in any case, this visit will in no way alter the position of the Moroccan people or the historical facts and our indefeasible rights over our two usurped cities.

Sebta and Mellilia are two Moroccan cities and they will remain so, and it is in the interest of both the Moroccan and Spanish peoples to settle this difference in a spirit of understanding and sincerity, for after all the return of these two cities to the motherland is inevitable.

9516
CSO: 4400

EDITORIAL ON TINDOUF VISITS BY FOREIGN DIGNITARIES

Casablanca AL BAYANE in French 13 Dec 80 p 1

[Editorial: "A Significant Sympathy"]

[Text] The "pilgrimages" to Algiers and Tindouf continue one after another, as well as the incongruous arguments in support of the anti-Moroccan view. But their authors are no longer the same ...

Recently, it was a delegation of the French RPR [Rally for the Republic] which met with a "SDAR [Saharan Democratic Arab Republic] minister." The delegation was also eager to recall that since 1975 Mr Jacques Chirac, who was prime minister at the time, had stated that he was in favor of "the self-determination of the Saharan people."

As for Mr Andrew Young, the eternal traveling salesman for American diplomacy and a close associate of outgoing President Jimmy Carter, he was anxious to affirm that the establishment of a "Saharan state" would be "a factor of peace and stability in the region."

These are significant positions, since they are certainly evidence of the interest which certain forces have in the emergence of an artificial entity, a very obvious prey for imperialist appetites.

For whatever anyone may say, neither Mr Young nor the RPR, no more than the Spanish UCD [Democratic Center Union] or Mr Solarz, are the representatives of progressive ideas or forces .

We must therefore wonder about the sympathy--which is not so recent as some would have others believe--that these circles have for the mercenaries of the POLISARIO Front. Actually, these questionable convergences definitely confirm the well-founded nature of the view which endeavors to demonstrate that, beyond cursory stereotypes and cliches, the Moroccan people's struggle to recover and subsequently to preserve their territorial integrity runs counter to the long-term interests of international reactionary and imperialist sectors.

it is legitimately conceivable that imperialism actually needs a focus of tension in the Maghreb, permitting it to take action on behalf of either side, to prevent the achievement of Maghrebian unity and to divert the peoples of that region from the principal fight against the cunning and dangerous enemy.

Obviously, the mobilization of these important representatives in support of the POLISARIO Front--which Mr Young (an expert in this area?) generously describes as a "national liberation movement"--is in keeping with such a political objective as much as economic expectations (establishing a mini phosphate-mining state in the service of multinational corporations opposed to Morocco).

There is no need to remind anyone, therefore, that these significant demonstrations strengthen our determination to defend our territorial integrity and reunification at all costs.

Other Maghrebian forces should understand once and for all that they are playing the game of the common enemy by persisting in refusing to acknowledge the validity and correctness of the recovery by our country and by our people of their provinces which were formerly separated and plundered by colonialism.

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CSO: 4400

TRANSPORTATION WORKERS STRIKE TO PROTEST UMT ACTION

Casablanca LIBERATION in French 12-18 Dec 80 p 7

[Text] More than 3,400 RATC [Casablanca Independent Transport System] Casablanca Independent Transportation System workers went on strike on Thursday morning, 11 December 1980, to protest the cowardly attack on the militant Moulay Idriss Aazaf. In point of fact, the latter, a member of the trade union executive committee and a workers' representative, was savagely attacked inside the administration building on Wednesday evening while in the process of going to pick up a summons to appear before the disciplinary council. This attempted assassination was carried out by a fascist gang prompted by the UMT's [Moroccan Labor Union] bureaucratic apparatus and supported by the RATC's central administration.

That criminal act is part of a terrorist campaign launched by the UMT to force RATC workers to go on a so-called strike in "sympathy" with railroad workers. But faced with the determination of the workers, the bureaucratic apparatus resorted to this fascist method to impose its unilateral arbitrary decisions.

The gang attacked the militant Moulay Idriss, inflicting serious abdominal injuries, after which he was hospitalized in a Casablanca clinic. News of this attack was received with indignation by all RATC workers and CDT [Democratic Labor Confederation] militants and has resulted in a protest strike, after which local authorities and the RATC administration have pledged to bring the criminals to justice, to repeal the arbitrary decisions concerning dismissals and suspensions, to respect trade union links and to open a responsible dialog concerning the list of demands of the workers as soon as possible. Trade union officials have also declared that the workers will continue their strike if these promises are not kept within a 48-hour period. Finally, the executive committee has sent a telegram of protest to the respective authorities.

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BRIEFS

ARREST OF OPPOSITION LEADER--Abderrahman Benameur, a member of the USFP [Socialist Union of Popular Forces] National Administrative Committee, regional secretary of Rabat-Sale, a member of the National Office of the Moroccan Human Rights Association, former bar association president and a member of the Rabat Municipal Council, was arrested in his office on Wednesday, 10 December. At the time of this writing, no explanation has been given concerning this arrest. Neither administrative nor legal authorities have stated the reason for this action, which has created a climate of discontent among USFP militants and the attorneys' organization to which Comrade Benameur belongs. We vigorously protest this arrest, particularly since it has occurred at a time when the entire world is celebrating international Human Rights Day. [Text] [Casablanca LIBERATION in French 12-18 Dec 80 p 11] 11915

CSO: 4400

BA'TH OFFICIAL EXPLAINS MERGER WITH LIBYA

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 8 Oct 80 p 21

[Interview With Ba'th Party National Command Member Muhammad Haydar by Khalil al-Taqi]

[Text] On 10 September, the political commands of Syria and Libya announced a historic decision to unify the two countries in all respects and to establish a single state with a single leadership and executive authority. The resolution said that the leaders of both countries would meet within a month from that date to draw up the executive decisions and measures for the merger.

This union poses several questions as to the form of the single state, its name, capital, army, the future of existing forces in both Syria and Libya, and the union's relations with other states and forces in light of present relations between both these countries and these other states and forces.

AL-QABAS presented 15 questions to Syrian Ba'th Party National Command Member Muhammad Haydar, chief of the foreign relations office, who in more than one previous cabinet had held the post of deputy prime minister for economic affairs. The following dialog took place.

[Question] The Syrian system of government is a parliamentary presidency, while there are popular committees in Libya. How can the two systems be reconciled?

[Answer] During the unification meeting held by Syria and Libya, there were some basic facts with which this meeting started and which were finally agreed on. By mentioning and clarifying these facts, this question and many others can be answered.

The first basic fact with which this meeting began was unifying the Syrian and Libyan political leaderships into a single political command which will be required to lead this unified state in specific directions--a democratic orientation, a socialist orientation, a struggling orientation (in the sense of being a militant union), and a progressive orientation in the international policy context, in the sense of being oriented towards the people's camp, towards the establishment of advanced relations with the states of the Socialist camp, and towards a greater role among the non-aligned nations and the Third World.

These democratic and socialist orientations have domestic manifestations--manifestations which exist now and are the legacy of being separate countries. By these I mean the way democracy and the socialist transformation have been applied in Libya and in Syria; the methodology of this application may not coincide, but it is oriented in the same direction. This political command has to study the applications in force in both Libya and Syria, and has to democratically unify these experiments as the unification of organizations in both countries progresses.

In another sense, it is not possible, and is not permissible, for us to begin from scratch in discussing the points of difference between these two experiments. What we have to look for now are the points of congruity. As for those points where there might be differences in details, this is a task for the organizations of the union, which will have to deal with these difficulties as if they were difficulties within a single country.

Therefore, I want to stress that any difficulties, or any differing work methods in any existing organization in the separate countries, must not impose themselves on the unified state. Furthermore, these difficulties must not lead to our terminating the union because we are unable to overcome them. Rather, we, or more precisely, the unified political and constitutional organizations within the union, have to find all the ways of solving them.

Of all the difficulties which we might mention, we can begin with the differences in how democracy is practiced. We in Syria practice democracy on the basis of constitutional organizations, popular organizations, and professional unions. In Libya, they practice democracy, and get the citizenry to participate in deciding their general affairs, through popular congresses and revolutionary committees. It has been agreed that these differing methods will continue in their present form in both countries, and that there will be dialog within the constitutional and political organizations of both countries to take measures to confirm the situation and experiment most suitable for each country.

The Role of the Ba'th Party

[Question] What will be the Ba'th Party's role in the new union?

[Answer] This point has also been discussed and agreed on. It was decided that the revolutionary forces which brought about the union are the ones basically interested in the continuation of this union, and therefore these forces will always be responsible for protecting this union. The revolutionary forces which brought about the union, or which adopted the resolution realizing this unity, are the Ba'th Party in Syria and the 1 September Revolution Command in Libya, which consists of the Revolution Command Council and the political and organizational frameworks which can be considered an extension of the Revolution Command Council, such as the revolutionary committees and other bodies in Libya.

Therefore, two political unification forces have come together. Creating and perpetuating the confluence and its role will serve to protect and develop the union. This is a lesson learned from previous unification experiments, because any union which is incompatible with the forces which created it weakens

itself from Day One. This is what happened with the 1958 United Arab Republic, for the union which was established was incompatible with the forces which fashioned it. This is not the case now, for the union rests on the shoulders of the forces which made it, and these forces have to protect and strengthen it.

The State Presidency

[Question] What will the presidency be like in the union, in which the people will have the power, as the historic Tripoli unity declaration stressed?

[Answer] The Libyan and Syrian political leaderships have now become a single political leadership. Therefore, the single leadership is a collective one, which in the beginning stage will create the organizations needed to manage the state and to enable the citizens to express their wishes on this subject. At that time, the matter will be left up to the people, to practice their right to choose the president of the state and the higher state organizations in such a manner as to express themselves.

As I see it now, in the first stage all the organizations will practice political leadership by themselves until they settle down and begin formulating the organizational means for the people to play their role in choosing the authorities.

At that time, in light of this agreed-upon method, the people will choose. But in any case, the Libyan and Syrian revolutionary forces, which as I have mentioned are represented by the Ba'th Party in Syria and the 1 September Revolution Command in Libya, will remain. This is the vital, instigating idea of the state--its political and ideological concept.

The Capital and the Army

[Question] Where will the capital of the new union be located?

[Answer] As far as I know, they did not go into all these details because there wasn't enough time, and because there was no real need for these details as long as it had been agreed that the supreme command of this state would decide this and other questions.

[Question] What will the form and command of this union's army be?

[Answer] There will be a single army, the shape to be determined by the organization responsible for commanding it. This army, the army of the integrated, unified state, will be the concern of all the organizations. There will be a single economy, a single foreign policy, and a single educational policy; the union must be integrated and merged.

[Question] Will the union permit the transfer of arms from Libya or combat units from Syria?

[Answer] This army will have a single command which will administer it according to the need to protect the state and the country, as well as the need to ensure national well-being through national defense of the homeland.

Once this state is established, there will be no such thing as the Libyan army or the Syrian army, or Libyan arms or Syrian arms. There will be the Arab army, unified in weapons, material, men and leadership.

[Question] Will the name of the new union be the United Arab Republic, or the United Arab Jamahiriyyah, or has another name been suggested?

[Answer] As far as I know, this matter has not been discussed. It is not a matter for disagreement in any case.

[Question] What will happen to cooperation with the Soviets in the new union, especially since Syria signed a friendship and cooperation treaty with the Soviet Union?

[Answer] I have already mentioned that there will be a single foreign policy orientation for both countries, as was agreed to in the Tripoli statement. The foreign policy orientation will be unified with respect to this matter.

Once the union is established, there will be a single orientation in this respect, which, naturally, will take the direction of strengthening, consolidating and reinforcing relations with the socialist camp, with the friendly Soviet Union at the head of the list.

The Union's Role in Africa

[Question] It is well-known that Libya is providing Africa with military aid—combatants, arms, and material. What will the Syrian role be?

[Answer] There will be no Syrian role in Africa once the union is established, nor will there be a Libyan role. The new Arab state will have a unified role, to be drawn up by the pertinent leaders of the union according to the well-being of the Arab world and this state.

Naturally, if the leaders of this state ask any military unit of the unified Arab army to fight anywhere in the world, it will do so. And if this state's leadership wants to undertake any activity anywhere in the world and chooses any soldier for this purpose, no matter where he was born in the union, this soldier will be at the disposal of the state leadership. No other party will be able to make such a decision except the state leadership itself.

[Question] Libya is supporting Ethiopia, while Syria has firm relations with the Eritrean revolution. How can the two stands be reconciled?

[Answer] As we see it, there is no dispute here between us and our Libyan brothers. That is, we both support the Eritrean revolution, and, once the political conditions in Ethiopia are changed, we both want to strengthen the progressive situation in Ethiopia. We want to find the common denominators of Ethiopia and the Eritrean revolution, so that this two-decade-old problem can be solved peacefully in such a way that our Eritrean brothers can achieve their national identity and can totally cooperate with world progress, the progressive camp, and the popular camp.

We believe that the new political circumstances in Ethiopia have become conducive to finding such a solution. We are making every effort, on our part, for the sake of this solution.

[Question] Can one find a peaceful solution which is not at the expense of the Eritrean revolution?

[Answer] Yes, there can be a solution which is not at the expense of the Eritrean revolution. As soon as there is a just solution guaranteeing the Eritrean people's interest in achieving their national identity on the one hand and perpetrating the alliance with all the forces of the world-wide revolution against imperialism on the other hand, this will bring about the well-being of the Eritrean people.

In any case, the current stands are separatist stands, since their parts are mutually contradictory in some respects. This will also be solved through the union, because there will be a single source of all decision-making for the union. At that time, there will be no different stands between the parts of the state—the stand will be one.

[Question] Does that mean that the map of relations with world revolutionary movements will change?

[Answer] I don't think that there are any contradictory international stands now, even with respect to liberation movements. I don't think that there is any major incompatibility. In the various components of these issues there might be some differences, but in general, even if we start with the separate stands now in existence, we find that we in Syria and our Libyan brothers are now almost in agreement in our general stands on international political issues and on relations with world liberation movements and the socialist countries.

The Palestinian Revolution

[Question] Syria strongly supports the Palestinian revolution and has firm relations with Fatah, while Libya disagrees with Fatah and supports the popular committees which have split from Fatah.

[Answer] I believe that this issue between our Libyan brothers and Fatah has also been solved and has not reappeared. There was a small crisis, which in my estimation was solved. There was also an earlier crisis between Syria and the Palestinian resistance, even between Fatah itself and Syria.

In the context of the coming together of Arab progressive forces, we feel that there is no room for permanent hostilities or explosions. Some small disputes might occur, but the will of the Arab nation, especially these progressive forces, to stand fast can overcome all sensitivities. I believe that current Libyan-Palestinian revolution relations are also good. This union will strengthen these relations between the union and the Palestinian revolution, as has been confirmed by the leaders of the Palestinian revolution itself.

The Steadfastness Front

[Question] Will the new union embrace the other parties to the national steadfastness front?

[Answer] This new state has declared from the start, from its very birth, that it is open to all Arabs who accept its principles and want to join it. Naturally, the Arabs most closely attached to this state will be the ones most ready to respond, and this is as it should be.

This state invites all the steadfastness front parties, as well as all Arab countries, to join it. This state is not an axis on the Arab scene, nor is it a factor which will divide, rend or fragment the Arab world. Rather, it will be a nucleus for complete Arab unity, as resolved by the Tripoli charter. It will be a factor of cohesiveness, a factor which will strengthen and reinforce the unified Arab stand, starting from the ground floor--steadfastness in the face of the enemy, a desire for liberation, and a will to build a future in which social justice will prevail—a future in which economic and political oppression of all our Arab masses will be eliminated, so that they can realize their identity and share in building Arab civilization.

[Question] Were Syrian-Iraqi relations discussed at the Tripoli meetings?

[Answer] Not as far as I know. I think the Tripoli meetings dealt specifically with establishing the union, not with discussing relations between either part of this state and other countries.

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DECENTRALIZATION OF CERTAIN ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS

Damascus TISHRIN in Arabic 7 Nov 80 p 3

[Article by Elias Khuri]

[Text] There is a trend in most modern administrations in the world toward adopting a new system of administration. This system is based on reducing, as much as possible, centralized authority; that is, not limiting this authority to one body - the cabinet, or one area - the capital. This is based on several bases and principles confirmed by experience, which state that such centralization of authority sometimes reflects in a negative way on the administration, project implementation and respond to the citizens' needs in other cities and areas. In most cases, bureaucracy spreads and relations between the central and local administrations become so routine as to obstruct work and the provision of citizen demands and the solutions to their problems. For example, a branch administration cannot decide or implement anything related to any project before contacting the central administration and getting its approval--if it approves.

This shows us the importance of the new measures taken by the prime minister and which stipulate the transfer of certain cabinet functions to local authorities in governorates; that is, to governors. These measures also transfer all responsibilities for economic, foreign trade, education, services and all other citizen-related matters to these local administrative units. This only leaves central authorities with the responsibilities of supervision of planning, legislation, organization, development and the execution of big projects which the administrative units cannot handle.

We are not exaggerating when we say that these are some of the most important measures that this leadership has taken for this country during the past phase, especially after the 7th National Party conference. These measures strengthened the bases of the national democratic regime and developed the role of local councils and branch administrations, as well as facilitating projects, responding to the citizens' needs and developing their realities.

Of course, this new experiment is not a simple one; it needs great efforts, qualified personnel, flexibility in work and ability to organize and implement. When these conditions are available, the realization of the principle of transferring central authorities to the governors and administrative units will substantially help push our country's developmental operation forward.

ALEPPO TO GET MORE WATER FROM EUPHRATES RIVER

Damascus TISHRIN in Arabic 19 Nov 80 p 3

[Article: "Third Project to Draw Euphrates Water to Aleppo; Project Studies Based on Population Growth Projections"]

[Text] The third project to draw Euphrates River water to Aleppo is one of the vital and enormous projects being implemented in our country in view of its importance to the second largest city in the country and in view of the volume of its works and costs. According to the preliminary estimates, these costs amount to 367 million Syrian pounds. It suffices to know that the current project will supply the city of Aleppo and the villages along its course with 220,000 cubic meters of water daily, i.e. 40,000 cubic meters more than what the city gets from the two previous projects.

This project has come as the result of numerous studies based on the population growth projects and the expectations of construction and industrial expansion in the city and its suburbs. The project also takes into consideration supplying sufficient quantities of water to the industrial zones and installations, to the nearby suburbs and to the villages located near the project's canal until the year 1995.

Because of the importance, the project has received attention from all the officials and from the higher authorities. A supervision and followup committee has been formed for the project under the chairmanship of the governor and with the director of the Water Authority, the director of housing and the director of technical affairs at the Water Authority as members. This committee has been given adequate powers to expedite implementation of the project and to overcome all the obstacles facing its completion. Moreover, the necessary financing has been secured from the surplus realized by the Aleppo Water Authority and from the Public Debt Fund. The remaining part has been secured in the form of loans from international funds. The date 1 February 1978 has been considered the starting point for the implementation of this project which is to be completed at the beginning of 1982 and to go into operation in the same year.

Studies

In view of the vastness and importance of the project, international establishments have conducted the technical and economic studies to select the best and ideal

solution [sic] for the project. As for the detailed studies, they are conducted by the Aleppo Public Water Authority in participation with a number of professors from Aleppo University and with only two foreign experts.

Project Description

Water will be pumped from the Euphrates River by the groups of pumps installed in the main drawing plant [on the Euphrates] through pipes to the nearby water treatment plant where the water undergoes initial treatment with (aluminum sulphates), chlorine and lime. The water is treated initially by being passed through rapid sand filters. It is then pumped by the groups of pumps installed in the treatment plant through a pipeline to the top of the draw canal consisting of cement pipes and siphons through which the water passes by gravitation to the purification plant in Aleppo where the water is treated for a second time in the same way it is treated in the initial treatment plant. It is then treated with chlorine again and purified by having nitrogen gas passed through it. The water is then pumped by the pumps existing in the purification plant to the main storage tanks and propulsion [al-daf'] lines and from there to the high storage tanks and balance lines to secure water for the city's elevated areas. The water then flows into the city's main distribution line which extends along the main streets and then to the pipes that carry water to the houses around the network.

Project Sections and Completion Rate

1. Pumping plants: These include the pumps on the main drawing point and in the second and third water treatment plants.

Insofar as the equipment in the main intake point on the Euphrates River is concerned, this equipment is comprised of three groups of pumps with a daily pumping capacity of 220,000 cubic meters. These groups were installed in the designated site and tested by the end of 1979.

As for the second plant--the purification plant located near the main intake point on the Euphrates River--a contract for its civil works, including a hall for the plant's engines and their attachments, has been awarded to a local contractor who has already started his work and who is to complete it at the outset of 1981. A contract has also been concluded with a foreign firm to supply and install the equipment in 16 months, beginning with the first half of 1980. This equipment includes pumps and generators adequate to pump 220,000 cubic meters daily. The third plant is the purification plant in Aleppo. The plant's civil works have been entrusted to the Military Housing Authority which has started the work that is expected to be completed at the beginning of 1981. This work includes a hall for the engines and their attachments. A contract has been concluded with a foreign firm to supply and install the equipment, consisting of pumps and generators with the capacity to pump 130,000 cubic meters daily, in a period of 16 months beginning with the first half of 1980. This work is expected to be completed in 1981.

2. Treatment [purification] plants: The civil works for these plants include the construction of the filters and the sedimentation basins in the second plant on the Euphrates River and the filtration and purification installations in the third plant in Aleppo. Work is currently underway to prepare the main dossier for these

works after agreement with the company supplying the equipment [sic]. The arrangements for concluding the contract concerning these works with the Military Housing Authority have been made. The supervision committee has empowered the Water Authority to conclude the said contract.

As for the equipment, a contract has been concluded with a French firm to supply and install filtration, sedimentation and chemical purification equipment. The firm was given the instructions to start the work, which will take 20 months, last November.

3. Propulsion [al-daf'] lines: These consist of metal pipes with diameters ranging from 1,000 to 1,250 millimeters. These pipes are to be installed in stages between the following sections: The intake point and the treatment plant, between the treatment plant and the top of the canal and between the purification plant and the ground reservoirs.

Between intake point and top of canal: The distance between the intake point and top of the canal, passing through the treatment plant, is 21.5 kilometers. A contract for supplying the necessary metal piping has been concluded and the piping has been supplied. A contract was also concluded for the excavation and installation works covering a 12.5 kilometer part of the pipeline on 13 March 1980. This part is expected to be completed by the end of this year.

A contract for the remaining part of 9 kilometers will be concluded later. An old pipeline with a length of 7 kilometers and a diameter of 1,000 millimeters has also been replaced.

The propulsion lines between the purification plant and the ground reservoirs with a length of 8 kilometers: A contract for the excavation and installation works has been concluded. The work has started on 14 October 1980 and is to last six months. A contract has also been concluded with a foreign firm to supply the metal piping needed.

4. Draw canal: This section calls for the construction of a 76 kilometer long canal with reinforced cement, 12.5 kilometers of which consist of siphons with a pressure of 4.5 kilograms per square centimeter. The canal's diameter amounts to 2,000 millimeters and the canal has various depths ranging from 3-16 meters and allows the free flow of water.

To construct this canal, an international invitation for bids was advertised and the contract was finally accorded to the Military Housing Authority. A contract was concluded with this authority on 10 April 1979 to complete the work in 32 months.

To carry out this contract, the Military Housing Organization imported a special plant for the production of prefabricated piping. The plant was constructed and went into operation on 27 August 1980.

The plant is proceeding well and the piping produced by the plant is installed in the excavated sections. It is expected that the canal will be completed on schedule in the last month of 1981.

5. Distribution network: The network consists of metal pipes with diameters ranging from 80-600 millimeters to convey water to the new development areas in the city according to the city's expansion.

A contract to supply the piping necessary for the network has been concluded and the necessary excavation works have been awarded to local contractors. The first part of the project has been completed. Work on the second part has started and will last one year, ending in 1981--keeping in mind that the network's construction is periodic and is carried out in response to the citizens' requests and according to the constant construction development.

6. Reservoirs: This work calls for the construction of four ground reservoirs with a total capacity of 300,000 cubic meters, including one reservoir in al-Haydariyah area and three reservoirs in the university area. This is in addition to an overhead reservoirs with a capacity of 600 cubic meters to supply water to the elevated areas.

7. Command center: It consists of electric cutoff centers in the treatment and purification plants, an automatic control center in Aleppo and a telephone network that links all of the authority's sections.

Work in the cutoff centers has been completed and the centers are now ready. Studies are currently underway on offers to build the command center for the automatic control of water flow within the purification plant in Aleppo.

8. Warehouses and workers' housing: A warehouse has been built in the Aleppo purification plant for the storage of spareparts and chemicals.

9. Technical consultation and training: The study to link the third project with the previous projects is ready. This study was prepared by technical elements in the Aleppo Water Authority in cooperation with professors from Aleppo University and two foreign experts. Technical elements comprised of engineers and technical assistants have been trained by the firms supplying the equipment for the third project so that these engineers and assistants may take over their tasks of operating this equipment. A number of chemists have been trained by the French (Lemoj) Establishment.

10. Replacement of old equipment: This replacement has been required by the fact that the first project to draw the Euphrates River water started in 1955 and the fact that nearly 25 years have passed since the installation of the project's equipment, pumps and generators. This equipment has thus undergone a lot of repair and maintenance work and has become so old as to cause a drop in the project's theoretical production capacity of 90,000 cubic meters daily.

Observations on Progress Work

From the information that we have been able to gather from the people in charge of the work, it has become evident to us that work in most parts of the project is proceeding according to the set plan and that the Water Authority is maintaining constant followup on the implementation in the hope that the project will be completed on schedule before the summer of 1982 so that the city may not face a water crisis.

However, there are sections in the project where the work is moving slowly and where more manpower is needed to enable these sections to keep up pace with the other parts of the project so that the project may be completed on time.

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